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INTRODUCTION
The task of writing a contemporary history is sur­
rounded by more than the ordinary difficulties common to 
any scholarly effort. Scarcely a month passes without 
the publication of letters, memoirs, biographies or other 
evidence which may supplement or refute what has previously 
been accepted as fact. Also political shifts--a presi­
dential election campaign, a war or domestic economic 
unrest--often alter perspectives as to the wisdom of past 
policies.
The twentieth century historian in writing on the 
causes of recent wars has enjoyed one advantage. In 
earlier times, the archives or repositories of belliger­
ent nations have been closed to non-official readers 
for a period of forty to eighty years after cessation 
of hostilities.^ This was not the case, however, after 
World War I, yet the historian, during the first years, 
had access to only a limited and edited amount of infor^ 
mation. A radical change occurred after I92O when many 
of the national archives of the erstwhile belligerent 
powers were opened to scholars. It was inevitable that 
a drastic revision of judgments reached during the war 
would follow the publication of so much new evidence.
^Harry E. Barnes, History and Social Intelligence 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I926), p. 22?.
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Historians who had written without reserve during and 
immediately after the war saw themselves confronted 
with the need of revising their own Judgments or having 
others do the Job for them.
A case in point was the American historian during 
and after World War I. Prior to the American entry in 
1917, public opinion in the United States was divided. 
The declaration of war, however, forced the consensus 
of the American people along one line with one ultimate 
goal, the complete defeat of the Central Powers. To 
assure an united home front, the government set out 
through the use of propaganda and censorship to mold 
dissident groups into a conforming public amenable to 
the successful prosecution of the war.
Propagandizing by official and private agencies in 
the United States, to say nothing of the innumerable 
pressures exerted upon the public mind from without 
the country, was probably a necessary evil accompanying 
the war, but the vicious hatreds and prejudices engen­
dered by that device made the task of contemporary his­
torians, particularly those writing on the origins of 
the war while hostilities were in progress, doubly 
difficult. In the frenzied atmosphere of war, scholars 
were frequently caught up in the mass hysteria and made 
concrete observations without the advantage of essential 
perspectives. The publication of the secret documentary 
evidence bearing on the war's beginnings confronted them
3
with the need for revision of the wartime verdict of 
responsibility. The label of "revisionism" has been 
applied to the work of the historians who challenged 
the wartime Interpretation of responsibility for World 
War I, but. In a broader sense, all historians are re­
visionists .
A study of the writings of American scholars on 
the question of the origins of the war logically must 
be divided Into two broad phases. The first Includes 
works written while the authors were subject to wartime 
pressures, propaganda and a marked shortage of substantial 
evidence and roughly spans the years 191I1-I92O. The 
second phase, the revisionist period beginning about 1920, 
followed the unprecedented openings of national archives 
after the war and witnessed an Increasing acceptance In 
America and the world at large of the revisionist posi­
tion on the origins of the war.
CHAPTER I
INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE, I91I1-I92O
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed 
June 28, 1919, reads as follows:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm 
and Germany accepts, the responsibility of her­
self and her allies for causing all the loss and 
damage to which Allied and Associated Governments 
and their nationals have been subjected as a con­
sequence of the war imposed upon them by the 
aggression of Germany and her allies.
This is the famous or infamous "war guilt" clause
upon which were based the Allied demands for reparations
and which, by implication, sanctioned the entire treaty.
It was generally assumed in the United States and in
other Entente nations that Germany, by her acquiescence
in such an indictment, admitted her guilt and ended
for all time the debate over the responsibility for
precipitating World War I. Nothing could have been further
from the case. On the contrary, neither the German
nation nor a great body of historians, variously called
revisionists or debunkers, was ready to accept the
signing as final proof of Germany’s guilt.
In 1919, however, Germany had no choice except to
subscribe to a verdict in which she had no faith. The
German people as a whole were certain that they had not
willed the war. German diplomats and statesmen, while
recognizing certain omissions and blunders, likewise
4
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were not conscious of having charted a course which 
aimed at war. The German signature on the Treaty of 
Versailles hence could only be involuntary— extorted 
at the point of a bayonet. It was inevitable that Ger­
many from the first advocated a closer examination of 
the evidence, convinced that the verdict was open to 
modification.
American historians generally were ready to accept 
and defend the judgment of the Allies. Wartime emotions 
and the lack of evidence to the contrary made them 
susceptible to interpretations which in retrospect seem 
crude and infantile. It is necessary to examine the 
climate and bounds within which the historian moved.
By 191^, historical scholarship generally had 
attained a high degree of impartiality. Patriotic senti­
ments the world over had been subordinated to a desire 
to tell the truth. Then came the World War, and history 
was set back, in psychological temper, to the generation 
before Ranke. Historians of repute in all nations were 
guilty of succumbing to the popular ardor sweeping the 
world. It was in the United States, however, that the 
largest number of eminent scholars "broke loose from 
their intellectual moorings and outdid Bancroft in 
enthusiasm.
^Harry E. Barnes, A History of Historical Writing 
(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 193#), P. 279*
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That the student of history may become affected by 
biases arising from religion, race, nationality, partisan 
zeal or economic attachments is a generalization which 
might be applied to the historiography of any period but 
which is even more true during periods of international 
tension. After the decision of the United States govern­
ment to enter the war in 1^17, the American historian 
was more than ever apt to succumb to any or all of these 
pitfalls in his search for the truth. Furthermore, it 
goes without saying that even the most scholarly histor­
ian is likely to become group-conditioned, a fact which 
was illustrated graphically by the behavior of American 
historians and pseudo-historians during the war years. 
Many of these, #10 had shown remarkable poise in handling 
such controversial subjects as the American Revolution 
or the Civil War, showed now that they had not the 
courage to oppose public opinion and rode a crest of 
popularity by reiterating what was being said on street 
corners across the nation. In the frenzied atmosphere 
of American neutrality and particularly after the entry 
of the United States into the war, authors were caught 
up in the mass hysteria brought on by the dissemination 
of propaganda and made their Interpretations without 
the advantage of an objective perspective.
History when you are in the midst of it is 
always nearly Intolerable to the sensitive. It 
is only when a period is over and everything has 
been burned away that we can stand it. That is 
because we see the form and direction, and at the
same time, we do not know what it was like to
live in it.
At the outset, there can be little doubt that 
United States public opinion generally favored the 
Entente in the European war. If the press can be con­
sidered an accurate reflection of American consensus, 
and in this case, it probably can, the American people 
overwhelmingly favored the Allies, A  nation-wide survey 
of editors in 191^ showed 367 pro-Ally and only 20 
in favor of the Central Powers.^ In 191^» President 
Wilson’s public utterances were models of neutrality, 
although he was privately "heart and soul for the 
Allies,"^ His pleas for neutrality in both thought and 
deed were a difficult, if not an impossible, achieve­
ment to attain given the circumstances. While their 
sympathies were with the Allies, the vast majority 
of Americans nevertheless hoped that their country 
might remain aloof from the European conflict. As late 
as 1916, President Wilson received a mandate from the 
people to continue his policy which had "kept us out 
of war," The ardent wish for neutrality expressed widely 
in the United States stemmed probably from two sources,
^Harold Lavine and James Weschler, War Propaganda 
and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1940), p, ix.
^Harvey Wish, Contemporary America (New York:
Harpers & Bros,, 1955)> P • 190*
^H*C, Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), P» I90.
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the traditional position in regard to European disputes 
and the official stand taken by the President.
One segment of American society, however, was vocal 
in its partiality toward the Entente powers--the acade­
micians, whose number was relatively small but whose 
influence was great. Into this group, the intelligentsia, 
would fall the most influencial of American historians. 
Probably representative of the historical profession in 
1914 was Dr. Roscoe Thayer who replied to President 
Wilson's plea for neutrality in an extremely unneutral 
fashion:
Only a moral eunuch could be neutral in the 
sense implied by the malefic dictum of the Presi­
dent of the United States...I have noticed in 
this crisis that the men who boasted of being 
impartial were either pro-German, or they had no 
hearts to beat faster although the fate of man­
kind hung in the balance.^
That Thayer's sentiments represented those of the 
majority of the American historical profession is in­
dicated by his election, despite the protests of 
Professors Ferdinand Schevill of Chicago and Henry A.
Sill of Cornell, as president of the American Histor­
ical Association shortly before the declaration of war 
on Germany.
Besides pressures from within the country, the war­
time historian had to contend with propaganda emanating 
from each of the opposing European camps. Although Ger-
^C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historian Cut Loose,"
The American Mercury. XI, No. l+Ij. (August, I927), ^17»
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many invested millions of dollars In a propaganda 
campaign to induce the United States to consider the 
attributes of remaining neutral, the British propaganda 
machine far overshadowed anything the Germans could 
muster. The English "war of words" was propaganda in the 
broadest sense of the word. News, money and political 
pressure each played a part in the battle which was 
fought not only in London, Washington and New York, but 
also in classrooms and pulpits throughout the United 
States. The campaign was so designed that American pas­
sions and emotions would become involved to an extent that 
neutrality would become a virtual impossibility.^
Toward attaining this objective, the Allies had a 
tremendous advantage over the Central Powers. Count von 
Bernstorff, German ambassador to the United States during 
the years of neutrality, once said that the Anglo-Saxon 
heritage and language barrier were two factors with which 
the German propagandists were never able to cope. In 
addition to these two very powerful advantages, the English 
were able to take advantage of the German example of 
how not to conduct their campaign. Realizing the immense 
value of the written and spoken word, the German govern­
ment established its official propaganda headquarters 
in New York City. They committed nearly every possible 
blunder. They were far too open with their operations-- 
too negligent of tact and finesse. In short, the Germans
^Peterson, p. I|_.
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were never able to gauge public opinion; they were always 
logical but never psychological,? and their efforts back­
fired and ultimately seriously damaged their cause. What 
the Germans did not understand was that the effectiveness 
of propaganda depends upon the expert munipulation of 
genuine sympathies, not on bribery. More than anything 
else, their campaign was compromised from the outset since 
there were few sympathies with which they could work save 
those of the Irish and German-Americans.
Serving as an additional obstacle with which the 
German propagandists had to grapple before they could 
hope to attain any degree of success was the fact that 
prior to the war, few American newspapers had had 
correspondents in Europe. As a result, Americans 
were forced to rely almost exclusively upon British 
journalists for their news of Europe, and that news 
was unavoidably colored by the British attitude. The 
more Anglicized the news the historian read, the more 
certain appeared the veracity of the incomplete docu­
ments on hand. The German activity in Belgium, as 
reported by the Anglo-American press, seemed to bear 
out the most insidious of the Entente charges.
As if the American people were not already getting 
more than enough of the British point of view in their 
daily news diet, the Royal Navy, on August 5» 191^, cut
?George Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New ______ u-e i
York: H. Liveright & Co’., I930T, p. II6.
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the cable between the United States and Germany. Now, 
with the perfection of the wireless still a matter of 
months in the future, American newspapers were com­
pletely dependent upon English newsgatherers, and the 
American historian did not get even his occasional dis­
patch out of Germany to temper the pro-Entente news 
releases. The cutting of the cable came at a time when 
public opinion in the United States was crystallizing, 
and the Germans were never able to catch up. When normal 
communications between this country and Germany were re­
stored, it did little to affect public opinion. "The 
first publication is that which is formative of pub­
lic opinion and affects public emotion."®
The efforts of the few correspondents who were in 
Europe representing American newspapers proved to be 
of little avail in trying to present "the other side 
of the story" since most of their copy passed through 
the British mail censors. Associated Press correspon­
dent Schreiner estimated that three-fourths of the dis­
patches written by American newspaper and magazine 
correspondents were "perishing under the shears of 
English censors."^
The above represented only the negative steps 
taken by the British government pursuant to the first
®Peterson, p. I4.6.
^Walter Millis, The Road to War, America, 191^- 
1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935)> P* l47.
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positive step in September, I91I4. In that month, the 
War Propaganda Bureau was established in a London 
edifice known as Wellington House, the name by which 
the organization has since been popularly known. Sir 
Gilbert Parker was placed in charge of the subdivision 
directing propaganda in the United States, and he pro­
ceeded to take up where Shakespeare, Chaucer and Byron 
had left off. Wellington House, which existed con­
currently with numerous other quasi-official and 
independent propaganda agencies, busily engaged itself 
in the dissemination of literature in the United States. 
Ironically enough, many of the publications which re­
ceived wide circulation in America at the behest of the 
British propaganda machine were the very ones which 
the American Historical Review recommended to its 
subscribers as being of such "character as to deserve
the student's attention.
Allied propagandists fashioned their appeal to all 
classes, but of prime importance were the intellectuals. 
With this respected segment of the populace adhering to 
the Allied cause, the British hoped others would follow. 
In the final analysis, the English plans called for 
American recruits to do the actual field work in the 
United States, and it was for this reason that the
^^Am^rican Historical Review, XX, No, 2 (January, 
1915)» 4^2. This comment was made in reference to a 
list of early publications purporting to relate the 
origins of the war including Why We Are at War by members 
of the Oxford faculty of modern history. See below.
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historian, journalist and politician was each subjected 
to an extra measure of British pressure. Although the 
written word was a powerful weapon In the British cam­
paign to sew the American literati firmly to the Allied 
camp. It was not the only device resorted to by the 
masters of propaganda. Both the English and French 
entertained American men of Influence regally In their 
respective countries, the British soon outstripping 
their continental cohorts. American newspapermen and 
Interpreters of the European scene were wined and dined 
In the best of English tradition.
Most United States citizens Invited abroad by 
Wellington House were admittedly lukewarm supporters 
of the Entente when they left New York City. When they 
returned from their all-expense paid sojourns, during 
which they were treated to "proof" of German atrocities 
In the form of Allled-gulded tours of the Belgian 
battlegrounds, they were violently pro-Entente. By the 
end of 1915, all but a small portion of the nation's men 
of letters had been successfully recruited to the Allied 
camp. Strangely enough, many of these very men had 
earlier recognized Allied propaganda for what It was-- 
a force to be reckoned wlth--and repeatedly announced 
that they would not be swayed by the English and French 
efforts. It may be coincidental, but those who Initially 
had borne the brunt of the Allied propagandizing efforts 
were those who first fell victim to the psychological
14
trap.11
How the British obtained the names of prominent 
Americans at whom their propaganda might be most profit­
ably directed would make an Interesting study In Itself. 
After his appointment as director of the American 
branch of Wellington House, Sir Gilbert Parker proceeded 
to carefully analyse American public opinion through 
newspapers and periodicals. On the basis of his study 
and through a discriminate use of Who’s Who, Parker 
was able to compile a mailing llst.^^ It was these men 
who, knowingly or not, kept the British Informed as 
to the course of American public opinion so that they 
were always aware just how far their government might 
go In violation of American neutral rights before 
Invoking the wrath of the people. Clearly, this was a 
facet of propaganda to which German psychologists 
had given little thought.
Some of the best ammunition for Wellington House 
came from the pens of American writers. There Is, however, 
little evidence to support a charge of widespread collusion 
between American authors and British propagandists. A 
more suitable explanation for the similarity between 
the wartime writing In the United States and the 
official line of Wellington House Is the American
ÜQ. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought (New York:
The Vanguard Press, I929), p. 62.
^^Davld Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. , 1933)> ÏÏ1 113.
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cultural heritage which compelled writers in this 
country to emulate their British colleagues. The two 
exceptions where the British actually underwrote the 
expenses incurred in the dissemination of works by 
Americans were James M. Beck’s The Evidence in the 
Case and The American Verdict on the War by Samuel 
H. C h u r c h . 13 While these were the only two examples 
of open Anglo-American literary cooperation, there 
can be little doubt that Parker and company welcomed 
the prolific output by a whole "school" of American 
historians and would-be historians who insisted on 
delving into the causes of the war before adequate 
documentary evidence was available to tell the whole 
story. It might be mentioned that the American Histor­
ical Review cited Beck’s book as one of the better 
secondary sources on the background of the war and 
condoned the 1915 position of the ex-United States 
Attorney General with the comment, "Enough documentary 
evidence is available to make a judgment permissible, 
even to the historian.
The immediate purpose of the intensive British 
propaganda campaign was to create an atmosphere 
compatible with the allocation of United States economic
ISJames D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and 
in the United States, IÇlIpJlçib (Cambridge; Harvard 
University Press, 1935), p^ 16'.
^^American Historical Review. XX, No. 3 (April,
1915), 694-95.
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aid. The ultimate objective, of course, was that the 
economic aid would be followed by men and machines of 
war. To accomplish both the short and long run objectives, 
it was mandatory that an ordinary power conflict appear as 
a life and death struggle between good and evil. Beyond 
this, the Allied "mission" must be made to appear synony­
mous to that of the United States. Since the interests of 
Great Britain and America--the salvation of the world 
for democracy--were ostensibly identical, was it not 
natural that they should be members of the same team 
at Armageddon? To those who subscribed to the English 
"mission" line, the presence of Russia, the most 
autocratic of all European nations, on the team must 
have led to no end of uneasiness. Still, Russia was 
a Christian nation, and to the near-sighted individuals 
propounding the "Holy War" myth, her adherence to the 
Entente could be reconciled.
By culling from the writings of the "Prussian 
School" of historians, notably Traitschke and Droysen, 
Allied propagandists, supplemented by the works of 
American historians, were able to convince the American 
masses that Germany perpetrated the war in the inter­
est of Prussian autocracy and was prosecuting it with 
a calculated brutality. The speech differences between 
the United States and Germany and the clannishness of 
German-Americans were played to the hilt in an effort 
to convince the American public that the German nation
17
inherently stood against everything held dear by citizens 
of the free world.
The ’’Holy War” or ’’crusade to save the world for 
democracy” line was particularly appealing to Protestant 
ministers of the Gospel, and they proved to be an 
excellent media through which the seeds of racism were 
sown among the masses. President Wilson also proved 
highly susceptible to the ’’righteous" cause preached 
by the progenitors of the holy war line.^^ The propa­
gandist, be he British or an unwitting tool of the 
British in the guise of an American scholar, aimed
directly at emotion since, in the final analysis, emo-
17tion is the common denominator of all propaganda.
Always opportunistic, the British propaganda 
machine directed its efforts along two additional 
lines. By effective use of the legalistic appeal, 
always attractive in the United States, many Americans 
were convinced that since Germany had broken the law 
when she invaded neutral Belgium, she must be punished, 
and it was the place of the United States as one of the 
guardians of international law to participate in the 
administration of justice. Another objective for which the 
British propagandists strove in the early months of the war 
was the creation of an atmosphere of confidence regarding
Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchen and the Wilson War 
Policies (Boston; Little, Brown & Co., I927), p. 121.
l?Squires, p. 38.
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an eventual Allied victory. Such a belief was basic 
to the success of the overall British plan since it was 
unlikely that the United States would invest either 
economically or militarily in a losing cause.
By all odds, the most notable achievement of the 
early efforts of Wellington House in the United States 
was the general acceptance of the myth of sole German 
war guilt. Despite the fact that the fable was exploded 
by serious historians in the 1920's, American education 
has been seriously blighted by the earlier interpreta­
tion until the present day. It was not only the American 
public that fell victim to the British assertion but also 
the great majority of American historians. The British 
cry of guilty was echoed by Americans in all walks of 
life until the verdict was accepted as fact. There was 
little the Germans could offer in rebuttal.
To the host of American historians writing in I914, 
the Sarajevo incident came like a deluge. ’’BangJ went 
Principes pistol...and bangJ went all the professors.”
By the end of July, the historians were firing. By the 
end of August, they were in "violent e r r u p t i o n . T h e  
few American historians who kept their intellectual 
equilibrium such as Professors Sill of Cornell, Schevill 
and Thompson of Chicago, and Sheperd of Columbia were 
denounced as "intellectual traitors."^9
l^Grattan, The American Mercury, XI, No. 1|15*
l^Barnes, A History of.... p. 279*
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Beginning with German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s 
unfortunate slip of the tongue in referring to the 
treaty guaranteeing Belgian territorial integrity as 
a ’’scrap of paper” and continuing throughout the war, 
German actions, as portrayed by historians and journal­
ists alike, seemed to bear out the guilty indictment.
As George Viereck so aptly put it, ’’World War I began 
with a ’scrap of paper’ and ended with a million scraps
of paper.”^0
It is impossible in a paper dealing primarily 
with historical interpretation to examine minutely 
the expert techniques employed by British propagandists 
to seduce the American public into the Entente camp. 
Suffice to say that the British used all of the propa­
ganda gimicks then known to man and added a few of their 
own such as the fabrication of pictorial evidence.
President Wilson, like his countrymen, was in­
fluenced by the atrocity stories out of Belgium. This
was particularly true after the circulation of the
PIfamous Bryce Report. Of all living Englishmen, Viscount 
James Bryce, the de Tocqueville of the twentieth century, 
was perhaps the most trusted by the President and the 
academicians. When Bryce sponsored the fabrications,
^^Viereck, p. 22.
21Report of the Committee on Alleged German Out­
rages Appointed by His Majesty’s Government and Presided 
over by Lord Bryce (Cd. 789^-95) London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1915*
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there could be little doubt in the veracity of the charges 
against the Germans, and the Report was received as gospel 
in 191s.22
While excesses such as those listed in the Bryce 
Report undoubtedly existed in varying degrees, "every 
scrap of evidence serves to exonerate the German army 
of the c h a r g e s , "23 indeed, the record of the German 
soldiers in Belgium was amazingly clean. On September 
3, 1914* five American newspapermen who accompanied 
the invading German armies in Belgium dispatched the 
following message to the Associated Press;
In spirit CofJ fairness we unite in declaring 
German atrocities groundless as far as we were 
able to observe... unable to report single instance 
unprovoked reprisal...Discipline German soldiers 
excellent. No drunkeness...To truth these state­
ments we pledge professional personal w o r d . 4
By the time of the Sussex incident in I916, the
American public, for the most part, was convinced that
all that had been said about the "Huns" was true, and
a veritable war hysteria swept the nation. With the
"rape" of Belgium, Allied propagandists had begun a
hate campaign, and the harvest of their efforts was
now about to be reaped. If it did not prove the pen
was mightier than the sword, it at least showed it
could be a powerful supplement to it.
22vsfillard Waller (ed.). War in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Random House, 19lfO), p. 39.
23Lavine and Weschler, p. 2?.
24lbid., p. 27.
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Besides being subjected to a general feeling of 
hostility toward the Central Powers and innumerable 
psychological pressures exerted from without the nation 
which he might consciously or unconsciously allow to 
color his narrative, the American historian exploring the 
war guilt problem faced yet another obstacle in his quest 
for the truth— a decided paucity of reliable information.
To what could the scholar, particularly the far-removed 
American historian of 191^-1920, look if he wished to assess 
the relative responsibility for precipitating the war.
He could investigate the diplomatic dispatches and con­
ventions to which the various European states were sig­
natory after the Franco-Prussian War. What the American 
historian did not know in 19^4> however, was that the 
"open covenant" with which President Wilson was later so 
preoccupied had not been held in particularly high esteem 
by any of the European powers after I87I. If the American 
historian had had all available documentary evidence at 
his fingertips, which, incidentally, few of them did, he 
could still do no better than approximate the truth. If 
he wished to ply his trade objectively in searching for the 
causes of the war, he would have to refrain from inter­
preting the evidence until it was all in.
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, 
the American Historical Review quite properly warned its 
subscribers to beware of any publication purporting to 
relate the history of the war's origins before it was
22
humanly possible to do so. The position of the Journal 
would have been defensible had it stopped there, but it 
did not. In succeeding issues, the Review recommended 
certain collections of documents and secondary sources 
which, because of their character or the standing of their 
authors, deserved the scholar’s attention. That the 
standing of an author has very little to do with the 
veracity of a particular work written expressly for the 
purpose of substantiating the righteousness of his nation’s 
actions before the public of the world’s largest neutral 
can hardly be debated. Witness Why We Are at War^^ or 
the work of Lord Bryce.
As for the collections of government documents, the 
Historical Review recommended the British Blue Book,^^ 
the first of the so-called colored books, in which was 
published only what the British government felt was fit 
for neutral and domestic consumption. If what the 
American Historical Review recommended to its sub­
scribers can be taken as an index of what American 
historians were subjected to as reliable sources in 
the early war years, it is small wonder that few German 
apologists could be found among American scholars before 
1920. The truth was that the British Blue Book, no more
Z^Members of the Oxford faculty of Modern History.
Why We Are at War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, igi^. See below.
^°Great Britain and the European Crisis, Correspon­
dence, and Statements in Parliament, together with an 
Introductory Narrative of Events. London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 191^.
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than the early official statements of the other belliger­
ents, offered much in the way of concrete evidence. It 
was somewhat less than complete and carefully edited.
Only in the third decade of this century, after revolu­
tions had shaken several of the erstwhile belligerent 
governments, were the archives opened to historians. It 
was then evident how much had been omitted in the early 
official papers. If any account of the origins of the 
war written before I919 at the very earliest had even 
a close approximation to the truth, it was only because 
of the superior guessing power of the historian, not 
because he held superior documentary evidence.
It might be contended that undue attention has 
been accorded Allied propaganda in a study devoted 
primarily to historical interpretation. The charge 
that propaganda has not been given the place it deserves 
in allocating the reasons which prompted American action 
in 1917, however, is probably valid. If it can be 
assumed that Allied propaganda played a part in the 
ultimate American decision to go to war, it is equally 
certain that the psychological weapons utilized by 
England in her war of words exercised a profound influ­
ence upon American historians then publishing. The barb 
fact is that British propaganda showed the way, and 
many American historians of the period 191^-1920 
obediently followed.
What emanated from the typewriters of American
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scholars during the war years bearing on the origins of 
the war, particularly after I9I7 when writers were 
subjected to pressures of George Creel's Committee 
of Public Information, could as well have been spoken 
or written in England or France. Despite the President's 
plea for neutrality, the literati little more than 
echoed the extremely unneutral sentiments of British 
and French scholars. This is Justification enough for 
a discussion of British propaganda techniques and their 
effect in a study devoted to the investigation and 
comparison of two phases of American historical writing. 
The literary output of the period 1914-1920, historically 
speaking, overwhelmingly favored the Entente. This can 
be explained in part by the scarcity of reliable infor­
mation, but it does not excuse the vindictiveness and 
malice with which most American historians writing on 
the origins of the war approached the problem of respon­
sibility.
After the United States entry, that vindictiveness 
became even more apparent than it had theretofore been. 
With the declaration of war came the need for mobiliza­
tion both militarily and intellectually. In I917, the 
American historical profession submitted itself almost 
unanimously to the "high" uses of the Creel Committee. 
Leadership in preparing the invective against Germany 
came from professional historians Thayer, Chevalier Hazen, 
William S. Davis, Munroe Smith, A. Bushnell Hart and
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Bernadette E, Schmitt, all of whose services were enlisted 
by the National Security League, a propagandistic sub­
sidiary of the CPI. In addition, a list of occasional 
contributors to the "Red, White and Blue" series would 
Include such illustrious scholars as: Beard, Barnes, 
Becker, Corwin, Pay and West. Their contribution to the 
war effort was "one of the most stupendous jobs of popular 
scholarship that this country has ever seen."^?
Unsatisfied with the already heavily biased out­
put by the historians, George Creel and James T. Shotwell, 
professor of history at Columbia University, collectively
conceived a National Board for History Service to line
28up historians for the Allied cause. Conformity of 
thought was to be the by-word; when Professors John W. 
Burgess and William M. Sloane pleaded for consideration 
of the German case, they were labeled suspect by their 
colleagues.
For their meritorious service on behalf of the 
Entente, American historians were rewarded handsomely. 
Hazen was delegated by Creel to edit German sources 
upon which the wartime historians leaned heavily to 
substantiate their theses. The standard American high 
school text on European history was Hazen's, and the 
ideas he propounded there were later expanded and embodied
27james Robert Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that 
Won the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l939)»
p." 159.
2^Barnes, A History of..., p. 280.
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In his Fifty Years of Europe. In the years following 
the peace, Hazen served as an exchange professor to the 
University of Strasbourg where, to his chagrin, he 
found the Alsaciens less contented under the French 
than they had been under the G e r m a n s , Besides the 
material rewards heaped upon the "kept" historians, 
acclamation came in other forms. For nearly a decade 
after the war, the presidents of the American Histor­
ical Association were selected from those who had most 
advanced the Entente cause during the war,^0
When the historian takes it upon himself to search 
for the causes of an event as cataclysmic as the World 
War, he accepts a moral responsibility to tell the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth. It cannot be denied 
that the earlier war guilt scholars were hampered from 
the beginning by the fact that the documents necessary 
to assess properly the relative responsibility for 
causing the war remained hidden in the archives of the 
belligerent powers. But this factor does not detract 
from the contention that those writers who delved into 
the causes of the war before it was possible to approxi­
mate the truth failed in a grave responsibility to their 
own and succeeding generations.
If there is any substance in the assertion that the
^^Grattan, The American Mercury. XI, No, ij-Ij., i|l5* 
^^Barnes, A History of..,, p, 280.
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United States might have averted Involvement In World 
War I, and It Is the opinion of many students of the 
subject that there Is, American historians, as Interpreters 
of the events leading to the war, must shoulder at least 
a part of the responsibility for the United States entry. 
One of the most Important reasons for American Implica­
tion In "Europe's War" was the state of mind In the 
United States— a product of British propaganda In the 
first Instance and later of American historical Inter­
pretation.
In general, historical activity In the United States 
during the war was characterized by a high degree of 
jingoism and patriotic slanting of effort. Intellectual 
cooperation with the war effort and the readjustment 
of traditional American historical views which placed 
the allies of the United States In an unfavorable light.
^^Mathew A. Pltzslmons, Alfred G. Pandt and Charles 
E. Novell (eds.). The Development of Historiography 
(Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 195^)» p. ^20.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OP WORLD WAR I AS VIEWED 
BY AMERICAN HISTORIANS, I91I4-I92O
The ensuing chapter is devoted to a discussion of 
American war guilt scholars writing in the period ranging 
roughly from 191^ through I92O and to the interpretations 
they assigned the events leading to the outbreak of 
hostilities in 191̂ 1» While each of the writers considered 
approached the problem from a slightly different angle, 
enough homogeneity exists among them that they may be 
distinguished from their colleagues publishing after I92O 
who were concerned with the same problem. Before examin­
ing the specific works of early American students of 
responsibility, however, a brief survey of the type of 
source material then available is in order.
During the war and in the years immediately there­
after, the discussion of responsibility rested largely on 
national prejudices and intuition. Beyond this, those 
who discussed the origins of the war relied on the in­
complete collections of government documents, the ’’colored 
books.” Of these, the British Blue Book was the most 
complete, but even that apology left a good deal unsaid 
that might have reflected unfavorably on the British actions
28
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of The Incomplete and unofficial German apology,^
primarily intended for a German audience, was designed 
to convince the people that the war was forced upon the 
Central Powers by Russia. It was a convincing statement 
of the German position and had the desired affect within 
the country. Never Intended as a complete exposition of 
the German case, however, the obvious gaps in the German 
statement conveyed the worst possible impression outside 
Germany.
The English and German apologies of 191^ were followed 
in rapid order by statements from Russia, Belgium, Serbia, 
France and Austria. None of the 191^ apologies, sub­
sequent research was to prove, were complete; all were to 
a greater or lesser extent misleading. Because of the 
scarcity of documentary evidence from which the whole 
story of the war’s origins might be gleaned, American 
scholars investigating responsibility accepted some primary 
and secondary sources as fact without the advantage of 
comparisons by which the reliability of such sources might 
be checked.
Besides the "colored books," one of the principal 
sources of information on which American students of the 
background of the war relied were "eye-witness" accounts 
of the European scene which purported to relate the pro-
^German White Book. Aktenstucke zum Kriegsausbruch. 
Dem deutschen Reichstag vorgelegt am Ij.. Ü. ’li|.7 lÆit 
nachtraglichen ErgSnzungenI Berlin; Liebheit, 191^.
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gresslon toward war as It occurred. At the same time
publications like Why We Are at War, written by the six
Oxford scholars, were utilized by American writers almost
as primary source material. The value of a publication
such as the one written by the learned professors,
according to the American Historical Review, lay in the
"character and standing" of its authors. An examination
of the contents of the volume published in 191^ will
quickly invalidate the contention that the thesis of the
book was in any way affected by the "character" of its
authors. Having received the blessing of the American
2Historical Review, it is probably safe to assume the book 
was widely read by American historians. Its importance 
for purposes of this study lies principally in the fact 
that the interpretation presented by the Oxford historians 
was widely reiterated by American scholars publishing in 
the ensuing years.
The authors chose the Franco-Prussian War as a starting 
point from which to examine the events leading to World 
War I. A knowledge of the remote causes of the war, the 
Oxford professors contended, was essential before the 
immediate causes could be viewed in their proper per­
spective and before the student of history could hope 
to understand why Austria-Hungary and Germany "threw down 
the glove" to France and Russia and why England intervened
pAmerican Historical Review, XX, No. 2 (January,
1915)
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not only as the "protector” of neutral Belgium but as a 
friend of France.^
Throughout the period which gave birth to the rival 
alliance systems on the European continent, England was 
portrayed as innocence personified, yielding at every 
turn in an effort to placate the adolescent German nation, 
which suffered from a bad case of growing pains. The 
Triple Alliance was the grand cause of the war because it 
inspired over-confidence in Germany and the Dual Monarchy 
leading them to press their claims both east and west with 
an intolerable disregard for the law of nations.
France, the authors conceded, started the continental 
armaments race with the Soulager Law of 1886 whereby the 
French peacetime army was raised to $D0,000 men, but 
Germany soon outstripped her western neighbor, and the 
Franco-Russian alliance was the only alternative for 
France which faced a nation whose peacetime strength 
stood at 5>400,000 in IÇl^.^ Although the armament con­
test sounded the alarm well in advance of 19l4> the carte 
blanche Germany presented Austria was evidence enough that 
the "startling" events of 191^ had been planned well in 
advance of the assasination of the Austrian heir apparent.
The war in which England was then engaged, the invec­
tive continued, was fundamentally a war between two different
^Members of the Oxford faculty of Modern History,
Why We Are at War (Oxford; Clarendon Press, I91I)-), p. 29.
^Ibid., pp. ij-O-̂ E
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principles, raison d'etat and the rule of law. "One 
regards international covenants as 'scraps of paper,' 
while the other regards the maintenance of such covenants 
as a grave and inevitable obligation." England stood 
for the idea of a public law of Europe and for the small 
nations which it protected. "Our interest is in Right.
We are fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme 
interest."^ Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium 
could have drawn England in on the French side. The 
average Englishman in IÇl^ could not believe that German 
statesmanship had degenerated to piracy; the proof was not 
long in coming and the ultimatum was dispatched to Germany.
England, according to the authors, took the only 
course compatible with honor. The Triple Entente was 
fulfilling a mission--the destruction of military anarchy. 
Russia, who had been forced to accept humiliation at the 
hands of the Dual Monarchy in the Bosnian crisis of I908, 
had no choice in keeping with her traditional position as 
protector of the Balkan Slavs but to accept the challenge 
offered by Austria. Since the new Russian constitution 
was "Anglophile," the Oxford scholars felt Russia's natural 
place in the alliance system was with England and France in 
the pursuance of the common cause of international arbitra­
tion and disarmament. "Duty and interest compel the Allies
^Members of the Oxford faculty, p. IO8.
6Ibid.. p. 117.
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in the same direction."
Looking at the work of the Oxford historians from a 
1958 perspective, the student finds the legalistic and 
moral themes central to the book. The Allies were por­
trayed as the defenders of international law, the prin­
ciple of arbitration, of "Right" in general, while the 
real issues, the national interests of the European states, 
despite lip-service paid to the remote causes of the war, 
were largely ignored. Why We Are at War is only one of 
many examples that could be cited as representative of 
the early interpretation relative to the outbreak of 
World War I. The reason for its selection is that it was 
one of the first to expound a thesis which became in­
creasingly popular in America with changes in emphasis but 
nearly always with identical conclusions.
My Four Years in Germany, written by former ambassador 
to Germany James W. Gerard, was one of many "eye-witness" 
accounts by Americans speculating on the causes of the 
war. As a reminiscence, this work has no place in the 
bibliography for this study, but the number of American 
historians who referred to Gerard’s book indicates a certain 
faith in the integrity of the author and should justify an 
examination of its contents, if for no other reason than 
that it was typical of the type of source on which American 
students of the war’s origins leaned heavily. As stated 
in his preface, Gerard’s purpose in writing the memoirs
^Members of the Oxford faculty, p. 56.
of his term as United States envoy to Berlin was to im­
plant a realization in the American mind that "we are en­
gaged in a war with the greatest military power the world 
has ever seen." The implication, of course, is one of 
pure propaganda, but that did not prevent many American war 
guilt scholars from using Gerard’s unfounded conclusions 
to substantiate their theses.
The defects in the Gerard volume from the point of 
view of the scientific historian are immediately apparent.
He took the peculiarities of isolated Germans with whom 
he came into contact and applied them indiscriminately to 
the entire German nation. His penchant toward generali­
zation would appear to be enough to make the sincere scholar 
hesitate in accepting his findings as fact. Nevertheless, 
Gerard’s conclusions were widely cited as creditable 
evidence by early American students of war responsibility.
It was not the German leaders alone with whom the 
Allies had to contend but the entire German nation. The 
United States, Gerard maintained, joined in a "crusade" 
against a nation whose poets, professors and parsons 
united in stiring its people to a "white pitch of hatred 
first against Russia and England and later against the 
United States,"®
Probing the collective German mind, Gerard found that 
the Germans psychologically were a simple people whose
®James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New 
York: George H .  Doran Co., I9I7)» P* x .
35
ydominant characteristic was an extreme naivete conducive 
to the acceptance of a racialist line of propaganda.
A "hereditary instinct," passed on from the Teutonic 
Knights, caused the Germans, fearful of their neighbors, 
to become tools of a noble class which believed in war for 
its own bitter sake. Moreover, many of the German doctors 
with whom the author associated felt that the "heavy eating 
and large consumption of wine and beer had an unfavorable 
affect on the German national character and readied them 
for war.
According to the ex-ambassador, there were countless 
facts that pointed to the summer of 1^1^ as the logical 
time for the start of a German-inspired European war.
By the time William II left for his Norwegian cruise 
July 6, 1914, a definite line of action had been con­
ceived after the ruling caste recognized the advantages 
afforded Germany by the opening of the Kiel Canal, the 
possession of the Zeppelin and the perfection of the 
submarine.
The event which finally persuaded the Kaiser and the 
ruling oligarchy to resort to war was the attitude of the 
people in the Zabern Affair and the fear of a growing 
dislike of militarism. The event in Alsace prompted the 
decision by the Junkers that a speedy bloodletting was 
necessary to placate popular discontent which, Gerard
^Gerard, p. 57* 
lOlbld., pp. 97-98.
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wrote, manifested itself in the Reichstap; through the 
Social Democratic opposition. In other words, Gerard 
viewed the war simply as a "safety valve" by which the Ger­
man nation, torn asunder by an increasingly strong opposi­
tion to the ruling classes, might again achieve unity of 
purpose under the guiding hand of the military. The most 
charitable thing to be said of such a view is that it was 
short-sighted.
To the student of history today, Gerard’s character­
ization of the German nation appears a feeble, amateurish 
attempt at mass psycho-analysis aimed simply at inciting 
popular indignation in the United States quite in keeping 
with the activities of George Creel and company, Bernadette 
E. Schmitt, however, lauded the book as "definitive and au­
thentic" and commended the author for his several con­
tributions to the claim that Germany had prepared for the
11war well in advance of IÇl^.
Perhaps as damning as any single piece of evidence 
substantiating the oft-heard claim of sole German war 
guilt was the I918 contribution to the international 
controversy by Henry M, Morgenthau, former American 
ambassador to Turkey. The author’s purpose in writing 
was to furnish the American people with further evidence 
that the crime of 191^ was not Just manslaughter but, 
in fact, murder in the first degree. "I do not want to
^^Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Review of My Four Years in 
Germany, by James W, Gerard, American Historical Review. 
XXIII, No. 3 (April, 1917), 399*
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be an accessory after the fact by having proof of this 
crime and not making it public.” Morgenthau, however, 
neglected to clarify why he remained an "accessory” for 
more than three years.
After an over-simplified analysis of the events in 
the Balkans between 1913 and I9I7, the years he repre­
sented the United States in Constantinople, Morgenthau 
expressed his belief in five basic factors concerning 
the German state: (1) Germany had a plan of world con­
quest; (2) the existence in Europe of a self-perpetuating 
group of raonarchs centered in Germany was a menace to 
democracy; (3) The co-existence of autocracy and democracy 
could never be more than an armed truce; (Ij.) The Allies 
had the physical forces and "internal strength of justice” 
to crush the autocracies; and (5) The enemy, autocracy, 
was sustained by the German army. Until it was destroyed, 
autocracy would continue its a g g r e s s i o n . T h e  above were 
not "facts” which required a particularly keen insight.
They were being repeated daily on street corners across 
the nation after the entry of the United States in the 
European war. The self-styled interpreter of the German 
scene could have easily gleaned his observations from the 
works of almost any of the authors whose works on war
^^Burton J. Hendrick, "Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story,” 
World's Work, XXXV, No. 5 (April, I918), 120. Morgenthau's 
revelations initially appeared serially in the New York 
World in October, 1917*
^^Ibid.. pp. 121-22.
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guilt had been published before I9I8.
Besides the ’’evidence” Morgenthau purported to un­
cover through his analysis of German activities in Turkey, 
the ex-diplomat rose to the occasion and so distorted an 
event concerning the origins of the war that two generations 
of historians have been unable to completely expunge from 
the record the effects of the exaggeration. According to
Morgenthau, a Crown Council was convened July 1^1^,
at Potsdam to which nearly all German ambassadors, members 
of the general staff, naval commanders, bankers, the cap­
tains of German industry and Austrian dignitaries were 
summoned. The sleuthing American ambassador's suspicions 
were aroused a few days after the Sarajevo incident when 
the German ambassador to Turkey, von Wangenheim, failed 
to appear at a requiem mass in honor of the late Austrian 
Archduke and duchess. The explanation for his conspicuous 
absence was freely offered by the boastful German ambass­
ador a few days later. His presence had been required at
the "epoch making” imperial conference.
To each of those present at the meeting, the Kaiser 
purportedly put the following question: "Are you ready
for war?” In each instance, the answer was in the affirma­
tive, except in the case of the financiers who needed 
about two weeks to sell foreign securities and float loans. 
The conference decided to do nothing to arouse suspicion in
^^Henry M. Morgenthau, "Ambassador Morgenthau's 
Story,” World's Work, XXXVI, No. 1 (May, I9I8), 72-73.
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order that the bankers might have the time needed to re-
19adjust their finances for the coming war. This was 
offered as an explanation for the alleged increased 
activity on the world’s stock exchanges.
Morgenthau concluded his series of articles with 
the statement that the "colored books" flooding Europe 
made little impression on him. "I do not have to study 
fragmentary evidence. I know." As von Wangenheim had 
proudly admitted, the conspiracy that caused the Great 
War was "hatched by the Kaiser and his imperial crew at 
the Potsdam Conference July 19li|-."̂ ^
Here was conclusive proof of the "blank check" 
theory as well as nearly every other charge which had 
been hurled at the German nation since 191^> and the 
American historian and layman alike received Morgenthau’s 
testimony with receptive ears. An indication of how 
Morgenthau's revelations were sensationalized by the 
American press can be seen by looking at any one of a 
number of periodical articles. The Literary Digest com­
mented editorially, "If there is any question in your 
mind as to who precipitated the greatest of all human 
tragedies, see the enlightened facts as revealed...by 
Henry M. Morgenthau.
^^Morgenthau, World's Work, XXXVI, No. 2 (June,
1918), 170.
l^Ibid., p. 171.
^'^"How von Wangenheim Proudly Spilled the Beans," 
Literary Digest, LVII (June 15, I9I8), 50»
ifO
At this point, it is proper to note that subsequent 
investigation proved that a series of conferences were 
called by William II July 5 and 6, but that discussion 
did not concern a general European war which both Germany 
and Austria hoped to avert. Morgenthau, when later faced 
with the facts, conceded that there was no Crown Council 
where the decision was made to wage war, but, he insisted, 
those who conferred with the Emporer on July 5 were the ones 
who would have been present had such a war council taken 
place.
The Disclosures from Germany, published under the 
auspices of the American Association for International 
Conciliation, comprised but a small part of the pat­
riotic editorial work done by American historians during 
the war. The Disclosures purported to be confessions by 
Germans who were supposedly in a position to know whereof 
they spoke and who openly admitted German war guilt. The 
first of the "confessions," "The Lichnowsky Memorandum," 
was a statement by Prince Lichnowsky, pre-war German 
ambassador to England, admitting before the world Germany’s 
guilt in precipitating the war. According to Lichnowsky, 
the retirement of Bismark led to the German decision to 
press her search for colonies in the Balkans and the Near 
East. To realize her ambitions in both areas, it would be 
necessary to put the force of the German Empire behind the
^^George Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York:
H. Liveright & Co., 1930), p. 210.
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wedge Austria was driving into the Balkans and to acquire 
a dominant influence in Constantinople. That this in­
evitably meant war with Russia was fully realized, but 
such a war was not f e a r e d , ^9 xjp to this point, the ex- 
ambassador had added little to the story of German in­
trigue related by Morgenthau and others.
The chief value of the Lichnowsky papers to the 
historian was the German ambassador's rejection of the 
stand taken by wartime German apologists, namely the 
"encirclement theory," which held that the Franco- 
Russian alliance was aimed at choking Germany economically 
on two sides. Germany was not isolated by the wiles of 
her neighbors, Lichnowsky asserted, but by her own con-
PDduct. For the view held by some Germans that Serbia 
had inflicted upon Austria’s honor a stain that could only 
be wiped out by blood, Lichnowsky substituted the charge 
that the extermination of Serbia was mandatory because 
she stood in the way of Austro-German ambitions. The 
theory which held Russian mobilization tantamount to an act 
of war was dismissed by the former German diplomat on the 
ground that it was purely a military notion which had never
PIstood up in the diplomatic world.
Lest Lichnowsky’s repudiations appear overly con-
l^Munroe Smith (ed,), "The Lichnowsky Memorandum,"
The Disclosures from Germany (New York; American 
Association for International Conciliation, I9I8), p. 7»
2°Ibid., pp. 10-12.
Zllbid., p. 15.
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elusive, cognizance must be taken by the student of the 
ambassador’s position at the time of the outbreak of 
hostilities. The reason he gave for his initial assign­
ment in London was his adherence to antiquated Bismarkian 
theories in which colonies played an insignificant role. 
Lichnowsky claimed ignorance of the Pan-German movement.
By his logic then, it was only natural that his govern­
ment assign to England a man who was unaware of the plan 
to create German "hegemony" in Europe by means of a war 
"long on the drawing boards." How Lichnowsky’s ignorance 
of so-called Pan-German schemes was reconciled with his 
revelations bearing on alleged German aims in the Balkans 
is an obvious contradiction upon which the editor of the 
"confessions" failed to elucidate. Furthermore, the stu­
dent must bear in mind that Lichnowsky had been repudiated 
by his own government. Under these circumstances, his 
testimony might well have been dismissed by the serious 
historian. Perhaps the reason for Lichnowsky’s ignorance 
of German plans for aggression was that there had been no 
plans on the drawing boards of which he spoke.
Few reservations were held by historians then pub­
lishing. Lichnowsky’s testimony was used as evidence to 
substantiate all that had theretofore been written about 
Germany. They concurred unanimously with the Lichnowsky 
assertion that "it is not surprising the whole civilized
world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for 
P ?war." The problem, of course, was that of accepting as 
22smith, pp.
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fact the testimony of one Anglophile ambassador who had 
been denounced by his government and was, in fact, guilty 
of treason and using it as a basis for condemning his 
superiors.
Lichnowsky's revelations were corroborated by a 
Dr. Meuhlon in letters also published at the behest of 
the American Association for International Conciliation
p-5and edited by Professor Munroe Smith.  ̂ Dr. Meuhlon, a 
pre-war member of the Krupp board of directors, was, 
according to the editor, one of the relatively few Germans 
who knew from the outset that the Central Powers had forced 
an unnecessary and unjustifiable war on Europe. Unwilling 
to further German military activity, the munitions maker 
took the only course compatible with his alleged pacific 
views and exiled himself to Switzerland. His confessions 
gave further substance to charges previously made and 
confirmed to the satisfaction of most American war guilt 
scholars the inference that full agreement on the course 
to be taken had been reached between Berlin and Vienna.
According to Meuhlon, the outcome of the Kaiser’s 
"Moroccan adventure" had left him in a war-like frame of 
mind. The failure of diplomacy at Algeciras and Agadir 
had convinced him that in the next crisis he would "un­
sheath the s w o r d . "^4 Meuhlon attested also that the
^^Smith was a professor of international law at 
Amherst College.
^^Munroe Smith (ed.), "Memoranda and Letters of Dr. 
Meuhlon," The Disclosures from Germany (Hew York; American 
Association for International Conciliation, I9I8), p. I86.
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Kaiser went on his Norwegian cruise July 6 for appear­
ances only. The evidence to substantiate such a charge 
was admittedly hearsay, but. Professor Smith maintained 
summarizing accurately the attitude of most American 
students of the war guilt problem, the historian could 
not exclude all evidence that was barred by English judi­
cial procedure. The value of hearsay evidence depended 
upon the position and character of the immediate witnesses, 
which, in this case, were allegedly good. Moreover, 
hearsay evidence was "creditably enhanced when the testimony 
fit in with the established f a c t s . T h e  logic by which 
such a conclusion was deduced is certainly open to question. 
Who was it that established the "facts" of which Smith 
wrote? The answer is persons of the same stamp as those 
who provided the corroborating evidence.
Meuhlon refuted the charge heard in some German 
quarters that the Belgian government had arranged to 
cooperate with Great Britain in an aggressive war against 
Germany. According to the munition tycoon's statement, 
the assertion was absurd because Belgium had made herself 
dependent upon the Krupp Works in Germany for military 
supplies. Proof that Belgium had erred in placing her 
trust was evident when the German refusal to deliver 
arms already paid for was considered.
The "evidence" cited above is merely illustrative
^^Smith, p. 187.
2&Ibid., p. 188.
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of the type of sources which early American war guilt 
scholars used to bolster the verdict arrived at after 
scrutiny of the incomplete "colored books." There are 
obvious defects in accepting any of the testimony as 
fact upon which to convict the German nation, but American 
writers were wont to accept any statement that might 
somehow fit or be made to fit into their general scheme 
of things.
The early students of war responsibility, those 
publishing between 19l4 and I920, reverted from conven­
tional historical methodology whereby a thesis is estab­
lished empirically from an examination of all the facts. 
Most of the American writers concerned with the beginnings 
of the war had formulated their theses long before de­
ciding to write, and from their preconceived notions, 
they often arrived at the facts deductively, discarding 
any information that might not square with their original 
hypothesis— that Germany was solely guilty.
II
One of the most popular central themes around which 
the earlier American students of war responsibility built 
their theses was that of the "war to save the world for 
democracy," That writers of this type were but little 
concerned with intellectual honesty or historical fact 
is evident; that their work complied with the literary 
requirements of the Committee of Public Information is
1+6
equally evident. One of the most scurrilous examples of 
this type of "history" was Why We Went to War by Christian 
Gauss. In his preface. Professor Gauss of Princeton 
University wrote that he had done what others had main­
tained could not be done--advanced an indictment against 
a whole people for their complicity in the "crimes of 
their rulers." In this respect. Gauss represented a 
minority report among writers concerned with war res­
ponsibility, most of whom preferred to distinguish between 
the governed and the governors.
Wars, Gauss maintained, were the final expression 
of fundamental antagonisms between nations, and the rea­
son for World War I was not the boundaries at stake but 
the ideals of the opposing camps. Real causes then were 
not to be found in the Balkans or Near East but in the 
basic differences between autocracy and democracy. The 
Prussian detested democracy. The German ideas on the 
mission of Germany, the morality of the state and the 
place and function of the military in society were "not 
only divergent, but absolutely incompatible with those 
of the West. We must not delude ourselves that the 
gulf between democracy and Prussianism can easily be 
bridged.
Gone is the fair-haired German who loved his pipe 
and his fiddlers three. Gauss argued. The German people,
^^Christian Gauss, Why We Went to War (New York: 
Scribners & Sons, 1Ç18), pp. 3-4*
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however, were still docile, or they would never have been 
willing to submit to the yoke of autocracy. The acceptance 
of the military junkers in Germany was easily understood. 
Very simply, there was no difference between the ruled and 
the rulers in Germany. The difference was between the
28Germans and Americans.
The central and ineradicable difference between 
the West and Germany, Gauss contended, was the differ­
ence between freedom and autocracy— between feudalism and 
democracy. The most serious mistake the people of the 
United States could make. Gauss warned, would be to be­
lieve that the German autocracy existed through the force 
of the ruler. The German state was not an amalgam forced 
into cohesion by pressure from above. It had the two
requisites to longevity: power from above and confidence
29from below. The spirit inculcated in the German people 
was the secret of World War I. The German fought not for 
humanity, but as the Mohammedan fought and died for Islam. 
The people were laboring under a sort of mass hypnosis by
which the mission, power and privilege of the German state
manifested themselves in an area above the American con­
ception of right and wrong. Prussian fanaticism and 
mysticism were the real causes of the war.
To understand German diplomacy and German psychology, 
the Princeton professor wrote, it must be understood that
28Gauss, pp. 10-11.
Z^Ibld., pp. 15̂ 17.
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the Prussian regards all other states as rivals. The life 
of the state came not from its own strength but from the 
livelihood of other states. From such a theory came the 
Prussian justification for war. Too long a peace was 
considered a national calamity, and Germany had been at 
peace for more than forty years in 1^1^. "The time had 
come for the great catharsis which would restore the state 
to its primitive health.
Americans insisted upon a German inability to under­
stand the psychology of other peoples. An understanding 
of German psychology was, the author claimed, an absolute 
necessity for the well-being of the United States. They, 
the Germans, were a different people, nationalistic and 
imperialistic in temperament, who believed in the sup­
eriority of their mission. Their young had not been raised 
to respect "a Washington or a Lincoln." Their national 
heroes were "men of force who succeeded through deceit.
Gauss assimilated the testimony of Morgenthau, 
Lichnowsky and Meuhlon to substantiate his charge that 
Germany gave to her "cat's paw," Austria, an unconditional 
"blank check." His Inferences to the effect that, if 
Germany was successful in Europe, the United States would 
next bear the brunt of Prussian autocracy was conjecture 
pure and simple. The argument that Gauss, as a professor 
in modern languages, cannot be viewed as representative of
30Gauss, p. 1|6.
31lbld.. pp. 73-74.
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the American historical profession is tenable only until 
his thesis is found echoed in the works of other more 
"scholarly" writers, including those of some of the most 
eminent of American historians. Like Gauss, nearly all of 
the early war guilt writers tried their hand at psycho­
analysing the German nation, and in each instance, the 
conclusions drawn were strikingly similar to those of 
Gauss.
That the Princeton professor bore out popular senti­
ment was evidenced by a review in the New York Times 
lauding his diatribe as a "calm, well-resolved and con­
vincing book." A review in the American Historical Review 
recommended the volume to historians interested in the 
origins of the war. and complimented the author for the 
skill with which the material was handled and for his 
"sobriety of judgment" which resulted in "one of the best 
volumes on the war.
The European Anarchy by G. Lowes Dickinson was pub­
lished initially in the British Isles and proved so popular 
and successful, propagandistically speaking, that it was 
reprinted with appropriate additions and deletions for the 
American audience in 191?« Its importance, other than 
seconding previously made unfounded charges, lies in the' 
fact that American historians leaned heavily on Professor 
Dickinson’s conclusions. According to Professor Oliver P.
^^Samuel B. Harding, Review of Why We Went to War, 
by Christian Gauss, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3 (June, I919), 520-21.
^0
Chitwood of University of West Virginia, one of the leading 
American students of the war guilt question, Dickinson’s 
work was essential to any understanding of the period 
leading up to the outbreak of hostilities.^^ With all 
due credit to Dickinson, it should be added that he 
was not one to ’’stand pat” after his 191? thesis had been 
invalidated by subsequent scholarship. In I926 when it 
became apparent that his wartime view of responsibility 
was no longer tenable, Dickinson revised his earlier 
interpretation under the title. The International Anarchy.
In his earlier volume, however, Dickinson viewed 
the events leading up to World War I with the same sub­
jectivity that infected the work of his American colleague, 
Christian Gauss. The spirit of Bismark, Dickinson wrote, 
infected the whole of German public life. It gave a new 
lease to the political philosophy of Machiavelli.^^ Ad­
mitting that jingoism existed in all nations, the author 
asserted the ’’brand” found in Germany was peculiar both in 
intensity and in its character. Germans were romantic to 
the extent that they did not see willingly things as they 
were. Their temperament raangified, distorted, concealed 
and transmuted everything. Because of these peculiarities,
^^Chitwood referred the student to the "charming” 
Dickinson thesis in the introduction to his The 
Immediate Causes of the Great War. See below.
3^G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 
190̂ -191̂ ° London: The Macmillan Co., 1Ç26.
3^G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy 
(New York: The Macmillan Co" I917), p. î-1.
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the German character was unique, and one found a romantic 
enthusiasm, a willful blindness, toward the realities of 
war. One peculiarity In German jingoism uncommon to that 
of other western nations, Dickinson argued, was Its emphasis 
on an "unintelligible and unreal abstraction of race." The 
Germans viewed themselves as the "salt of the earth," 
and their mission took form In efforts to spread the 
Teutonic "enlightenment" to their less fortunate neighbors.
Dickinson concluded his psychological analysis of 
Germany with the stock assertion that Germany was guilty 
of giving the Dual Monarchy a "blank check" after June 28, 
191 .̂. He conceded, however, that most Germans conceived 
the conflict as a "preventive war," meaning If Germany 
did not fight In 191^, she would be compelled to do so 
later and under less advantageous circumstances.
Frank H. Slmonds, In his multi-volume series.
The History of the World War, adopted a similar central 
theme for the first volume devoted In part to a discussion 
of the war’s background. In Its Inception, Slmonds wrote, 
the war seemed no more than another war, more terrible 
than those In the past, but one comparable to them In 
origins and purposes. As the struggle progressed, how­
ever, It became clear that the German attack was more 
than a bid for world power. Germany had attacked the 
whole fabric of our common civilization and all the pre­
cepts and doctrines of humanity. Together with anger and 
detestation of German violence. It became recognized In
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the United States that the war was, after all, a stand of 
autocracy against democracy.
Simonds purpose in writing was to set forth the 
"development of the world verdict against Germany." He 
made one concession to the German nation that few of his 
colleagues were willing to acknowledge with his assertion 
that the actual outbreak of hostilities was largely 
accidental. He quickly retrenched, however, writing that 
the conflict was an inevitable consequence of the new 
visions and purposes of the German people. That Germany 
actually brought on the war in the critical days of July, 
191^, was an unsupported allegation; that her whole course 
after the Kaiser came to the throne was one of ruthless 
aggression was, according to Simonds, hardly to be mis­
taken.
The "cause" for which the Allies were fighting pro­
vided the central theme for a series. Readings in Con­
temporary History and Literature, published originally 
for use in a special "war issues" course at the United 
States Haval Academy and later disseminated to the gen­
eral public under the auspices of the Creel Committee. 
According to the introduction to "World War and Ideals," 
one in the series edited by two members of the Academy 
faculty, the purpose of the book was "to enhance the
■^^Prank H. Simonds, The History of the World War 
(New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., I917)s Ï1 vii-viii.
37lbid., p. 62.
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morale of the members of the Corps by giving them an 
understanding of what the war is about and the supreme 
importance to civilization of the cause for which we 
are fighting.”
In setting forth the thesis around which the book
was centered, the editors wrote that the democracies of
the world were pitted against the last stronghold of
autocracy in a conflict thrust upon them by the dynastic
policy of a set of rulers who used the "Divine Right"
38concept to further their personal ends. To support 
their basic premises, the editors chose those authors 
who best illustrated the democratic tendencies of the 
Entente powers. Probably written before the Bolshevik 
Revolution, Russia was portrayed by the authors as having 
finally seen the light and having thrown off the chains 
of autocracy, was developing upon a basis of universal 
sufferage and republican institutions.
Innumerable additional examples of authors who 
analysized the events proceeding the war from an 
"autocracy versus democracy” perspective could be 
cited. This was not history in any sense of the word.
In each of the apocryphal accounts considered above, 
autocracy, exemplified by Germany, occupied the center 
of the stage in the role of a villain whose "mission" 
was the domination of Europe or, as Gauss suggested,
^^Walter B. Norris and Morris E. Speare (eds.),
"World War and Ideals", Readings in Contemporary History and 
Literature (New York; Ginn & Co., I9I8), p. 20
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the world. The Entente powers, on the other hand, were 
cast in the role of heroes fighting desperately to pre­
vent further autocratic depredations against the "free" 
world. To relate the history of Europe between I87I and 
1914 in terms of good and evil as Gauss and others did 
would indeed have required a vivid imagination, although 
the scarcity of reliable information bearing on the war's 
origins no doubt helped. Besides an incredible quality 
of subjectivity which permeated each of the volumes examined 
above, the outstanding characteristic of each of them was 
the penchant of their authors to blacks and whites. 
Generalizations which might have been substantiated in 
isolated instances were indiscriminately applied to answer 
a multitude of problems. That human beings act differently 
under varying circumstances apparently never occured to 
these writers who deduced the origins of the war from 
the original hypothesis that Germany was guilty.
Ill
Another popular line taken by writers then dealing 
with the causes of World War I was the legalistic approach 
first set forth in the United States by James M, Beck in 
The Evidence in the Case. Beck's argument was in the form 
of a legal brief based on "evidence" gleaned from his less 
than acute analysis of the early "colored books." The 
folly of drawing historical interpretations from the 19l4
belligerent apologies has already been noted.
Fundamentally, Beck's thesis was built around the
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assumption that Germany, as a violator of international 
law, was as liable for punishment as the criminal under 
civil law. Having designated himself prosecuting attorney. 
Beck assimilated into a concise brief the "evidence" by 
which the "Supreme Court of Civilization" might arrive 
at a verdict. In developing his case, the former United 
States Attorney General found "conclusive proof" that the 
German foreign office was not only consulted by Austria 
previous to the ultimatum to Serbia, but that Germany, 
in fact, gave to the Dual Monarchy an unlimited "blank 
check," Like most of his colleagues publishing on the 
origins of the war. Beck distinguished between the ruling 
caste and the German masses since "this detestable war is 
not merely a crime against civilization but also against 
the decried and misled German people." ”
The writings of Bernhardi, Nietzsche and Treitschke 
nurtured German Junkerdom which was based on the philosophy 
of Machiavelli, the first to recognize that the state was 
power. There was, according to Beck, an emotional and 
mystical element in the advanced German thinker which 
made him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual 
and moral absurdities which Intellectuals of other nations 
would never think of accepting. "The irrefutable proof of 
the acceptance of those philosophies was Belgium.
39james M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case as to
la%
1|.0.
Moral Responsibility for the War (New York; Grosset 
& Dun p, 1915)» p. xxvi.
Ibid., pp. 9-11
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Because the German government never officially repudiated 
the ideas of individuals like Nietzsche and Treitschke, 
their words were seen as the guiding lights for all modern 
German thinkers, an assumption Beck would indeed find 
difficult to substantiate.
While the IÇl^ apologies of the Entente powers did 
not show evidence of suppression of facts, the obvious 
inaccuracies in the German White Paper disclosed an un­
mistakable purpose "amounting to an open confession that 
they intended to force their will upon Europe even though 
this course involved the most stupendous war in man's 
h i s t o r y . W i t h o u t  informing their conferees in the 
European family of nations, Germany and Austria "tor­
pedoed" civilization. Austria could not possibly have 
proceeded in a war which would inevitably incur the wrath 
of Russia without absolute assurances of German support. 
Germany felt that Austria should be allowed to proceed 
against Serbia unabetted but denied the right of any 
state to support Serbia. This, according to Beck, was 
Germany's "tragedy of errors.
During the "Twelve Days," every proposal to preserve 
peace came from the Entente camp, and every such sug­
gestion was met with an uncompromising negative from 
Austria and either that or obstructive quibbles from 
Germany. The Kaiser gave his assent to the Austrian
^^Beck, p. 30.
^^Ibld. , p. i|0.
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coup In the hope that some of the German prestige lost 
In North Africa might be regained. Russia, William II 
felt sure, would follow the same course she had in the 
Bosnian crisis and acquiesce in the Dual Monarchy's 
action. Realizing he had gone too far, the Kaiser 
hastened back from his Norwegian cruise, but it was too 
late. "A Washington would have saved the situation, but 
the Kaiser was not a Washington.
Beck pursued his almost totally indefensible in­
dictment concentrating on German actions in the last few 
days before the declaration of war on Russia. Although 
Germany was urged by England and France to await the 
result of the Austro-Russian conversations, her declaration 
of war rendered peace impossible. The German justification 
for her actions based on the argument that she did not wish 
to forego the advantage of speed in mobilization against 
the Russian numerical superiority was the "clearest dis­
loyalty to civilization." It must be assumed. Beck sur­
mised, that, in tendering the German ultimatum to Russia 
protesting that nation's mobilization, the Kaiser wished 
war. "Such will be his awful responsibility...and the 
verdict of history.
The thesis propounded by Beck, as baseless as his 
charges may seem today, gave impetus to others writing in 
a similar, though often less vituperative, vein. One of
^^Beck, p. 112.
^^Ibid.. p. 189.
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these was Ellery Stowell of Columbia University» He at­
tacked the German defense which held that the premature 
Russian mobilization made Impossible the acceptance of 
British Foreign Minister Grey's eleventh hour proposal 
for mediation. German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Stowell 
Inaccurately pointed out, cherished the belief that England 
and France should have compelled Russia to desist, while 
Germany refused at every turn to restrain Austria. To 
the everlasting honor of England, Stowell wrote, she re­
fused to back France In any aggressive war. To Germany's 
dishonor, she refused to take a similar stand In regard
to the Dual Monarchy, Insisting that German Interests were
iiBsuch that support of Austria was mandatory.^
The fact that Bethmann-Hollweg had been unable to 
discover any evidence to lessen his nation's responsi­
bility was, according to Stowell, less Important than 
the fact that the effort was made. "It Is an Indication 
that Germany recognizes her responsibility before the bar 
of the world's opinion.
Other examples of historians and pseudo-historians 
who viewed the war guilt problem legallstlcally might be 
mentioned, but It would serve no purpose since most of 
them merely echoed what the progenitor of the thesis,
James M. Beck, had written In 1915*
^^Ellery C. Stowell, "Responsibility for the War,"
The New Republic, IX, No. Il6 (January 20, I917), 328.
^^Ibld., p. 329.
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IV
After the publication of Roland G. Usher's Pan- 
Germanism in 191^» there was a great vogue among American 
historians to base their analyses of the causes of the war 
on the central theme of alleged Pan-German activities. 
Prepared for publication prior to the outbreak of the war, 
there are throughout the book evidences of an objective 
survey of the subject matter. Before its appearance, 
however, the manuscript was edited and chapters were added 
in the light of what transpired in l^l^ with the result 
that the study took on a pro-Entente flavor.
It was Usher's contention that Germany aimed at 
nothing short of world dominion. Known to all Eur­
opean diplomats, it was this factor that compelled the 
belligerents of IÇl^ in the courses they had charted 
after I87I, The historian too, according to Usher, was 
in the "enviable” position of knowing of the plans or long- 
range schemes of the various European states far more 
certainly than he did the minutiae of their execution.
In other words, it was not only the statesmen of Europe 
who were aware of the German "plan” of world conquestj 
it was also apparent to the world’s scholars. Only the 
method by which the plan was to be executed remained a 
mystery. Because of the extraordinary position of the 
historian. Usher, a professor at Washington University,
advised his colleagues to be prepared to interpret current 
events in the light of schemes or ends which were known
6o
to be in the minds of statesmen.Usher, in effect, 
openly advocated a reversion from the empirical method 
applied to history where the facts form the foundation 
for the hypothesis in favor of the Cartesian method where­
by the premises are formulated first, and the facts follow. 
The danger inherent in such an approach is the tendency to 
make the facts fit neatly into a preconceived thesis.
This methodology was not unique with Usher, but he was 
one of the few professional historians who admitted using
such a technique to analyse the origins of the war. Such
an approach to history admittedly is valid in certain 
instances ŵ here the basic premise is an accepted fact, but 
to apply the deductive method of reasoning to the study of 
the causes for any war, especially while hostilities are 
in progress, leaves the scholar wide open to criticism. 
Having established the use of the deductive method for 
solving a problem, the question which inevitably poses 
itself is, "What was the basic hypothesis from which the 
student began his investigation?" In Usher's case, it 
was admittedly that Germany had long planned for the con­
quest of the world, and the war was viewed as the cul­
mination of German dreams. With such a "fact" established, 
it goes without saying that Germany was guilty of pre­
cipitating the war.
Although Bismark was the first German statesman
^^Roland G. Usher, Pan-Germanism (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19li+), pp. 115-1?.
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to see the possibilities of Pan-Germanism, Admiral von 
Tirpitz and William II "were responsible for bringing it 
to its present state of perfection"— an excellence which 
was achieved after an evolution through three stages.
After unification, German policy aimed; first, at terri­
torial and economic aggrandisement in the form of colonies; 
secondly, at attempting to secure markets in the East by 
the establishment of a trade route through the Balkans and 
Turkey; and thirdly, at the determination of an aggressive 
scheme for the forcible conquest of the world,
Usher conceded that Germany may not have wished the 
war on the particular day that it came, but, since the 
holocaust was "inevitable," the German position was such 
that prosecution of a war in 1^1^ gave her an advantage 
over her adversaries. Whether the decision to strike 
was reached because the moment seemed propitious or because 
longer delay would be damaging. Usher speculated that the 
details of preparation that were completed by August 1 
required at least six weeks for execution. The decision 
to go to war then had to be reached in Berlin and Vienna 
not later than mid-June, I91I4., two weeks before the murder 
of the Austrian heir apparent. Although the assasination 
of Archduke Francis Ferdinand came as a surprise to Pan- 
Germans, Usher charged that it was better adapted to 
their needs as a casus belli than anything they could
^^nsher, p. 119.
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have possibly devised,
Usher's two-sided approach to his problem can be 
seen in those portions of his work written before the 
outbreak of hostilities in Europe where he recognized 
Pan-Germanism, not as a movement threatening civiliza­
tion, but as an expression of the national determination 
to preserve and strengthen the corporate life of a great 
people. The two nations promoting Pan-Germanism, Usher 
wrote in contradistinction to ideas interwoven into other 
parts of his work, were not different from others in either 
morals or aims. Historically speaking, Usher's position 
would have been more easily defended had not a duality of 
approach been the transcendent characteristic of Pan- 
Germanism.
Through the periodical medium. Usher pursued the 
thesis initiated in his book and pointed out that the real 
causes for the outbreak of the war "lie less in the 
domestic relations between the two countries, Austria and 
Serbia, than in the general European situation in the 
fourth week of July, IÇlI)-»"̂  ̂ At first glance, such a 
statement appears to be a recantation of some of the 
absurdities given expression in his book. The impression 
is unwarranted, however, since Usher quickly lapsed back
^'^Usher, pp. 263-6̂ .
^Qjbld.. p. 295.
•^^Roland G. Usher, "The Reasons Behind the War,"
The Atlantic, GXIV, No, I4 (October, 1914), 445-
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into his earlier thesis.
To the Austrian, he wrote, the war appeared as a
struggle for self-preservation since a large segment of
her population looked to pesky Serbia for leadership.
It was, as far as the Dual Monarchy was concerned, a
war to end forever the attempts by Serbia to disrupt the
Empire, a legitimate endeavor prompted by Austrian national 
d2interests. By the German, however, the war was viewed
differently. The Pan-German had long dreamed of the
creation of a confederation stretching from the Baltic
to the Mediterranean under German protection. Hence, she
welcomed the Austrian activity in the Balkans since control
over that area was requisite to a successful consummation
of the German-dominated Balkan confederation, the first
step in Germany’s "world plan."
The time seemed favorable for an Austrian move in the
summer of 191^ before the small Balkan states had had an
opportunity to recover from the ravages of the two recent
wars. Usher suggested two basic causes for the Austro-
Serbian war: the disadvantage of the moment to the Triple
Entente and its advantage to the Triple Alliance, and the
current belief in Germany and Austria that the balance of
power might swing so decisively in the opposite direction
93that action in the future might become impossible.
The carte blanche was given Austria by Germany in
^^Usher, The Atlantic, GXIV, No. i}., ^^9°
Ibid., p. ii-51.
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the 1908 Bosnian crisis, not in 19l4 as most historians 
contended, Austria would never have undertaken the annexa­
tions with such vigor had not the alliance with Germany
'oilbeen of unlimited extent.^ The promptitude of support 
and the decidedly "unquestioned harmony" between Austria 
and Germany was such by I914 that little doubt could be 
held by the "serious student" of the war's origins that 
the demands made on Serbia by the Dual Monarchy had the 
complete approval of Germany. Those demands. Usher sur­
mised, constituted irrevocable proof that Austria and 
Germany wished to collectively precipitate a general Eur- 
opean war.
Usher's sentiments were echoed in a Living Age 
editorial entitled the "Origins of the War." The real 
cause of the war was the seizure of the German nation 
by an impulse prompted by the thought of "now or never." 
The Pan-Germans held it a crime not to strike when they 
were convinced that their nation had a preponderance of 
power. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the Austrian 
army in Serbia led to the logical conclusion that it never 
had been the intention of the Dual Monarchy to punish Ser-
96bia but to plunge Europe into a war at Germany's behest.
SkRoland G. Usher, "Austro-German Relations since 
1866," American Historical Review, XXIII, No. 3 (April,
1918),
^^Ibid., p. 5)95»
^6"The Origin of the War," Living Age, CCLXXXII,
No. 3362 (September 12, IÇl^), 684»
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For a defense of the above explanation for the outbreak 
of the war, the editor reasoned that it was the only 
interpretation that could be substantiated by ’’facts," 
but what those facts were was left to the reader's 
imagination.
The war could not be thought of intelligibly, wrote 
another pseudo-historian in a similar vein, unless it was 
assumed that Germany and Austria were seeking to achieve 
world domination. Whatever the true cause of the war, 
the "vital interests" with which the Pan-Germans toyed 
at the outset were little more than an excuse for the 
hostilities. What became of Serbia after being made the 
scapegoat for the cause of the conflagration was as un­
important to Austria as the fate of Princip, "the half- 
forgotten hero of Sarajevo."
Herbert A. Gibbons in The New Map of Europe listed
the causes for the war, the first of which was the
alliance system which evolved out of German activity
following the Pranco-Prussian War. The second. Gibbons
wrote seconding Usher’s groundless contentions, was the
Vfeltipolitik [world policy] or Pan-Germanism which brought
Germany into conflict with Great Britain and France out-
58side Europe and with Russia in Europe,
There was, according to Gibbons, a "striking anology"
^^"Vital Interests a Year Later," The New Republic, 
III, No. 38 (July 2^, 1915), 298.
<8Herbert Adams Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 
1911-191^ (New York; The Century Co., I9IY), p. 22.
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between the Germans in 191^ and the Jacobins of Revolu­
tionary France. As In 1793» the love for humanity had 
turned into blood lust and the battle for freedom into 
a search for booty and glory. The profound thinker in 
German universities and the visionaries on the working­
men’s forums were following the same path as the French 
Revolutionaries, and the "mission" of I87I had been per­
verted, The idea of the German mission was not unique 
to the nineteenth or twentieth century, however. Since 
the beginning of history Germany had been a "war man," 
always asserting himself by force. "The leopard cannot 
change his spots; so it is natural for the Germany of
the twentieth century to use the sword as it was for
59Germany of the tenth or first century."
Adopting a Gauss-like approach to German guilt. 
Gibbons disputed the contention that it was members of 
the German ruling clique who were responsible for pre­
cipitating the conflict. A review of German newspapers 
substantiated to Gibbons’ satisfaction the charge that 
German public opinion more often than not forced the hand 
of the foreign office and caused its high-handed actions. 
"German public opinion...is for this war to the bitter 
finish. It is the war of the people, intelligently and 
deliberately willed by them."^^ The Gibbons invective
then was not directed at the rulers of Germany; like his 
—
Gibbons, pp. 32-37*
60lbld., pp. 56-57.
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Princeton colleague, he charged the entire German nation 
with a crime against humanity.
A third cause for the war was Pan-German activity 
in the Ottoman Empire which resulted in the elevation of 
Germany to the position previously held by Great Britain. 
The most conspicuous thread in the web woven in Constanti­
nople was the Bagdadbahn, German intrigue in Morocco, the 
aftermath of which was an increase in naval and military 
armaments and the creation of a spirit of tension, merely 
added fuel to the fire already built by the Pan-Germans in 
the Balkans and made inevitable the clash between Teuton 
and Gaul.
The situation in June, 1913» was as grave as that of 
July, 1914» and in both cases, Serbia backed down. In 
1914» however, Germany and Austria were determined to pro­
voke a war which would end the nemesis of Serbia and spell 
the end of the traditional Russian "protectorate" over the 
Balkan Slavs. In the final analysis. Gibbons maintained 
that there could be little doubt that the war was delibera­
tely willed by the German government, motivated by Pan- 
Germanists and public prodding, and that the chain of cir­
cumstances which brought on the holocaust was carefully 
linked together by officials of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. After the Moroccan and Persian settlements, the 
question most heard on German street corners was not, "Will 
there be a war?," but "How soon will it come?"^^ In
^^Gibbons, p. 367.
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supporting the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Germany was 
not responding to an overt act by the enemy. She cal­
culated carefully the cost, awaited the favorable moment 
and then deliberately provoked the war. The only way the 
war might have been avoided would have been to allow 
Germany to "draw a new map of Europe.”
The outstanding characteristic of Gibbons work was 
the conspicuous absence of annotation. He excused him­
self on this count and for his failure to include a 
bibliography to which the student might refer with the 
comment that his references were too numerous— a novel 
explanation to say the least.
The Pan-German theme was central to The Roots of the 
War written collectively by William Davis, William Anderson 
and Mason Tyler, professors of history at the University 
of Minnesota. The most noticeable difference between this 
work and those of other early war guilt students was the 
attention accorded "remote” causes. Although consideration 
was given only those events which fit comfortably into their 
general thesis, the acknowledgement by the Minnesota 
historians that underlying as well as immediate causes 
were important gives the work a more scholarly appearance 
than those of most of their colleagues. While the ack­
nowledgement of the importance of remote causes is commend­
able and worthy of mention, the introduction to the volume 
casts unfavorable aspersions on the interpretations reached 
by the authors. Published after the United States decision
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to go to war, the authors introduced their work saying the 
book was written with a due sense of historical as well 
as patriotic responsibility. Had the result of the re­
search been unfavorable to the "justice" of the Entente 
cause, the work would not have been published until the 
war’s end. A discussion of whether or not the passing of 
moral judgments is an integral part of objective history 
lies outside the scope of this study. Suffice to say that 
such a statement leads logically to the conclusion that the 
work, which purported to be an objective survey of the 
events leading to the war, was but another subjective 
interpretation of those events.
Three factors, hate between Germany and France over 
Alsace-Lorraine, hate between Germany and Great Britain 
emanating from commercial rivalry and the disposition of 
the Ottoman Empire, the authors contended, played simul­
taneously into the hands of Pan-German schemers. Manip­
ulating the three factors, the German imperialists set 
out to deliberately precipitate a war which was seen as 
the first step in the establishment of a world empire, an 
"Empire of Teutonia," more universal than that of Rome. 
After pointing out the importance of understanding the 
diplomatic history of Europe from I87I to 191^, the authors 
reverted to the stock Pan-German, "autocracy versus dem­
ocracy," explanation of the war’s origins. In their 
discussion of the diplomacy leading to war, the authors 
pointed out some of the evidence used by the later re-
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vlslonlsts to acquit Germany such as the "encirclement 
theory." Although the Franco-Russian rapproachment kept 
alive French hopes for a successful war on Germany, the 
authors insisted that the "real" causes of the war were 
to be found elsewhere.
Between I87I and l^l^, the democratic ideal made 
progress in every civilized state save Germany. If her 
"intelligent monarchy" was to prove a lasting success, it 
would be a set-back to democracy which would be branded 
as incapable of governing the most formidable and pro­
gressive nation in Europe. For a new lease on life the 
despotic foes of democracy could thank Otto von Bismark 
for the foundations he errected in Germany. In I888, 
William II began to reign. In I89O after the retirement 
of the "Iron Chancellor," he began to govern. The strong 
arm of Bismark had paved the way for an "unenlightened" 
despotism. The unification of Prussian Junkerdom and the 
monarchy in Germany put democracy on the defensive all over 
the world, "People were beginning to doubt whether the 
democracies of the United States and Great Britain were all 
that was claimed."
The evidence was clear, the authors argued, that 
Germany planned a war against France in 18?^, a sup­
position disputed by later, more objective historians,
^^William Anderson, William S. Davis and Mason W, 
Tyler, The Roots of the War (New York: The Century Co.,
1918), p. 135.
G^Ibld., p. 199.
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Because of English and Russian objections, however, Bismark 
subsided, but the Chancellor had found that he could no 
longer reckon on steadfast Russian support despite the 
League of the Three Emporers. Russian vacillations re­
sulted in Bismark’s "smashing" of the Treaty of San Stefano, 
increased German intrigue in the Balkans and Turkey and 
eventually in the Austro-German alliance. Austria had 
been substituted for Russia as Germany's vassal. Had 
Germany chosen to ally herself to Russia, the authors 
maintained, it would have had to be as an equal, but Austria 
could easily be subjugated by her senior partner. Recent 
historians have cautioned against acceptance of the "horse 
and rider theory" as the motivating factor behind the 
errection of the rival alliance systems.
The reason for the failure of The Hague Conventions 
on armaments in 1899 and I907, according to the authors, 
was the refusal of Germany to accept the recommendations 
of the commissions. Since no clause could be found which 
did not raise a German objection, Germany was the death of 
arbitration. She made certain that Europe would continue 
to be governed by fear— the growing animosity between Eng­
land and Germany, the German dread of Russia and Germany's 
abhorence of everything for which France stood. The feel­
ings between the nations of Europe were reciprocal, but, the 
authors maintained, the hatreds in Germany were stronger 
toward her neighbors than were those of her neighbors 
toward her.
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The Pan-German, at whose door the Minnesota his­
torians ultimately placed the blame for World War I, found 
his teachers In Prlederlch Nietzsche and Heinrich von 
Treltschke, The former did not create Pan-Germanism, but 
he did supply It with a philosophic stimulus and a sem­
blance of Intellectual authority which fertilized Its soil. 
Treltschke was far mightier than Nietzsche. The Influence 
he wielded from the University of Berlin was equal to that 
of the Kaiser’s ministers. Together, Nietzsche and 
Treltschke pointed the way for three groups, the Prussian 
Junkers, the university professors and the great manu­
facturers. The seeds of Armageddon, originally sown by 
Treltschke and Nietzsche, were later cultivated by 
Bernhardl, von Moltke and William 11.^^
The fruits of the Pan-German propaganda were har­
vested In the Moroccan crises. The German position In 
respect to North Africa was largely determined by her 
late arrival as a colonial power. It seemed to the Pan- 
German that the last "white man’s country" was passing Into 
the arms of France. By the time the ’’unnerved’’ Pan-German 
moved, the real question, the dlspostlon of North Africa 
was lost, and the larger questlon--the division of the 
world--remalned. At bottom, the authors surmised, It was a 
question of prestige that motivated the Pan-Germans.
After the loss of face In Morocco, German Imperlal-
Anderson, Davis and Tyler, pp. 354-^6»
^Ibld., p. 407.
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Ists began a vigorous prosecution of the means by which 
their ends might be attained. According to the Minnesota 
scholars, the Bosnian crisis of I908 was a "direct sowing 
of the dragon's teeth." The two Kaisers had rattled their 
swords, and England and Russia alike declined to fight.
If not directly, at least indirectly, German intrigue in 
the Balkans was responsible for the First and Second Balkan 
Wars, In IÇl̂ ., the dreams of all Pan-Germans were about 
to be realized. The war machine that had stood silent for 
forty-three years was to resume its appointed and glorious 
task. From the inception of Pan-Germanism, Austria had 
demonstrated her servility before her infinitely more 
masterful and intelligent ally. The more the "plot" of 
July, 191^ was examined, the authors argued, the more 
fixed became the conviction that the Pan-Germans had 
adopted a deliberate project for achieving world domination 
through three separate, but remotely connected stages:
(1) the defeat of Russia and France and the subsequent 
establishment of Teutonic influence across the Balkans and 
Turkey; (2) the defeat of Great Britain, the seizure of 
British colonies and the substitution of German for British 
seapower; and (3) the violation of the Monroe Doctrine to 
permit German dominance in Latin America, Had Great Britain 
stood aloof, the "plan" called next for the conquest of the
United States.
65Anderson, Davis and Tyler, p.
&?Ibid., pp. 515-17»
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on the question of whether or not Germany gave her 
ally a "blank check," the Minnesota historians hedged, but 
they disputed the honesty of German officials who denied 
knowledge of the contents of the Austrian note. The 
evidence then available led the three authors to assume 
that the German government knew that Austria intended to 
precipitate a conflict menacing to the peace of Europe and 
that she encouraged her ally to accomplish her selfish
ends. "Such evidence would be enough for the densent
«68 jury."
Prederich C. Howe, noted American lawyer and author, 
examined the origins of the war from essentially the same 
perspective but did not exhibit a sense of patriotism 
equal to that of the Minnesota scholars. The Pan-German 
moves in the Balkans, initiated in 1888 when concessions 
for building the Bagdad Railroad were obtained, were seen 
by Howe as the cause for the economic rivalry between 
Great Britain and Germany which eventually led to the 
war. The protection by the two nations of what each of 
them considered her exclusive rights in the Hear East led
69to an environment conducive to war.
An attempt has been made in this section to outline 
the theses of some American historians and would-be his­
torians who were wont to explain the origins of the war
^^Anderson, Davis and Tyler, p. ^02.
^'^Prederich C. Howe, "The Heart of the War,"
Harper's Magazine. CXXXVI, No. S (April, I918), 729.
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primarily in terms of alleged Pan-German activities.
Although some of the authors considered looked to the more 
remote causes of the war, their conclusions did not deviate 
from those of their colleagues who examined only the im­
mediate causes. In each case, it was the intrigue of the 
Pan-Germans at home and abroad that was seen as the prin­
ciple cause for World War I.
V
One segment or "school” of early American war guilt 
scholars defies classification. The work of this group 
is, however, characterized by one common denominator, a 
tendency to examine only the immediate causes in assessing 
the responsibility for World War I, Most of them felt there 
was no need to consider remote or fundamental causes since 
the traditional antagonisms, which had for decades dis­
rupted European tranquility, had subsided by 191^. Indeed, 
many authors, after the Moroccan and Persian settlements, 
felt Europe was witnessing a new dawn of international 
understanding. Since the century-old national animosities 
were seemingly settled, they reasoned, it was the immediate 
causes— the events between June 28 and August 1, 191^—  
that were of primary interest to the student of the war’s 
origins.
Publishing in 191$, Ellery C. Stowell, unaffected 
by American implication in "Europe’s War," took a position 
which approached that of the later revisionist historians, 
although he was concerned principally with immediate causes.
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Looking at the problem of war guilt from a legalistic 
perspective, Stowell discussed the ’’unnatural, perpetual 
neutrality” of Belgium which, in 1839» had been forced on 
the Francophile nation by the astute Lord Palmerston.
Since Germany violated Belgian neutrality--a situation to 
which she had pledged her adherence--she was guilty of a 
crime against the family of nations.
In a sense, the author here examined a "remote” 
cause of the war, but the fact remains, Stowell used only 
those events from the diplomatic history of nineteenth 
century Europe that fit comfortably into his thesis, and 
his attention was primarily directed at the diplomacy of 
the year 191̂ .. Although his theme is more palatable to 
the student than those of most of his contemporaries, he 
still fell victim to the methodology used by some of his 
colleagues discussing the beginnings of the ’’Great War." 
Deductively from a basic hypothesis, Stowell constructed 
his case against the Central Powers.
The major portion of the author’s research was accorded 
the Austro-Serbian crisis. It was inexplicable, even in 
the face of a most serious grievance against her, that 
Austria should "proceed so far in the abuse of force before
there had been any opportunity for investigation by the 
70powers.’’ Unexposed to the "illuminating" evidence pre­
sented the world by Ambassador Morgenthau, Stowell accepted
70Ellery G. Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 
I91L (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 191^), p. 95*
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the official German statement that she had not received a 
prior communication of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia»
It was, however, evident to Stowell that Germany ’’took 
particular pains to be in a position where she could pro­
claim ignorance of the note." The advancement of German 
aims in the Balkans would best be served by such a position. 
If she were ignorant of the contents of the Austrian
ultimatum, she might refuse arbitration and insist on a
71localized conflict.
The disturbance of the balance of power emanating 
from the consolidation of the European alliances was not, 
Stowell maintained, a cause for the war. Rather, it was 
the state of mind created by the disturbance of the erst­
while balance. When German leaders recognized the poten­
tial of the coalition facing them, they felt it mandatory 
that a telling blow be quickly delivered. When the German 
point of view, philosophy of life and the influence of the 
large military caste were taken into consideration, it was
inevitable that Belgium would be brushed aside to lose no
72time in subjugating France.
Adopting the "divided responsibility" thesis in pre­
ference to the "sole German war guilt" theory, Stowell 
anticipated later revisionist assessments of responsibility. 
His conclusions, however, were radically different from the
historians writing after 1920. Austria, the Columbia 
_
Stowell, pp. 121-23.
7^Ibid., pp. I4.8O-8I.
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professor argued, must accept principal blame for the
deliberate manner in which she concealed her intentions
while she prepared an impossible ultimatum. ’’Here, in
the first instance, must be blamed the war in which Europe
73is now engaged.” Since arbitration between Russia and 
Austria had been the accepted precedent for settling 
Balkan disputes, Germany's refusal to allow mediation of 
the Austro-Serbian quarrel assured for herself a grave 
responsibility. Adopting the ’’horse and rider theory,” 
Stowell explained that Germany, because of her irreconciable 
stand and her superior intellectual and material develop­
ment, accepted a larger share of the responsibility for 
precipitating the general European war than her ally.
’’She risked the peace of Europe in a campaign after pres­
tige.
Stowell dismissed Russian mobilization as an immediate 
cause for the war because she had had provocation from 
both of the Central Powers. In the final analysis, Russian 
action was a direct result of Germany's refusal to allow 
the Austro-Russian difficulties to be solved in the manner 
applicable to Balkan disputes, England too was absolved 
of any part of the blame since it was ’’unthinkable” that 
England might remain neutral in the face of a German 
violation of Belgian neutrality.
The actions of all European states were contributory
^^Stowell, p. 483, 
T^Ibld., p. ^85.
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causes for the war, but the motivating force behind the 
courses charted by each of the various nations, including 
the Dual Monarchy, was German provocation. In standing 
between Austria and diplomatic intervention by the powers, 
Germany assumed before civilization "the full responsi­
bility for Austrian action. [ i t a l i c s  mine.J By her 
refusal to cooperate with her sister states, Germany 
shouldered by far the heaviest responsibility for the 
war.
For an explanation of the German actions in 191^, 
Stowell looked to the "state of mind" in Germany after 
unification. Instead of revering a Lincoln or "that 
other hero who could not tell a lie," the people of Ger­
many paid homage to a man, William II, who trampled the 
express provisions of the constitution and a statesman, 
Bismark, who knew how to suppress a part of the truth.
The European War offered a vivid example of the mental 
mobilization of a whole nation. The German people united 
themselves in. support of the fundamental idea which lay at 
the base of German political action— a worshiping of the 
national existence expressed in an almost mystical adora­
tion of the state.
The futility of attempting to write objective history 
within a psychological framework has been alluded to above. 
Stowell affor'ds yet another example of an outstanding
^^Stowell, p. ij.91.
7^Ibid., pp. 507-510.
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American scholar falling victim to generalizing on a 
nation's character. In explaining the origins of the war 
psychologically, the Columbia professor relegated himself 
to the position of a Gauss and left the impression that 
his purpose in writing was first and foremost vindictive 
and only secondly to throw some light on the events sur­
rounding the outbreak of the war.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy, publishing in The Nation, adopted 
Stowell's thesis that German actions explained the course 
followed by all European powers in the summer of 19li|. 
Essentially, Love joy was concerned to disprove the German 
assertion that Russian mobilization was the real casus 
belli. Contrary to the official German explanation, the 
ultimatum delivered to Russia was a "conditional declara­
tion of war." Officially, Germany had said she mobilized 
only after Russian mobilization, that is, on July 31. 
According to Lovejoy, the conference at Potsdam on the 
evening of July 29, where the German plea for British
neutrality was drafted, constituted proof that Germany
77expected to go to war early in the last week in July. 
Subsequent scholarship after 1920 proved that the confer­
ence of July 29 where the final plans for war were allegedly 
drafted was, in fact, never convened.
Professor Edward R. Turner of Yale University seconded 
the stand taken by Stowell that it was Germany which
Arthur 0. Love joy, "What Was the Casus Belli?, "
The Nation. C, No. 2^92 (March i+, I9IS), 2^7.
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shouldered the burden of the war guilt, although Turner 
saw Austria as a contributing factor. The direct cause of 
the war was the Austrian note to Serbia, and the nations 
responsible were Germany and Austria because of their un­
willingness to confer with the interested powers. Turner 
dismissed the possibility that Austria, a vassal state to 
Germany, conceivably could have worked independently in 
dispatching the Austrian ultimatum. The eleventh hour 
decision at the Ballplatz to mediate with Russia absolved 
Austria of the immediate guilt and proved beyond "a shadow 
of a doubt” that Germany was the moving force behind the 
Austrian actions. The German refusal to allow arbitration 
of the dispute "proved” that the tension between Berlin 
and St. Petersburg exceeded that between St. Petersburg and 
Vienna.
The war resulted from a fatal series of mobiliza­
tions. Russian mobilization served as the German casus 
belli. Undecided whether or not to allow a partial mobili­
zation against Austria at the outset, the German decision 
to forbid any mobilization whatsoever was the direct cause 
of the Russian mobilization in the north and ultimately the
78cause of the war. To Turner, with a short-sighted view 
typical of the American historian of 19lii--1920, the immed­
iate cause of the outbreak of hostilities was Russian 
mobilization, but the "underlying" cause was the German
7^Edward R. Turner, "The Immediate Causes of the 
War," The Ration, Oil, No. 2&39 (January 27, I916), 101,
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ultimatum forbidding mobilization. The diplomacy of the 
previous forty-three years was inconsequential.
By 1916, Turner wrote, enough material had been
published that it was possible for the historian to write
above and beyond the realm of opinion. The most valuable
documents upon which to base historical conclusions were
79the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book because, 
in every case, "they are complete and corroborate one 
another." On the other hand, the German White Book was 
"brief, sketchy and inspires little confidence.
Professor Oliver P. Chitwood of the University of 
West Virginia was the great exponent of the contention 
that an understanding of the remote causes of World War 
I was not so important as a knowledge of the immediate 
causes. That nation which "fans a smoldering feeling of 
rivalry into an act of hostility has committed a great 
sin."^^ In support of his position, Chitwood maintained 
that the most serious questions threatening a breach in 
international relations had been settled by 191^» No 
question faced Europe that a desire for peace and wise 
diplomacy could not have solved. Still, Chitwood in 
practice discussed what other historians called remote
^^France^ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La 
Guerre Européenne, 191^» Paris: Imprimerie nationale,
B^Tumer, The Nation. CII,' No. 2639, 99.
^^Oliver P. Chitwood, The Immediate Causes of the 
Great War (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Co., I917), p.v.
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causes, the difference being that Chitwood extricated only 
those events, a discussion of which tended to corroborate 
his basic premise that it was the immediate cause which 
were really important. The principal direct cause of the 
war was Teutonic aggression in the Balkans. After I878, 
that aggression, Chitwood asserted, evolved from dangerous 
to criminal. In I9II and IÇl^, Germany obtained de jure 
recognition from Russia and England respectively of her 
railroad rights in the Balkans. The last difference bet­
ween England and Germany had been amicably settled prior to
82the outbreak of hostilities. Pan-German aims in the 
Balkans had been realized, and a dispute in that area 
seemingly could be resolved without resorting to armed 
conflict.
Chitwood's thesis, after lightly disposing of all 
remote causes, was built around the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia. He cited evidence designed to prove the charge 
that the Serbian note was in reality a German-inspired 
document with an Austrian signature. The sources upon 
which he relied were the London Times which, in July,
1917, first enlightened the world with the suggestion 
that a war council had been convened at Potsdam July 5> 
19ll|<- The meeting, Chitwood asserted, discussed and 
decided upon all points to be included in the Austrian 
communication to Serbia. Since It was probable that 
Russia would refuse to submit to another affront to her
 U2'Chitwood, p. li|..
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national dignity as "protector of the Balkan Slavs" and 
that war was likely to result, all parties attending the 
fateful conference anticipated the subsequent action by 
the belligerent powers, Further substance was given the 
"Potsdam myth" by Lichnowsky’s testifying that he had heard 
that all present at the Potsdam Conference "gave their 
unqualified assent" to the Serbian ultimatum with the fur­
ther suggestion that it "would not be a bad thing if war 
with Russia should result,"®^ The most damaging evidence 
of all, of course, was the Morgenthau tale.
The powers that started the flame were responsible 
for the world conflagration. Since the unreasonable 
Austrian ultimatum was the cause of the war. Great Britain^ 
Prance and Russia were completely exonerated. Germany, 
however, by "her own admission," j^Morgenthau’s testimony] 
shared equally with Austria the responsibility for the 
demands made on Serbia, This "fact" established, the 
responsibility for the European war fell solely on Austria 
and Germany,
The testimony which Chitwood found so damning to the 
Central Powers was used by nearly every historian concerned 
with the origins of the war after the publication of the 
Morgenthau "revelations," It was principally from the 
evidence offered by the ex-ambassador, Lichnowsky and 
Meuhlon that the consideration of immediate causes rather
G^Chitwood, p. 63.
®^Ibld,, p. 6i|.
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than remote causes became the vogue among American war 
guilt students. With such ostensibly reputable sources 
upon which to base historical conclusions, it appeared 
that the direct causes were indeed more important than the 
general diplomatic picture between I87I and 1^1^. Of 
course, such an approach relieved the historian or pseudo­
historian from tedious research entailed in examining and 
evaluating the more remote evidence on hand.
From the testimony concerning the Potsdam Conference, 
writers deduced a multitude of conclusions, few of which 
were warranted even if based upon that falsified infor­
mation, For example, M. Louise McLoughlin, writing in 
Current History, intimated that the Potsdam Conference 
was not only concerned with the Austrian ultimatum, but 
that there, on July 5, IÇl^, a "deep laid" plan was drafted
by the Central Powers in which the invasion of Belgium
Adwas only the first step toward world domination.
The naivete of a writer who assumed that a plan for 
world conquest, even if one did exist, which it did not, 
could be conceived in one day or, for that matter, "Twelve 
Days" is quite beyond comprehension. There is absolutely 
no evidence, conclusive or otherwise, unless extracts are 
taken from the writings of extreme nationalistic German 
theoreticians and applied to real political situations, for 
the charge that Germany intended to conquer the world.
Louise McLoughlin, "The Beginnings of the 
War," Current History, XIII, No. 3 (December, 1917),
493.
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That the German government never officially repudiated the 
statements of a few philosophers not even remotely connect­
ed to the government does not constitute "proof" of anything. 
The United States has never felt it necessary to officially 
condemn the ideas of American expansionists— geopoliticians 
like Alfred T. Mahan or politicians like Theodore Roosevelt-- 
because their imperialistic philosophies have not been the 
prevailing guiding lights of American foreign policy.
Neither were the ideas of Nietzsche or Treitschke nec­
essarily the guide posts by which German statesmen wended 
their way diplomatically in the nineteenth and early twent­
ieth centuries. American historians publishing in the per­
iod 191^-1920, however, were wont to adopt the preachings 
of any German whose ideas might fit conveniently into their 
general theses, and apply them as the motivation behind the 
actions of the German government. A case could conceivably 
be made that the United States wished to conquer the world 
if one were careful to pick and choose the sources upon 
which to base his thesis. lil/hen all of the facts were taken 
into consideration, however, such a thesis would crumble.
This is precisely what happened to much of the "deathless 
prose" produced by American historians during the war years.
Rejecting the interpretation generally accepted by 
early students of responsibility, David J. Hill, a former 
United States ambassador to Germany, laid at the door of 
one man, William II, the blame for the World War. Before 
the answer to the Austrian note had even been received from
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Serbia, the Kaiser, according to Hill, was arranging to
confine the war to the continent, operating upon assurances,
which Hill contended were never given, from King George
that England would remain neutral. Despite his promises
to Russia that he would use his influence to restrain
Austria, William II "spoke not a word for peace.
Thinking he could have the war on his own terms, the Kaiser
deliberately plunged the -whole continent into war. His
role consisted of "flashing his sword in the face of the
Tsar determined Europe would have nothing to say about it."
To the author, the war was a manifestation of the Kaiser’s
personal temperament. Hill, the diplomat-turned-historian,
not only disregarded all remote causes, but he also wrote
off the usually conceived immediate causes as immaterial,
placing the responsibility solely on William II.
To Munroe Smith, the immediate causes of the war
were of predominant importance since German foreign policy
had changed very little after the retirement of Bismark.
The aim of the Bismarkian policy was the prevention of a
coalition of superior powers against Germany. Bismark’s
conduct of foreign affairs was quite in keeping with
Theodore Roosevelt’s formula. If he carried a big stick,
he walked softly. "Only against France was the big stick
8?occasionally shaken."
^^David J. Hill, "The Kaiser’s Responsibility,"
Current History, XIII, No. 3 (December, 191?)» 497»
^^Munroe Smith, Militarism and Statecraft (New 
York; G. P. Putnam & Sons, I9I8), p. 31
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That policy was not changed after I89O except in 
relation to Russia, The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty 
in 1890 provided the event upon which the rival alliances 
were forged. This was the extent of Smith's analysis of 
what might be termed remote causes, although he, like many 
of his contemporaries, attempted to psycho-analyse the 
German nation and applied the nebulous, academic state­
ments found in German intellectual history to real situa­
tions. The German actions in 191^, according to Smith, 
were attributable to a "state of mind" which evolved from 
a modest beginning provided by Machiavelli.
The most decisive of the immediate causes was the 
German decision to declare war because of Russian mobili­
zation. The proper answer to mobilization was mobilization, 
not war,^^ In the brief time between the Austrian ultimatum 
to Serbia and the German ultimatum to Russia, every European 
power except Germany and the Dual Monarchy worked toward 
averting war. Even if German apologies were accepted.
Smith argued, the burden of aggression could not be shifted 
from the Central Powers to the Allies unless Russian 
mobilization was an act of war, which was precisely what 
later "revisionists" contended.
The only feasible defense for the Central Powers, 
since they could not shift the responsibility to the 
Entente, was, according to Smith, the assumption that 
war was inevitable and that Germany and Austria engaged
®®Smith, pp. l|6-i|-7o
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in a preventive war in 191^. Hostile Allied intentions 
that would prove such a statement, however, were nowhere 
to be found in the r e c o r d .
Looking at the problem posed by the violation of 
Belgian territorial integrity from the moralist vantage 
point, Smith maintained that necessity could not Justify 
the act. The only immediate sanction of internation law 
was the reaction of general sentiment, and it was difficult 
to understand why the nation that found it necessary to 
"scrap" her treaty obligations should manifest indignation 
when she encountered general reprobation. On the face of 
the record--not the whole record but only those portions 
which Smith found compatible with his general thesis—  
the responsibility rested solely with the Central Powers.
In 191̂ 5 the Austrian and German governments succumbed to 
the mistake Bismark had avoided and sacrificed the moral 
advantages of the defensive position in favor of the stra­
tegic advantages of a rapid attack.
To Justify expansion through war. Smith searched 
German intellectual history for a philosophic doctrine 
which would suffice, and he found that Germany very simply 
had applied the Darwinian "survival of the fittest" to the 
competition among nations. In "Neo-Darwinism," Smith found 
an explanation for all German activity after unification. 
The German feeling of superiority, which was realized by 
interpreting and reinterpreting history, would be extended
Smith, pp. ^5-59*
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to all corners of the world after the struggle for power 
and the survival of those nations best qualified for dom­
inion. Neo-Darwinism found a religious base in the German 
assumption that the struggle for power was the method of 
progress ordained by God.^O
Professor Smith recognized land hunger, national 
allusions of a mission and militaristic sentiment as 
contributing factors leading to World War I, These 
sociological phenomena could be seen in any nation at 
some time in its development in proper balance, but 
exaggeration of any one of them amounted to a "national 
mania." A nation could become temporarily insane, and the 
fact that Germany insisted that she had been on the defen­
sive in 191^ indicated to Smith that she was afflicted by 
a "mania of persecution."^^ Temporary national insanity 
was the only plea which would be accepted by the "Supreme 
Court of Civilization."
The immediate causes, particularly the diplomacy of 
the "Twelve Days," was enough to convince Norman Hapgood, 
the "muckraking" editor of Harper’s Weekly., that Germany 
was solely responsible for World War I. The factors, a 
knowledge of which Hapgood felt was necessary to properly 
interpret the diplomacy immediately proceeding the war, 
were as follows:
(1) Austria was not a nation but a dynasty. Her
^^Smith, pp. 2IO-II4..
^^Ibld., pp. 261-62.
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foreign policy was directed toward holding the dynasty 
together. The murder of the heir apparent gave Austria 
the chance she had long awaited,
(2) Russia had made it clear after the Bosnian coup 
that she would not again allow a Slavic state to be humbled 
before the Dual Monarchy. She would have gladly accepted 
any compromise short of the obliteration of Serbia.
(3) The opening of the Kiel Canal doubled the effect­
iveness of the German fleet. Domestic troubles in Germany 
and growing Russian strength led German diplomats to 
believe that August, igi^ was psychologically the right 
moment to strike, despite the knowledge that Austria was 
ready to mediate her dispute with Russia.
Germany, Hapgood maintained, forced the war in I91I+, 
Austria was merely her ’’cat’s paw.” Germany encouraged 
the insulting tone of the Austrian note to Serbia, and by 
the time the naive Austrian diplomats realized they had 
been duped, it was too late,
A slightly different, although not particularly 
popular, twist was applied the events proceeding the war 
in the Catholic World. To the author, it was perfectly 
evident from the terms of the ultimatum that it was framed 
with the intent to precipitate a war. The note merely 
served to substantiate the maxim that ’’given the choice 
of two courses, Austria is sure to choose the worst.
^^Norman Hapgood, ’’Who Caused the War,” Harper’s 
Weekly, DIX, No. 3011 (September I9I4), 221-23.---
93’’The War in Europe,” Catholic World, XCIX,
No. 594 (September, I9I4), 853«
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The Instigator of the step taken by the Catholic Dual 
Monarchy, according to the World * s account, was Prime 
Minister Stephen Tisza, one of the most active Calvinists 
in Hungary. The German Emporer did all in his power to 
prevent the war. Even the Socialist journal, Vorwarts, 
which had been adamant in its opposition to the Crown, 
admitted that William II unreservedly worked for peace 
during the pre-war decade. In the instance of the war, 
the Kaiser suffered from the evil of all one-man govern­
ments— "the influence of an irresponsible back stair 
c l i q u e , T h e  tendency among historians undoubtedly 
would be to dismiss as baseless the conclusions of a 
denominational journal such as the World. Ironically, 
however, the analysis examined above more closely ap­
proximated the truth, except in reference to the pacific 
Count Tisza, than the more "scholarly" works by some 
American historians.
VI
99The research of Charles Seymour into the origins 
of the war stands out from the efforts of his contempor­
aries because of his multi-visioned approach to the pro­
blem of war responsibility. His methodology very closely 
approximated that of later scholars concerned with war
^Catholic World, XCIX, Ho. 99U» 899.
99 /Seymour was in I9I0 a professor of history at Yale 
University, the institution of which he later became 
president,
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guilt in that he examined both the remote and immediate 
causes of the war. It was obvious, he wrote, that so great 
a conflagration could not arise from one assasination alone. 
Merely the "occasion" for the conflict, the murder was the 
spark which ignited the magazine; if it had not been for 
thirty years accumulation of powder, "there could have
96been no explosion." The fact that Professor Seymour's 
conclusions did not conform to those of later scholars can 
be attributed in large part to the paucity of documentary 
evidence whereby the whole truth might be discovered. The 
addition of several chapters after the outbreak of the war— - 
the bulk of the research was completed before August, igi^—  
debased the work since those additions were written with the 
knowledge of what the diplomacy of forty years, or what 
was known of it, meant in long run terms.
German pre-eminence in Europe was realized under the 
strong hand of the "Iron Chancellor;" German hegemony 
began with the creation of the Triple Alliance, What had 
started as military primacy with a victory over France in 
1870-71 had become political primacy. In the process, 
however, Bismark had made the rapproachment of Russia and 
France inevitable since "the farthest is from Germany, 
the closer is to F r a n c e . Relatively confident that a 
peace conducive to her growth could be maintained, the
96Charles Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of 
the War, I87O-I9I4 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
191b), p. 1,
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Ibid., p.
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German nation, between I87I and underwent an extra­
ordinary material and moral transformation which led 
directly to the diplomatic crises which characterized the 
first decade of the twentieth century and finally led to 
the "Great War."^^ German economic expansion was a threat 
to the supremacy long held by Great Britain. Germany, 
which heretofore had stood in awe of her European neigh­
bors, now entered into competition with them. When the 
ambitious German state arrived on the colonial scene, 
however, she found that most of the world had been par­
celed out among the other imperialistic nations, chiefly 
Great Britain, France and The Netherlands. Entering the 
imperialistic scramble rather late in the game, Germany 
concentrated on economic penetration in the Far East, Near 
East and Africa, The Near East looked particularly ripe 
after the Austrian rapproachment. Through Austria and 
Turkey, Germany hoped to open a path to Mesopotamia from 
where she could compete with the British position in 
Egypt.
This far, the Seymour thesis squared remarkably well 
with later historians who were blessed with considerably 
more evidence with which to work. Searching for what could 
conceivably be a reason for the "sudden" German adoption 
of a "bellicose attitude" in foreign policy, Seymour went 
awry, adding conjecture to fact. Because Germany felt 
the need for a political position comparable to her econ­
98Seymour, p. 60.
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omic stature, a "vague desire for power in general" gave 
rise to the demand in Germany for a "world e m p i r e . A  
moral transformation permitting the erection of a new 
value system took place. Germany, it was felt, ought to 
play a part proportionate to her wealth and population, 
and Germans generally realized that goal could be achieved 
only through force. No matter how insistent or sincere 
might be the contention that dictates of self-preservation 
inspired such an attitude, Seymour argued, the German 
frame of mind was undeniably aggressive. Here, Seymour 
reverted to the popular technique of mass psycho-analysis 
applying statements of Nietzsche, Berhardi and Treitschke 
to explain German political action. His conclusions were 
similar to those of his colleagues who indulged in the will- 
o-the-wisp and equally as indefensible.
On the whole, the bellicose attitudes of the German 
nation were not manifested in international relations at 
the outset, but, despite the Kaiser's wish for peace, it 
was apparent that the "universal demand for expansion" in 
Germany would soon bring that nation into conflict with 
her European neighbors. Seymour absolved the Kaiser of 
personal responsibility for the war and indicted instead 
the Prussian Junkers, the capitalists and the German 
people in general. William II was merely the tool through 
which the military caste worked.
The diplomatic revolution which witnessed the Franco-
'^^Seymour, p. 88.
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Russian rapproachment and later Great Britain’s adherence 
to the Triple Entente ended the Bismarkian system of 
’antagonize and dominate,” The question to be determined 
was whether Germany would peaceably accept such a situ­
ation, The altered international situation caused
Germany to change her official tone from one of concili­
ation to one of "bellicose brutality" and resulted in the 
atmosphere which characterized Europe during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. After I9OO, three quick 
"blows" were struck to maintain German prestige: the 
Kaiser’s Tangiers speech in support of the Sultan, the 
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
dispatching of the gunboat. Panther, to Agadir on the 
African coast. It was a similar blow for German prestige 
that was largely accountable for the outbreak of World 
War I in 19ll|,^°^
After her frustration in North Africa, Germany turned 
anew to the Balkans where each of the major powers had an 
interest. For Germany, the outcome of the First Balkan 
War was dismal. The German-trained Turkish army had been 
badly beaten. Nothing would please Austria and Germany 
more than to have the victorious Balkan states scrap the 
Treaty of London and resume hostilities. The implication 
is that Germany goaded the Balkan states into rebuking the 
London settlement and resuming hostilities, an assertion 
which Seymour would find difficult to substantiate, Al-
^^^Seymour, pp. I6O-65» 
lOljbid., pp. 169-70.
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though none of the interested powers were contented with
the settlement of Bucharest after the Second Balkan War,
it evoked even more displeasure in the Central Powers,
because the territorial gains by Serbia represented a blow
102both to their prestige and their Near Eastern interests. 
Austria's political and economic domination of the Balkans 
which, after I908, appeared near now seemed threatened, 
the factor which determined the future course of the Central 
Powers.
By diplomacy of force, the new Serbia, which blocked 
German expansionist goals in the Near East, had to be 
paralyzed and Turkey strengthened. Bulgaria had to be 
dragged back under German domination and reinforced by the 
Macedonian provinces she failed to secure in I913. To 
the Germans, a permanent■league of Turkey, Bulgaria,
Rumania and Greece, backed by the Central Powers, was 
mandatory if Pan-German aims in the Near East were to be
103attained. Patiently, the Central Powers awaited a false
move by Serbia. The assasination of the Austrian heir 
apparent provided a casus belli better suited to the aims 
of the Dual Monarchy and Germany than they could have 
possibly devised. The time was ripe for the permanent 
annihilation of Serbia and the realization of Pan-German 
dreams in the Balkans. Toward that end, German diplomacy 
of the "Twelve Days" was directed. Austria operated as
^‘̂^Seymour, p. 238.
pp. 242-^3.
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a Teutonic "oat's paw" fully assured of unlimited German 
cooperation after receiving the carte blanche.
Seymour contended that it was not for the historian 
to "anathraatize the uncompromising tone assumed by Germany 
in the crisis of 191^,"^^^ but that is precisely what he 
did. His thesis, after June 28, IÇl^, does not materially 
differ from those of his most vindictive contemporaries. 
Seymour pronounced Germany guilty as charged on every count, 
a rather disappointing conclusion to what began as an ex­
tremely objective and scholarly piece of work. Still, in 
spite of its shortcomings, Seymour's analysis of the origins 
of the war is distinguishable from the efforts of most of 
his colleagues by the attention he accorded remote causes, 
Although the writings of nearly every American his­
torian and/or popular writer concerned with the subject of 
war responsibility between IÇl^ and 1920 condemned the 
Central Powers and defended the Entente, all American 
scholars were not so sure that the origins of the war 
could be painted in blacks and whites. One of the earliest 
to refuse to swallow unflinchingly the medicine offered 
by the Entente physicians was H. C. Mercer, a noted anth­
ropologist and student of European diplomacy. In a letter 
to the editor of The Nation in I916, Professor Mercer took 
issue with the cut and dried thesis propounded by Professor 
Turner in his "Immediate Causes of the War,"
Mercer appealed to the historian to refrain from
10i|.Seymour, p. 287.
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picking and choosing his evidence and to consider all of 
the available facts. He pointed out a few known facts that 
Turner "overlooked” in his. indictment of Germany. Turner 
did not take cognizance of the so-called Westminister 
Telegram from Germany to her ally wherein Austria was 
urged to discuss her differences with Russia. Conversely, 
neither England nor France had pressed Russia to cease 
mobilization which Germany had characterized as "menacing." 
Austria's eleventh hour decision to discuss her differences 
with Russia was seen by Mercer as a direct result of the 
Westminister Telegram. Furthermore, Mercer charged.
Turner had failed to discuss fully the Russian change from 
a partial to full mobilization in the face of German 
warnings that such an act would be considered "war­
like." Neither had the Yale historian taken note of 
the captured diplomatic letter from Russia to Belgium 
telling of the French government's promise of support 
to Russia before Germany had made a move. The signi­
ficance of other published correspondence in which Eng­
land's adherence to Russia and France was intimated well 
in advance of the German moves on Belgium had "inadvert­
ently" been overlooked by Turner. Lastly, Mercer asked,
why had three members of the British Cabinet resigned
109after the English decision to go to war?
As early as I919, George B. McClellan^^^ refuted
C. Mercer, "Letter to the Editor," The Nation., 
Oil, No. 2690 (April 13, 1916), i+06-07.
^®^McClellan was a professor in modern European his­tory at Princeton University.
100
the contention that all American historians felt Germany 
was solely responsible for precipitating World War I. 
Unfortunately, McClellan wrote, because of British pre­
eminence on the high seas and the cutting of the cable, 
many Americans had allowed themselves to be swayed by 
bellicose propaganda, lost their sense of proportion and
assumed an open belligerency not In keeping with the
107American position of neutrality. There were some
"generous souls" who Insisted that neutrality was cowardice, 
that there was a "higher duty" owed civilization. Those 
Individuals, McClellan commented, would throw the nat­
ional Interest to the winds and have the United States 
enter on whichever side they felt was fighting for human­
ity. In sounding his note of caution, McClellan pointed 
out the folly of blaming what had happened on any one man 
or, for"'that matter, any one nation. He preferred to look 
to European nationalism as the principal cause of the war. 
The feeling than abroad In all European countries that 
states and nationalities must be counterminus and that 
races be governed as units was, McClellan contended, the 
real cause of the war.^^^
The German violation of Belgium was no better nor 
worse than Great Britain’s violation of the Portuguese
107George B. McClellan, "The War from an American 
Point of View," Scribners Magazine, LVII, No, 38 
(March, 1915), 359%
^O^Ibld., p. 360.
101
colony of Lourenco Marques during the Boer War; both, 
however, were officially explained in terms tending to 
make ’’piracy” respectable. After hearing the philan­
thropic statements by Germany and Great Britain alike, 
it was, McClellan noted, refreshing to hear a Latin nation 
like Italy justify her imperialistic venture in Tripoli 
on the grounds that she simply coveted it.^^^ Because 
Germany arrived on the imperialistic scene after the 
boundaries of Europe had been rigidly fixed, it was apparent 
that she would have to look beyond the confines of the con­
tinent for territorial aggrandisement. Still, McClellan 
contended, she ’’stole” less than any other modern imper­
ialistic nation.
The events of IÇl^ rudely demolished the dreams of 
many observers of the European scene. It had been widely 
felt that a new era of internationalism had dawned, Now, 
it became apparent that twenty-five years of international­
ism was due to the force of economic necessity, not to the 
call of human brotherhood. In the same way, the opposing 
alliance systems were born. It was as absurd to assume 
that the powers grouped themselves into alliances because 
of international sympathies as it was to assume that either 
of the great alliances came into existence purely as ’pro­
tective f o r c e s . E c o n o m i c  rivalry with Germany was the 
motivation behind England's entrance into the Triple Entente,
^^^McClellan, Scribners Magazine, LVII, No. 38, 361.
llOlbid., p. 363.
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while La Revanche, the French watchword since I87I, prompted 
France in the same direction. Russia's insistence on 
placing herself at the head of the world’s Slavic peoples, 
implying a crushing of the Dual Monarchy, impelled Russia 
to take the course of Great Britain and France.
The charge of militarism, McClellan contended, laid 
with equal force against all of the belligerents. All 
nations, by 191^» were approaching the point where only 
two alternatives were open--war or disarmament. Since the 
national hatreds of the powers went too deep to permit the 
latter, it was merely a question of who would strike first. 
The conflagration might have been prevented in IÇl^, but 
it was "inevitable" eventually as the product of the spirit 
of nationality which had ruled Europe for a full century.
By 1917, the appearance of T. Lothrop Stoddard’s
Present Day Europe; Its National States of Mind gave
indications that revisionist sentiment had already begun
to take hold among a minority of American scholars. The
112trend which started with McClellan and Stoddard, how­
ever, did not manifest itself in a majority of American 
historians until the fourth decade of the century, but it 
is interesting to note what Stoddard did with the same body 
of facts his contemporaries almost unanimously used to 
indict Germany. For the point of view expressed in his 
book, Stoddard might well be labeled the first American
111 
)
"Professor in modern European history at Harvard
McClellan, Scribners Magazine, LVII, No. 38, 3 k̂' 
112,
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revisionist on the causes of World War I.
Germany, he wrote, felt she was fighting to save the
European heritage from Asiatic barbarism. When England
joined Russia, It was the vilest treachery to the cause of
civilization, since Inside Germany, the war was viewed as
a German-Russlan conflict. England, the Germans felt, was
not only fighting on the side of barbarism but also on the
side of moral lnjustlce--unjust because Russia had begun
the war to prevent "a thorough expiation of a wretched 
113murder.” Serbia was viewed by Germans as a Russian 
"cat's paw" of Pan-Slavlsm which epitomized the lust for 
world domination. To Stoddard must be given the dis­
tinction of presenting the first unbiased appraisal of 
German public opinion, and how It viewed the war.
Striking the note upon which scores of American his­
torians In the next two decades were to launch their studies, 
Stowell argued It was absurd to assign Europe's Ills to a 
single cause such as secret diplomacy, Prussian militarism, 
British navallsm or Pan-Slavlsm and then "verbally demolish 
this poor bogey with the announcement of the advent of the 
Golden Age." The cataclysm was not the work of any man or 
set of men. Its substance was the Inexorable legacy of 
the past.^^^
The Intention In this chapter has not been to examine
^^^T. Lothrop Stoddard, Present Day Europe; Its 
National States of Mind (New York: The Century Co.,
1$Ï7), P* 77.
^^^Ibld,. pp. 311-16,
lOl̂
the works of all writers publishing between IÇlij- and 1920 
who concerned themselves with the origins of the ’’Great 
War." Selections were made because they appear representa­
tive of the various approaches to the problem posed by war 
responsibility. Moreover, each of the authors considered 
above seems to have exerted a marked Influence upon his 
contemporaries.
Obviously, a chronological dividing line cannot be 
sharply drawn In a study of this sort whereby all historians 
or scholars belonging to one "school" will fall on one side 
of the line and all those propounding another Interpre­
tation on the opposite side. The year I92O was selected 
as a dividing point, not because there was a complete 
break with scholars of the previous decade In that year, 
but because works commonly referred to as "revisionist" 
appeared more often after I920. There were American 
historians whose views on war responsibility were never 
materially affected by the publication of the post-war 
diplomatic collections. On the other hand, the so-called 
revisionists began publishing before 1920, despite the fact 
that the documents necessary to re-evalute the earlier 
historical Interpretations remained hidden In the national 
repositories of Europe.
Because of a scarcity of documentary evidence whereby 
the whole story might be told and a decided affinity among 
American war guilt scholars after 1917 to place their pat­
riotic duty above Intellectual responsibility, the theses
los
of early writers Investigating the origins of World War I 
varied only In approach. Almost to a man the American 
historical profession, seconded by popular writers and 
pseudo-historians, rose to proclaim Germany guilty of pre­
cipitating a tragedy unequaled In the annals of human 
history.
With Europe aflame, the learned professors constructed 
a basic text, although the more Imaginative among them 
applied a few novel twists. The growth of Germany was 
predicated on diabolical ambition, the Intellectual prophets 
for which were Frederlch the Great, Nietzsche and Treltschke, 
After 1871, Germany secretly and carefully had plotted a 
war, the first step toward world dominion, Austria was 
held under the German thumb, and the Sarajevo Incident 
served as an excuse for the German blood bath. The fatal 
decision that the long-awaited moment had arrived was made 
at Potsdam July S> l?!^. After that date, Germany opposed 
all offers of mediation and pushed her "cat’s paw” closer 
to the abyss where a fall would produce Armegeddon— the 
battleground where good, the Entente, and evil, the Central 
Powers, would meet at last to determine the fate of mankind.
Because Germany refused all offers to mediate and 
consistently frustrated the offers of the peacemakers, 
Sazonov and Lord Grey, she was guilty before the "Supreme 
Court of Civilization.” World War I was the product of 
German ambition, and because of this, responsibility for 
the holocaust rested solely upon her shoulders.
CHAPTER III
REVELATIONS BEARING ON THE ORIGINS 
OF THE WAR, 1917-1930
In 1925» a movement backed by prominent British 
citizens, including George Peabody Gooch, H. G. Wells,
George Bernard Shaw and Maynard Keynes, was launched to 
delete Article 231, the "war guilt clause," from the 
Treaty of Versailles. Although the motives of those 
supporting the movement differed, the British scholars 
were unanimous in their belief that the document con­
stituted an insuperable barrier to international under­
standing. Keynes might feel the need for revision on the 
ground that the treaty was economically unrealistic, 
while Gooch could sincerely believe that Germany was wronged 
by the guilty appelation hung on her at Versailles.
The reaction against the terms imposed by the victors 
in 1919 was not confined, however, to Great Britain but 
was felt in each of the erstwhile belligerent nations.
The rapid change in sentiment among some of the world’s 
leading scholars was attributable to the revolutionary 
upheavals in Germany, Austria and Russia. In repudiation 
of the wartime regimes, the new socialist governments 
threw open their national archives in hopes that the 
world’s historians might find some basis in the secret 
documents for placing responsibility for the recent con-
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filet on the previous capitalist governments.
The new evidence convinced a minority of American 
historians that the blacks and whites painted by the 
Entente propagandists were at best gradations of grey. 
Scholars who had retained their sense of balance during 
the war aligned themselves with others who had recovered 
from the patriotic binge and began a systematic study of 
the documentary evidence bearing on the war's origins.
In contrast to the tremendous job of "popular scholar­
ship"^ during the war, the research done after the war 
constituted "one of the most remarkable examples of pro- 
ductlve scholarship In a century." A closer examination 
of the new documentary material upon which American histor­
ians studying the problem of war responsibility were to 
rely Increasingly Is In order. Until World War I, It had 
been the practice to keep the diplomatic records relating 
to the origins of wars under wraps for as long as fifty 
years. In IÇl^, the documents concerning the Franco- 
Prusslan War had not yet been fully published. But 
this was not I87O, and the first hint of what was to 
come appeared In print less than one year after the 
outbreak of hostilities. The Belgian archives were 
seized by Germany and extracts published under the edltor-
^Wllllam T. Hutchinson, "The American Historian In 
Wartime," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIX,
No, 2 (September, 19^2), 153-86.
2Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing 
(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), p. 280.
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ship of Bernhard Schwertfeger.^ Entente historians, how­
ever, were wont to dismiss the findings of Schwertfeger 
until it was found that much in the captured Belgian 
documents was substantiated by the state papers from 
other national repositories.
In 1919, the Austrian and German governments each 
published a collection of documents bearing on the crisis 
of 191^.^ J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and 
Friedrich Thimme, in 1922, collaborated in editing the 
German documents on the period 1871-191^ under the now 
famous title. Grosse Politik.
In the same year, a more complete collection was 
published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment 
entitled Official German Documents Relating to the World
^Belgische AktenstUcke 190S-191^ Berichte der 
belgischen Vertreter in Berlin, London und Paris 
an den Minister des ^ussern in Brussel. Ed. byBernhard 
Schwertfeger. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur 
Politik und Geschichte m.b.h., 191̂ <>
^Austian Red Book. Diplomatische Aktenstucke zur 
Vorgeschichte des Krieges^ 191^. Ed. by Roderich Gooss.
2 vols. Vienna: L. W, Seidel & Co., 1919*
Germany. Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch. 
I4. Vols. Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellshaft fîîr 
Politik und Geschichte m.b.h,, I919. Coll. by Karl 
Kautsky, Eng. ed. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Col­
lected by Karl Kautsky. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 192 .̂
gGermany. Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen 
Kabinette 1871-191^, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen 
Auswartigen Amtes. Ed. by J, Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn- 
Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme.^ Ij.0 vols. Berlin: 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte 
m.b.h., 1922-27.
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W a r This tremendous example of cooperative scholarship 
required the collective efforts of scores of historians.
It included: the testimony of Germans from all walks of 
life before a committee appointed by the post-war German 
government to investigate the war guilt problem; records 
of the reaction in Germany to President Wilson's peace 
note of 1916; and documents relating to negotiations bet­
ween Germany and the United States concerning the sub­
marine problem.
After the Austrian archives were opened to scholars. 
Professor A. F. Pribram of Harvard published his extractions 
under the title. The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 
1879-191^ » Later, two Austrian scholars, Ludwig Bittner 
and Hans Webersberger, published on behalf of the govern­
ment an eight volume collection of the documents bearing
on the years, I908-I9I3, which threw new light on Austro-
6Serbian and Austro-Russian relations.
Russia was the first of the former Allied powers 
to open her archives. The Bolshevik government never 
did undertake a systematic publication of all documents
^Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Official 
German Documents Relating to the World War, 2 vols. New 
York: Oxford University Press, I923.
7A. P. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austrla- 
Hungary. Cambridge: Ëarvard University Press, 1920-19 21.
^Austria. 0*sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von 
der bosnischen Krise I9O8 bis^zum Kriegsausbruch I9IË. 
Diplomatische Akenstücke des osterreichisch-ungarlschen 
Ministeriums des Xussern. Ed. by L. Bittner and Hans 
Webersberger. 8 vols. Vienna: A. Holzhausen, 1930.
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relating to the origins of the war, but in the winter of 
1917-1918, the Soviets published the so-called "Secret 
Treaties of the Entente" in Pravda exploding the hypo­
thesis that idealism had been the motivating factor behind 
Allied actions in 191^.^ Later, the Russian revelations 
were thoroughly analysized by a number of American scholars 
including Ray Stannard B a k e r . T o  the "Secret Treaties," 
the Soviet government added in 1922 a massive collection
of Materials for the Study of Franco-Russian Relations from 
_  _
1910-191^ » In the early 1920's French and German scholars,
X ^  12notably Rene Marchand, Emile Laloy and Priederich Stieve,
gained access to the Russian archives. From the pen of the 
latter came a multi-volume edition of Russian documents and
13secondary sources like his Isvolsky and the World War.
^The "Secret Treaties" were rearranged and trans­
lated into German in Dokumente aus den russichen 
Geheimarchiven Soveit sie bis zum Juli I9IÜ Eingegangen 
Sind. Berlin; Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft ftir politik 
und Geschichte m.b.h., I9I8.
^^Ray Stannard Baker (ed.), Woodrow Wilson, Life 
and Letters, 8 vols. New York; Doubleday, Page & Co.,
1927-1939.
11Materialy po Istorii Franko-Russkikh Otnoscenni 
za 1910-191^ . Moscow, 1922.
12/Emile Laloy, Les documents secrets des Archives 
du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Russie. Paris: 
Editions Bossard, I919.
Un Livre Noir: Diplomatique d 'avant-Guerre d'après 
les Documents des Archives Russes, 1910-191^° Ed. by 
René Marchand. 2 vols. Paris; Librairie du travail, 1922-23.
13Isvolsky, Per diplomatische Schriftwechsel 
Iswolskis I9II-I914. Aus den Geheimakten der russischen 
Staatsarchivel Ed. by Friedrich Stieve. Vols, Berlin: 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte 
m.b.h., 192^.
Friedrich Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War. Trans.
E, W. Dickes, London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., I926,
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Besides the official work done In the Russian archives, 
the Slebert pa p e rs , wh i ch  purported to be duplicates of 
official dispatches between London and St. Petersburg 
copied by the wartime secretary of the Russian embassy In 
London, fell Into the hands of German scholars and were 
published. They were later edited anew by the English 
scholars, Temperley and Gooch, In the British documentary
15collection.
At the outset, neither the French nor English govern­
ments opened Its archives to the scrutiny of the world's 
scholars, but the publication of the secret Russian docu­
ments exposed the wartime French Yellow Book^^ for what 
It was— the most seriously distorted of all the official
17apologies Issued during the war. The new documentary 
evidence gave scholars a start toward checking the validity 
of the official wartime statements. One of the earliest 
studies of this sort was undertaken by a German scholar, 
von Romberg, whose work. The Falsifications of the Russian 
Orange Book,^^ Included the pre-war diplomatic exchanges
^^Benno von Slebert, Diplomatische Aktenstu zur 
Geschichte der Entente-polltlk der Vorkrlegsjabre. Z vols. 
Berlin; Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fWr Politik und 
Geschichte m.b.h., 1921.
^^Brltlsh Documents on the Origins of the War, I898- 
191^. Ed. by G. Pi Gooch and Harold W. V. Temperley. iT 
vols. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926-I938. 
16 /France. Mlnlst&re des Affaires Etrangères. La 
guerre européens. Documents diplomatiques 191^. ParTs: 
Imprimerie nationale, 191^.
^^Barnes, A History of ..., p. 282.
^^Dle Falschungen des russichen Orangebuches, 
Herausgegeben von Frelherrn G. von Romberg. Berlin 
& Leipzig, 1922.
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between St. Petersburg and Paris and laid bare many of the 
suppressions in the earlier Russian apology.
Despite the widely heard charge that the revelations 
were simply German and Bolshevik propaganda, the veracity 
of the newly-published documentary evidence was creditably 
enhanced when it was recognized that the new releases 
attempted to discredit wartime governments. The authen­
ticity of the Russian papers was then acknowledged by 
Sazonov, Russian foreign minister under Tsar Nicholas, in 
the introduction to How the War Began^^ published in the 
early 1920's. Harry E. Barnes wrote categorically in 
1926 that no historian who gave the new evidence a thorough
examination had failed to become converted to the revision-
20ist position on the origins of the war. This, however, 
was somewhat of an overstatement as shall be pointed out 
later.
In 1928, the French government belatedly agreed 
to publish the documents of its foreign office concern­
ing the war’s beginnings, but the historians appointed 
to the official editorial committee included none of 
the revisionist stamp, indicating the possibility of 
government suppression. In I929, however, the first 
volume appeared and proved to be far superior to earlier
^^How the War Began. The Diary of Baron Schilling, 
Chief of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Office. 
London, 1925»
20Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World 
War (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, I926), p. 66I.
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21French collections. Beginning in I926, Gooch and Tem­
perley began to systematically edit the eleven volume 
British documents, a process which was not completed until 
1938. Adding to the flood of new evidence, many of the 
principal statesmen of the period in which the seeds for 
World War I were sown published their memoirs or letters. 
The ambiguities and inaccuracies in the reminiscences of 
men like von Tirpitz, Sazonov, Poincare, Asquith, Grey and 
Isvolsky were clarified after historians began to inverview 
the participants in the drama of 19l4°
German historians, quite naturally, were the first to 
approach the war guilt problem scholarly and critically.
The first post-war research into German diplomacy was that 
by Erich Brandenburg. Stieve, as indicated above, studied 
the Isvolsky-Poincare exchanges, and Herman Lutz undertook 
a study of English diplomacy. Theodore Wolff’s The Eve of 
191^ considered the pre-war diplomacy of all nations in­
volved in the war and was one of the first comprehensive
treatments of the war’s origins. The culmination came
22in Max Montgelas’ The Case for the Central Powers,
^^Prance. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 
Commission de publication des documents relatif aux 
origines de la guerre de 191^. Documents diplomatiques 
français (1871-191^)* Paris: Imprimerie nationale, I929.
22Erich Brandenburg, Von Bismark zum Welkreige.
Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaf t fu'r Politik und 
Geschichte m.b.h., 192q.
Herman Lutz, Lord Grey un der Weltkrieg, Berlin,
1927.
Max Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers.
London: G. Allen & Hrwin, Ltd., 19^5.
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described by Professor Fay as "generally acknowledged by
competent scholars (in the l^EO's] as the ablest. <. .volume
23on war responsibility."
In France and England, the only major belligerents 
whose governments were left unscathed by the post-war 
revolutions, professional historians were rather slow to 
accept the revisionist view. A notable exception in 
France was Pierre Renouvin who, in his Immediate Origins of 
the War,^^ adopted the new interpretation. Before the 1930's
dissemination of the revisionist thesis in France and England
was largely left to journalists and former diplomats such
as Georges Demartial. Sir Robert T, Reid's How the War 
25Game in I919 first stated the British revisionist view.
He was later joined by Sir Phillip Gibbs, a moderate pro­
ponent of revisionism, and G. P. Gooch. In Russia, out­
standing service on behalf of the new interpretation of 
the war's origins was rendered by E. A. Adamov and
Pokrovsky, while Barbagallo first presented the new posi-
pAtion of Italian historians.
^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p. 662.
^Pierre Renouvin. The Immediate Origins of the War 
(28 June-k August, 191Ij.)~ Hew Haven: Yale University 
Press, I92B.
29 ^^Georges Demartial, L 'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay.
Paris, 1926.
Robert T. Reid (Lord Loreburn), How the War Game.
London: Methuen & Go., 1919*
26E. A. Adamov, Razdel Aziatskoe Turtsii. (Partition 
of Asiatic Turkey.) Moscow, 192^.
M. Pokrovsky, Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege. 
Berlin, I927.
Gorrado Barbagallo, Gome si la Guerre mondiale.
Milan: Albrighi, Segati & Go., I923.
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Never before in the history of historiography had 
there been so rapid and complete a conversion in histori­
cal attitudes. A few scholars, of course, had never 
accepted Allied propaganda at face value, but their views 
very largely rested on intuition, not documentary evidence. 
The post-war revelations would have been of little practical 
value had it not been for assimilators like Sidney Bradshaw 
Fay who, as early as 1920, had absorbed what little material 
there was available and aroused attention by his articles 
in the American Historical Review. Fay sounded the note 
upon which numerous American historians in the following 
decades wrote. On the basis of the Austrian Red Book 
and Kautsky collection, he exploded the myth that the 
Dual Monarchy was Germany’s ’’cat's paw” in 191^. Still, 
it is significant that Pay argued the new evidence did not 
exonerate Germany of principal responsibility in precipi­
tating the conflict. In 1920, Pay, like most of his col­
leagues, accepted the Morgenthau version of the Potsdam 
2?Crown Council. Devoted to an attack on the official 
Russian apology. Pay’s second article revealed the real 
war aims. However, he concluded that Russia was justified 
in aiding Serbia in view of the German carte blanche to 
Austria.
That Pay had not been completely won over to the 
revisionist position is obvious in his earliest work on
27Sidney B. Pay, "New Light on the Origins of the 
War,” American Historical Review, XXVI, No. 1 (October, 
1920), 37.
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on war responsibility. A .comparison of Pay during the war 
years with the Pay of 1930 is a study of the evolving 
revisionist. During the war, he had been instrumental 
in the application of revisionism, but not to the origins 
of the war. While some American historians had refrained 
from writing on the background of the war during the con­
flict, few practiced the cold objectivity which character­
ized the previous decade. The United States entry in IÇl? 
brought a new emphasis on national history and a revision 
of the history of Anglo-American and Franco-American re­
lations so that the Allies appeared in the most favorable 
light possible. In this, the wartime brand of revisionism,
28S. B. Pay was an eager contributor. His evolution toward 
the new interpretation was apparent from his comments on 
Henry H. Asquith’s The Genesis of the War. Pay took the 
opportunity to censure the British government for its re­
fusal to open its archives to scholars with the suggestion 
that its wartime position had not been as defensible as
29had previously been believed. By I926, the year Pay’s 
two volume work on the background of the war appeared, the 
conversion was complete--Pay was America’s leading re­
visionist.
Harry E. Barnes, the most uncompromising of all
28Mathew A. Pitzsimons, Alfred G. Pandt and Charles 
E. Novell (eds,). Development of Historiography (Harrisburg; 
The Stackpole Co., 195^)V P* ^20.
B. Fay, Review of The Genesis of the War, by 
Henry H. Asquith, The New Republic, XXXVII, No. l|7q- 
(January 2, 192l|), 1̂ 1̂ .
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American proponents of the new interpretation, represents 
another case study in revisionist evolution. Even he, who 
in the 1920's was never considered a "friend” to Great 
Britain, engaged in activities sponsored by the Creel Com­
mittee, In 1918, he wrote that there was surprisingly 
little in the preliminaries or the events of the American
30Revolution that should cause permanent animosities.
After the war, Barnes, like many of his contemporaries 
reconsidered, but in his case, the reversal was more 
astonishing. So complete was his conversion to revisionism 
that he was believed by his colleagues in the American 
Historical Association "to be in receipt of a retainer of 
$100,000 a year from the ex-Kaiser.
To illustrate how one historian's temperament changed 
over the course of nine years, one has only to compare 
two statements by Barnes concerning the German Crown 
Prince. The first appeared(in a I917 National Security 
League pamphlet and referred to the Crown Prince as "seml-
32Imbecile." The second statement appeared in a I926 
edition of The Nation describing the same Crown Prince:
During the war we became so habituated to
reproductions of the Crown Prince as a rabbit- 
faced imbecile with an IQ of 20 that few Am­
ericans were capable of imagining him as 
possessed of the slightest cerebration...It 
_ _
Hutchinson, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XXIX, No. 2, 172.
G1C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historian Cut Loose,"
The American Mercury, XI, No. (August, 1927), i+30.
^^Ibid., p. 426.
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was with astonishment we were to find in his
memoirs.».the most attractive and plausible
apology which emerged from the German official
class after the war...33
While Barnes and Pay each developed into his own 
"brand" of revisionism, other American scholars made the 
leap more abruptly. These pathfinders included Frederick
Bausman, William L. Langer and Albert J, Nock.^^ With the 
blast at the igi^ theory of war responsibility, American 
scholars also levelled their guns at the accepted version 
of the United States entry into "Europe's War." C. H, 
Grattan and Walter Millis were notable among many who 
dealt with this question to some extent, but it remained 
until 1938 and the work of Charles Tansill, an assirailator 
the equal of Pay, that all aspects of the problem were 
satisfactorily explored,
33H, E. Barnes, "The Crown Prince as Archivist,"
The Nation, CXXII, No. 3188 (August 11, I926), 131.
3^Bausman*s Let Prance Explain. London: G.
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922 was the first compre­
hensive American attack on the Entente apologies.
Langer's early writings on war responsibility 
included: "The European Powers and the French Occupa­
tion of Tunis," American Historical Review, XXVI, No.
1 (October, 19251 and "The Franco-Russian Alliance," 
Slavonic Review, III, IV, (March-June, 1925).
Nock's Myth of a Guilty Nation represented one 
of the initial American efforts to expose the fallacy
in holding any one nation responsible for the war.
See below,
3^C. H. Grattan, Why We Fought. New York: The 
Vanguard Press, I929.
Walter Millis, The Road to War, America, I91I1--
1917. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935.
Charles Tansill, America Goes to War. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1938.
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In reviewing Barnes’ The Genesis of the World War., 
Professor Chevalier Hazen wrote that If the author’s con­
tentions were sound, Theodore Roosevelt, President Wilson 
Ellhu Root and Ambassador Page had all been wrong, a 
proposition few American historians were prepared to 
accept. Hazen was not alone; many American scholars 
In the 1920's displayed a decided obstinacy to retreat 
from the antiquated wartime version of responsibility. 
There are a number of reasons for the aversion generally j 
among historians toward accepting the revisionist view 
even after It had been substantiated by documentary evi­
dence, Perhaps the most Important reason was that In 
some cases the proponents of the "sole German war guilt" 
theory had acted as technical advisers to those who framed 
the post-war treaties. A paternalistic feeling toward the 
treaties for which their scholarship had provided a basis 
compelled most American historians along a conservative 
course.
That wartime biases among historians were slow In 
dying was Illustrated by a 1937 ruckus on the campus of 
Yale University. In that year. Professor Jerome Davis, 
an exponent of the Pay thesis on the war's origins, 
was Involuntarily retired for his conduct of European 
history classes. In the same year, Charles Seymour, a 
technical adviser to President Wilson at Versailles who 
had never accepted the revisionist Interpretation, became
■^^Grattan, The American Mercury, XI, No. I4-I4., ^30.
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37president.
During the 1920*3 and 1930*s, American historians 
writing on war responsibility could be divided into three
38separate categories. The first division, variously 
called "bitter-enders" or "die-hards," included those 
historians who persisted in upholding the wartime thesis 
of the war's origins in spite of evidence to the con­
trary. Among the more illustrious of this group were 
Hazen, William Stearns Davis and Carleton J. H. Hayes.
A second classification of American scholars was the 
"salvager" who cited the latest documentary evidence but 
clung to the view that Germany was primarily responsible 
in 1914* This group included Bernadette Schmitt, Charles 
Seymour and Raymond Turner, among others.
The third group--the revisionists--were those scholars 
whose work represented sincere attempts, on the basis of 
the latest evidence, to modify the obsolete wartime view 
of responsibility. It is incorrect to associate these 
men with economists like Keynes who felt the Versailles 
Treaty needed revision because it was economically un­
sound or with the "debunkers" of the 1920's who often 
wrote in that fashion simply because that was the type of 
literature the public demanded. The American revisionists 
logically fall into two sub-divisions: those who favored 
a divided responsibility, including Pay and Ferdinand
^"^Barnes, A History of..., p. 287.
^^Ibid., pp. 288-89.
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Schevlll, and those who held the more uncompromising view 
that neither of the Central Powers were guilty in IÇl^. 
Although the rabid revisionists admitted Germany and 
Austria displayed no great dexterity in l^l^, they main­
tained that neither power wished a European war. Further­
more, they argued, the military responsibility for the war 
lay with Russia and moral responsibility with Russia and 
France collectively. Advocating such an interpretation 
in the United States were Harry E. Barnes, Frederick 
Bausman and William L. Langer.
In the ensuing paragraphs, the interpretations assigned 
to the events surrounding the outbreak of the European 
hostilities by representatives of each of the foregoing 
categories will be examined. While that "school" of 
American war guilt scholars most commonly labeled revision­
ist grew consistently in the 1920's, all learned historians 
were not converted to the new interpretation as Professor 
Barnes would have his reader believe. Real inroads were 
made into the ranks of the proponents of the "sole German 
war guilt" thesis in the two decades following the war 
until by 1935j most American historians writing on the 
origins of the war favored a divided responsibility. No 
longer was the controversy concerned with the "guilt" of 
this or that nation. As much as the debate still existed, 
it was concerned with the "relative responsibility" of 
each of the belligerents.
CHAPTER IV
ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I AS VIEWED BY
AMERICAN HISTORIANS AFTER 1920
I
Contrary to Professor Barnes’ assertion that all 
American historians worthy of the name had, by the mid­
twenties, accepted the revisionist interpretation of the 
war’s beginnings, C. M. Babcock wrote that only one of 
every ten had evolved to that point of view by 1930.
Increasing numbers, he added, were moving in that direction
1influenced by Pay's well-reasoned account. While there 
are several feasible explanations for the conservative 
stand taken by most American historians after the war, 
Professor A. B. Hart's attitude probably exemplified that 
of most Americans, His resistance was based upon the fact 
that to accept the revisionist interpretation of the back­
ground of the war, one had to admit that the American
2people had erred in 191?»
Needless to say, this is hardly the reaction one 
would expect from a scholar in the face of empirical 
evidence to the contrary, but it is illustrative of the 
type of biases with which the contemporary historian must
^C. M. Babcock, "Pedagogues Stand Pat," The American 
Mercury, XIX, No. 75 (March, 1930),29O.
^Ibid., p. 290.
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cope before he can see events in their true perspective.
The prejudices of the post-war American historian were 
demonstrated whenever there was a comparison to be drawn 
between one of the Entente powers and Germany. If the 
British maintained the world's largest fleet, that rep­
resented a force for peace. But when Germany attempted 
to redress the naval balance, the Anglo-Saxon historian 
cried, "WarJ" Great Britain might make military agreements, 
and, as Sir Edward Grey said, they were not binding, but 
a similar Austro-German agreement was immediately labeled 
a "plot." In essence, the problem facing American scholars 
interested in discovering the real causes of the war was 
one of rising above national prejudices and pride and of 
considering the evidence relating to the war's origins with 
an open mind. This, American historians, who had so 
patriotically fought the war of words on the home front, 
were unwilling or unable to do.
Not only were many American historians as individuals 
incapable of rising above hatreds and biases engendered by 
wartime propaganda, but also many of the so-called scholarly 
Journals, or their editors, refused to acknowledge that there 
were two sides to the story of war responsibility. A few 
periodicals were noteworthy in opening their columns to 
"salvagers" and revisionists alike. Among these were the 
American Historical Review, Current History, The Nation and 
The New Republic. Periodicals like Foreign Affairs and the 
Journal of Modern History, under the editorship of Professor
12j+
Bernadette E» Schmitt, were careful that only the "right” 
kind of copy appeared in their columns. In answer to his 
critics, Schmitt maintained throughout the 1920's that all 
he had to say on the background of the war would be said in 
his book which was belatedly published in 1930. In the 
interim, contributors to his journal closed their eyes to 
recently uncovered evidence and wrote disparagingly of those 
who entertained revisionist thoughts.
Compared to their European counterparts, American
historians generally were rather slow to adopt a more
objective and realistic view towards the origins of the
/war. Although the wartime diplomats--Grey, Poincare,
Lloyd George, Churchill and Sasonov--admitted in their 
memoirs that Germany had not "plotted" the war, conser­
vative American scholars preferred to look to professional 
apologists like the British Serbophile, Seton-Watson, for 
evidence to reinforce their theses. These then were the 
diehards, or, as Professor Barnes labeled them, the "bitter­
enders," who clung to the Entente guilt thesis long after 
it had been invalidated by historical scholarship. Most 
of these men could see no apparent contradiction in the 
stand they assumed, because the revelations from the 
European archives were conveniently disavowed as Bolshevik 
or "radical" propaganda. This faction, which fortunately 
did not constitute a majority of American historians, cited 
pre-war evidence to substantiate the interpretations they 
applied to the origins of the war. They were led by authors
12^
who contributed so eagerly to the "Entente myth" during the 
war years— Charles D, Hazen, Raymond Turner, Albert H. 
Putney and William Stearns Davis. The stand-pat "school" 
of professional historians was joined by ex-diplomats from 
the Wilson administration like the former secretary of 
state, Robert Lansing, and the wartime Anglophile am­
bassador to England, Walter Hines Page.
In his Europe Since l8l^, a revised edition published 
in 1923» Charles D. Hazen ignored the bulk of the post-war 
scholarship on European diplomacy. Instead, he referred 
his reader to Charles Seymour's The Diplomatic Background 
of the War and The Roots of the War by William S. Davis, 
both of which had been rendered obsolete by the latest 
evidence from the European archives. It is noteworthy 
that Professor Hazen used none of the new documentary 
disclosures which might have tended to refute his thesis, 
which was materially unchanged from his I9IO edition, 
except that in the later work he was more harsh with the 
Central Powers. Writings by revisionist scholars were 
evidently inserted in his bibliography to lend an air 
of objectivity to the Columbia professor's work. Had 
Hazen heeded the findings of either Pay or Gooch, both 
listed as sources, his statements relating to the war's 
beginnings could not have been made with such certainty.
After a "careful" examination of the diplomatic 
records pertaining to the origins of the war, Hazen con­
cluded that the German nation had consistently provoked
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her European neighbors with an eye toward war. The realiz­
ation of German hopes came in 191^, and because of the 
carte blanche to Austria, tendered with open eyes as to
what the consequences would be, Germany incurred the moral
3responsibility for the war. Furthermore, her dispatch 
ordering a halt to Russian mobilization turned an Austro- 
Serbian quarrel into a European conflagration and made 
certain that Germany would shoulder also the political 
responsibility for the war.
The opinion of the outside world, Hazen wrote, had 
already been "overwhelmingly expressed," and the post­
war disclosures gave no reason for a change in that 
opinion. To those historians who favored a divided res­
ponsibility, feeling all European nations contributed to 
the creation of the conditions in which the war arose,
Hazen replied, imperialisms "do not clash of themselves. 
They are not impersonal forces subject to no human con­
trol."^ The implication, of course, is that German deliber­
ately conspired to create conditions in which the "im­
perialisms” might easily clash.
The history of Europe from I87I until 1^1^ showed 
that friction did not necessarily mean war, that it was 
possible to keep the peace if nations and the individuals 
directing national policies desired peace. Had Germany
^Charles D. Hazen, Europe Since I8IS (2d ed. rev.;
New York; Henry Holt & Co., I923), p. 557-
^Ibid., p. 666.
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and Austria been willing to do what they had done In the 
past, Hazen contended, there would have been no war In 191^< 
"But...[Germany and Austria] showed no penchant for such a 
procedure [arbitration^. Quite the contrary,...and war 
resulted."^ The "sinister and brutal" challenge of Austria 
and Germany was accepted by those who had done their ut­
most to prevent hostilities. That the contest was not 
merely a material one, but that the "most previous moral 
and spiritual interests" were Involved was clearly seen 
and stated at the outset by the Entente statesmen, Hazen 
wrote emulating the best of the wartime propagandists.
Had the author referred to all of the works listed In his 
bibliography, such an interpretation would have been very 
unlikely. The student Is left with the Impression that, 
far from surveying all of the evidence available in 1923» 
Hazen restricted himself solely to those works published 
before I919.
Hazen’s colleague at Columbia, Carleton J. H. Hayes, 
applied an antiquated Interpretation to the Immediate 
causes of the war, but, unlike Hazen, he blamed the remote 
causes on an "international anarchy." In pre-war Europe, 
Hayes wrote In an analysis not unlike the revisionists, 
self-interest was the dominant note. By June, 191^» that 
self-interest had degenerated Into cynical selfishness.
This, according to Hayes, was a direct result of the spirit 
of nationalism, a hang-over from the French Revolution.
^Hazen, p. 667.
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Instead of producing a sort of internationalism under which 
each of the states of Europe might live peaceably, the new 
phenomena emphasized the exclusiveness of each state. The 
spirit of nationalism fostered both political and economic 
anarchy. "Modern imperialism became an arc on the circle of 
exclusive nationalism."^ It was a vicious circle and the 
only way of breaking it was through war.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Hayes contended, 
nationalism, imperialism and militarism had walked forward 
hand in hand. The chances for peace were small in a world 
where every state was characterized a "power" and those 
whose armor was thickest, "great powers." The war’s under­
lying cause was international anarchy. "Its stakes were 
the perpetuation or destruction of that anarchy."^ To 
this point, Hayes had no quarrel with the revisionists.
His interpretation of the underlying causes, though 
perhaps over-simplified, was not unlike that assigned to 
the remote causes by Pay seven years later. It was with 
the immediate causes that Hayes and the revisionists 
parted company.
Since Germany, according to Hayes, was the most 
perfect example of imperialism and militarism, she was 
the most anarchic. It followed that she was the most 
responsible for the war. By l̂ l̂ -; German militarism had
^Carleton J. H. Hayes, A Brief History of the 
Great War (Hew York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), p. I4.,
?Ibid., p. 7
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achieved the highest place in the state. The successes 
of Prussia between I863 and I87I had sanctioned the union 
of nationalism and militarism. The instruments of the 
militarists were the united capitalists and Junkers,
The Junkers were now serving the capitalists 
the the capitalists were honoring the Junkers.
The promise to ’obey’ was left out of the covenant, 
for both contracting parties had freely given 
that pledge to the high priest who solemnized the 
nuptuals— the Kaiser himself,"
After blaming the war fundamentally on an "inter­
national anarchy," Hayes placed at Germany’s door the 
responsibility for events ranging from the Russo-Japanese 
War to the Balkan hostilities. From I895 to 191^, Germany 
pursued a "bluff" policy in order that her "place in the 
sun" might be attained. While German diplomats shook 
their fists in the collective face of the European family 
of nations, the German people, Hayes surmised, were coming 
more and more under the "psychology of suggestion," Russia 
was menacing; France was vengeful; and Great Britain was 
jealous. When the three nations drew together, the German 
professors of suggestive psychology began to exploit the 
words, "encirclement" and "preventive war," By 19li|, 
Germany was ready, and her class of Junkers and capitalists 
were willing and able to precipitate the war.^
Published two years earlier than the Hazen volume, 
Hayes' position on the war’s origins was, in a sense, more
^Hayes, pp, 10-12,
9%bid,, p, 13.
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defensible than that of his colleague. In 1^21, the new 
documentary evidence was rather meagre. What there was, 
however, if carefully studied, would have refuted the 
Hayes contentions. The sources upon which he constructed 
his diatribe against Germany are alone enough to reflect 
unfavorably on the work. Among the more illustrious of 
the authors upon whom Hayes relied for information to 
convict the Central Powers were Morgenthau, Lichnowsky, 
Chitwood, Stoweil, Gerard, Hill, Gauss and Stoddard.
Not once in the entire course of his volume did Hayes 
convey the impression that he was aware there had been 
any investigation into the background of the war since 
the cessation of hostilities. The works of the Columbia 
professors are merely illustrative of the product of ultra­
conservative American historians. In the latter 1920’s, 
it is noteworthy that fewer and fewer books appeared ex­
pounding the wartime guilt thesis. The barrage against 
the revisionist historians continued to be sure, but, 
unable to refute the new interpretations generally, the 
die-hard writers contented themselves in finding fault 
in the particulars of the revisionist position.
Raymond Turner was one of those who led the rear 
guard fight against a general acceptance of the new in­
terpretation of war responsibility. In 1927, the John 
Hopkins professor wrote an article entitled "German War 
Guilt Reaffirmed" in which he set forth a hypothesis later
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expanded upon In his Europe Since 1870.^0 In his Current 
History article. Turner attacked the revisionists in 
general and Pay in particular. Pay, he charged, demon­
strated an increasing tendency to lean to the side of 
Germany wherever possible. The new interpretation rested 
on sentiment, not facts. The latest evidence. Turner 
contended, corroborated the wartime view that Germany and 
Germany alone was responsible for the war.
Everywhere, Turner wrote, "Germans, radicals and 
others" declared again and again that the Treaty of
Versailles was a grevious error--that Germany was not
11solely responsible. A discussion of the type of mentality 
which traditionally has hung the "radical" appelât ion upon 
those who might deviate from their personal belief is beyond 
the scope of this study, but Turner's German-radical com­
bination is perhaps worth noting. He accepted the view 
that Germany was not solely guilty for creating the con­
ditions which prevailed in pre-war Europe, but argued that 
she still could be held "guilty" in precipitating the war 
in 1914» In other words, he accepted the revisionist 
position that there were many indirect causes of the war 
for which Germany could not be held responsible, Por the
war in 1914» however, German responsibility was "with
1_2justice primarily assigned."
^^Raymond Turner, Europe Since I87O. (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.), I927.
^^Raymond Turner, "German War Guilt Reaffirmed,"
Current History, XXV, No. 5 (Pebruary, 1927), 649«
^^Ibid., p. 649*
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The revisionist perspective on the importance of
remote causes. Professor Turner argued, was faulty. It
was the immediate causes--the events between June 28 and
August 1, 19l4--which were of prime importance, and in IÇl^,
there was no doubt that Germany had given to her ally a
’blank check” and encouraged the Dual Monarchy to declare
war on Serbia. Furthermore, it could ’’never be denied that
the ’’Great War” began with the German declaration of war
13on Russia and France.” From the outset, Germany and 
Austria ’’knew” that a general European war would follow 
the actions they took, and they abated not one instant in 
improvising measures designed to secure their own selfish 
ends. Because mobilization did not mean war in international 
law, Russian mobilization did not precipitate World War 1. 
There was always the possibility of averting war so long 
as it remained undeclared;^^ Germany threw peace to the 
winds when she declared war on Russia.
Turner erroneously argued that no scholar ever 
charged one nation or people with sole responsibility for 
bringing on the war. That there were many underlying 
causes which made the war probable in 191^ was not at all 
the point. The question to be resolved laid in the im­
mediate causes for which two nations, Germany and Austria, 
were responsible. For her action in attacking Serbia,
Austria assumed a large part of the blame. The Dual
^^Turner, Current History, XXV, No, 6^0.
^^Ibid., p.
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Monarchy, however, would not have gone as far as she did 
had it not been for the Potsdam pledges. Because the 
greater conflict began with the German declaration of 
war on Russia and France, immediate responsibility--that 
with which the "sincere" scholar should be concerned—
"lies properly with the German Empire.
In a later article. Turner uncovered what he termed 
"New Evidence Corroborating Ambassador Morgenthau's 
Account." The title of the article was somewhat mis­
leading since the "evidence" presented was neither "new" 
nor "corroborating." The impression conveyed by the title 
is that Ambassador Morgenthau was correct, which, in a 
sense, he was. There was, as all scholars agreed, a series 
of meetings at Potsdam July 5 and 6 during which the 
Kaiser conferred with minor figures in the German govern­
ment and an Austrian envoy. In the Morgenthau account, 
however, the "Crown Council" was distorted beyond recog­
nition. Since, as Turner maintained, no "accurate account 
of the conference had yet been offered"— this written a 
full year after Pay's heavily documented treatment of the 
July 5 and 6 talks--scholars were bound to accept that 
account which was best corroborated by subsequent events. 
Turner's I929 statement concerning the scarcity of pub­
lished material relating to the talks can convey only one 
impression. Either he was relatively unread in the con­
troversy over war responsibility, or he simply dismissed
^^Turner, Current History, XXV, No. 5s &55°
13l+
as Invalid any opinion running contrary to his own. Aside
froTi excusing the ex-ambassador for believing the tale
3. Ôpresumably told him by von Wangenheim, Turner’s article 
did nothing to substantiate Morgenthau’s testimony. Nei­
ther did Turner do anything to clear up the problem raised 
by Morgenthau’s decision to wait nearly three years before 
revealing the damning ’’evidence” upon which the Versailles 
verdict was primarily based.
17In 1926, Albert H. Putney asserted that Fay’s con­
tention that Austrian officials were not informed of the 
Sarajevo plot was incorrect. Because of inadequate pro­
tective measures, primary responsibility for Francis 
Ferdinand’s death rested with officials of the Dual Mon­
archy. Admitting it was unlikely that Austrian officials 
instigated the murder. Putney claimed they did nothing to 
protect the heir apparent, knowing his assasination would 
foment a war which was necessary if Austro-German aims in
18the Balkans were to be realized. Full cognizance of the 
’’warning” in which Putney placed so much stock was taken 
by the revisionist writers, but the vagueness of the message 
and the informal manner in which it was tendered led most
^^Raymond Turner, ’New Evidence Corroborating 
Ambassador Morgenthau's Account,” Current History,
XXXI, No. 2 (November, I929), 270.
17Putney was a wartime employee of the Dnited 
States Department of State and later dean of the School 
of Diplomacy and Jurisprudence at American University.
l^Albert H. Putney, ’’Denial of Serbia’s War 
Responsibility,” Current History, XXIII, No. ij.
(January, 1926), 527»
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of them to conclude that Serbian officials did not wish 
Austria to take precautionary measures prior to the Arch­
duke’s visit to Bosnia.
Having established the fact that a "warning" had been 
given Austria as to what the consequences of the military 
inspection tour might be. Putney charged that it was 
Austria, not Serbia, as Pay and others had written, that 
was criminally negligent. The motive for the "crime" was 
simple. The Archduke’s death would rid the Dual Monarchy 
of an heir whom the Austrian and Hungarian officials hated 
because of his liberal tendencies and also give the Austrian 
Junkers a pretext for crushing the Serbian nationalist
movement.
Looking at the general question of war responsibility. 
Putney maintained that two questions needed answering:
What were the causes that for many years rendered the war 
"inevitable?," and 1/Vhat caused it in 191^? To answer the 
first, two underlying geographical conditions had to be 
recognized: the Franco-German frontier and the existence 
of the "ramshackle" Dual Monarchy. Compared to other post­
war scholars, Putney’s view of underlying causes was short­
sighted to say the least. The first of his "underlying" 
causes was lightly dismissed since it had been a breeder 
of European wars for centuries. It was the existence of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire which made peace in Europe 
impossible in igiij--̂ ^
l^putney. Current History, XXIII, Ho. !{., 52?.
ZOlbid., p. 228.
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It was, the American counterpart to Seton-Watson 
asserted, Austrian mistreatment of subject nationalisties 
that caused Slav discontent, not Serbian nationalistic 
activity. But the fact the war came in 1^1^ instead of 
in 1908, 1911 or 1913 was largely accidental. The pre­
text presented itself, and in 191^, Germany was ready to 
take advantage of the occasion. "There was no European
statesman who did not clearly understand that the sooner
21it came the better it would be for the Central Powers."
Ex-Secretary of State Robert Lansing, among other 
wartime diplomats, joined the ranks of those resisting 
any change in the Versailles version of responsibility.
In 192^, Lansing answered an article by George Viereck, 
revisionist journalist, which had been written with the 
approval of the ex-Kaiser and which endeavored to prove 
William II was in no way personally responsible for the 
war. Nothing the ex-Kaiser could say, Lansing wrote, 
in any way lessened "the weight of guilt and contempt
which public opinion imposed upon him and which will be
PPhis portion as long as he lives and after." The for­
mer diplomat took pains to include Viereck in his denun­
ciation. The latter consistently abused officials of the 
United States and sought to justify Germany in her "bar­
barous conduct of the war.
^^Putney, Current History, SCIII, No. 1|, 529*
^^Robert Lansing, "The Ex-Kaiser’s Denial of War 
Guilt Answered," Current History, XXI, No. Ij. (January,
1925), ^85*
^^Ibid., p. 1|86.
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According to Lansing, nothing was published after 1922 
to refute the charge of German war guilt. Obviously, the 
ex-secretary was either somewhat behind in his reading or 
preferred to dismiss any work, no matter how heavily doc­
umented, that did not harmonize with his views on war re­
sponsibility. Since "nothing” had been published to the 
contrary, "the responsibility of the Prussian autocracy... 
for plunging the world into war has been p r o v e d . A  
further discussion of it would be a waste of time. With 
this, the question of responsibility was dropped, and the 
remainder of the article was devoted to a personal attack 
on the ex-Kaiser.
If William II had borne his guilt quietly, one might
feel remorse for one who had erred, but "no compassion
goes forth to one who strives to cast the blame for his
29own sin upon those against whom he has sinned." The 
Kaiser’s suggestion that Russia's decision to mobilize 
was motivated by her desire to use foreign warfare as 
a "safety valve" to avoid an explosion at home was, accord­
ing to Lansing, the very technique William II had used 
to precipitate the war. Socialist pressures caused the 
decision for war. To the Kaiser, democracy and all liberal 
political theories were anathemas. A victorious war would 
vindicate Prussianism and restore the imperialists to
^^Lansing, Current History, XXI, No. i|, ^86.
^^Ibld.. p. ^86.
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26popular favor. In essence, this was the extent of the
short-sighted Lansing thesis of the war’s origins. The
feeble voice of William Hohenzollern, he wrote, could make
no impression on the opinion of mankind. "The case is
closed...The verdict of guilty will stand through the
coming years as a monument to the colossal folly of the
27last of the Hohenzollern dynasty,"
So wrote the die-hard American students of war 
responsibility. Generally, they refused to acknowledge 
the validity of the most recent scholarship, conveniently 
branding it German or Bolshevik propaganda. Their theses 
were constructed on foundations provided them by wartime 
writers who, in the midst of war hysteria, had allowed 
themselves to explore war guilt with extreme subjectivity. 
Since, by the mid-1920’s, it was generally agreed that 
responsibility for the remote causes of the war could not 
be placed at the door of a single power, the defenders of 
the Versailles verdict concentrated on immediate causes. 
When scholarship cut the ground from under the "Potsdam 
myth," the "bitter-enders" in vain searched for some hidden 
testimony upon which Germany might be convicted anew.
When the heavily documented revisionist case became so 
impressive that their general outlines and perspectives 
became practically irrefutable, the champions of the war­
time version of responsibility contented themselves with
^^Lansing, Current History, XXI, No. I]., I[.89-90«
^^Ibid., p. ij-91.
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attacking the particulars of the new Interpretation.
II
When the position of the "bitter-ender” became un­
tenable In the face of the deluge of new evidence from 
the European archives, many of the erstwhile Entente 
apologists began to cite the latest disclosures, but 
only those which tended to uphold their preconceived 
notions on war guilt. Ostensibly, the methods utilized 
by these scholars was Identical to that of the revision-
•'N.
Ists. They examined carefully the latest evidence, 
usually concerning the Immediate causes, but from their 
empirical consideration of the data, arrived at opposed 
conclusions. In many cases, It Is difficult to separate 
the ultra-conservative American historians from the 
"salvagers” of the Versailles verdict #10 contended on 
the basis of the most recent scholarship that Germany 
was still primarily responsible for the war.
By all odds, the most Influenclal of the "salvagers” 
was Bernadette Schmitt of Chicago University. Of all 
American scholars of war responsibility, Schmitt must 
be accorded a place alongside Fay and Barnes as one of 
the principal protagonists In the post-war debate. His 
first major contribution to the controversy over war 
guilt was an article entitled "Triple Alliance and 
Triple Entente” In which he was "searching for the 
connecting link which acted as a chain of powder between
iko
28the various accumulations of explosive material” in 
the summer of l^l^*
The war, according to Professor Schmitt, came in 191^ 
because in that year the lines were sharply drawn between 
the rival alliances, and neither could yield without 
seeing the balance of power pass into the hands of the 
rival camp. Originally founded for peace, the alliance 
system seemed, by the turn of the century, to have justi­
fied itself, and it appeared that Europe could look for­
ward to years of peace and prosperity. Because of various 
German activities in the early 1900's--her refusal to 
consider an Anglo-German rapproachment, her "bellicose” 
actions in Morocco and her support of Austria in the Bos­
nian crisis--however, Russia, France and England drew 
closer together. More than any other individual, von
Bulow, German chancellor from I9OO to I909, "gave the
29Triple Entente life and being.”  ̂ The succession of 
Bethmann-Hollweg to the chancellorship seemed to ease 
tensions, but, according to Schmitt, he was not the "master 
of the political situation in Germany," In pre-191^ 
Germany, two groups, the militarist-navalist clique and the 
businessmen-industrialists, usurped political authority 
from the duly constituted government. The militarists 
saw France and Great Britain as powers to be dealt with
Bernadette E. Schmitt, "Triple Alliance and 
Triple Entente, I902-I91I4., " American Historical 
Review, XXIV, No. 3 (April, 19%), ^^9.
Z^lbld.. p. i|̂ 6.
while the capitalists longed for German hegemony in the
30Near East.
The appearance of the Panther at Agadir was no less 
legitimate than the French occupation of Fez in Morocco; 
the German refusal to limit naval power so long as Great 
Britain clung to the Triple Entente was understandable; 
the German Near Eastern policy was less repulsive than 
most other instances of modern imperialism. All these 
German activities, so often condemned by wartime his- 
torlans, Schmitt condoned. What kept alive the suspicions 
and fears of the Entente statesmen and eventually led to 
crystallization of cooperation within the Triple Entente
31was the pursuance of all three objectives simultaneously.
To Schmitt, the whole problem of war responsibility 
devolved to one question, "Was war inevitable in 1^1^?"
That no responsible European statesman desired a general 
war was acknowledged by the Chicago professor. Misplaced 
suspicions in each of the rival alliances was the primary 
cause for the armed peace before igi^ and ultimately the 
reason for the war. When the supreme test came, the break­
down was induced as much by panic as by the bellicose
32affirmations of any single power. The one bright spot 
in an otherwise dismal diplomatic picture in pre-war Europe
^^Schmitt, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3, 4S7.
^^Ibld., pp. ^^7-^60.
^^Ibid., p.
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was Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister. For 
his failure In achieving his ultimate goal, an effective 
concert of Europe, however, Grey himself was principally 
responsible. Because of his non-commltal attitude toward 
Germany and his repeated assurances to France, each side 
felt It knew what the British position would be In the 
event of war, and each was willing to risk a war to secure 
Its ascendency In Europe. Victory, each camp knew, would 
depend upon the march of events In the Balkans and the 
Near East.
German plans In the Near East called for vassalage of 
the Ottoman Empire, Wille Austrian alms In the Balkans 
Included the Isolation of Serbia by a string of alliances. 
Neither of the Central Powers, Schmitt wrote. Intended 
the outright annexation of territory, but the success of 
their plans would have given them political control from 
Belgrade to the Persian Gulf. To Russia, such a situation 
would be Intolerable, so she formed the Balkan League which 
might be used against either the Hapsburg or the Ottoman 
Empire whichever occasion presented Itself.
By the summer of IÇl^, It was apparent that. If 
Isolation and diminution of Serbia was achieved by Austria, 
and If Bulgaria was won over to the Triple Alliance through 
the cession of Macedonia, the Teutonic road to the East 
would be secure, Rumania was veering toward the Triple 
Entente. Such a rapproachment would form a Serbo-Rumanlan 
wedge between Austria and Bulgaria and make the Dual
i W
Alliance the arbiter of Balkan politics. "Thus, Serbia
33had become the key to the whole Eastern Question."
According to Schmitt, measures taken by the Dual Monarchy 
enabled the Junkers in Germany, who were already "jumpy," 
to take control. Bethmann-Hollweg, when he realized war 
was imminent, exerted pressure on Vienna, but he had 
clung too long to his dream "of scoring a resounding 
triumph for the Triple Alliance.
The attitude of Germany in the fateful days of July, 
1914 was seen by Schmitt as the major cause of the war.
Her refusal of the Grey proposal for a conference of powers 
after it had been accepted by Russia, Italy and France was 
the event which finally precipitated the war and ultimately
35ranged England on the side of France and Russia.
That Schmitt's work is scholarly and his method 
historical can hardly be questioned, despite Barnes’ 
assertions to the contrary. He very simply cited the most 
recent scholarship bearing on war responsibility and drew 
different interpretations in many cases than did the 
revisionist scholars, Schmitt, in fact, accepted the new 
interpretation on many points, particularly in reference 
to the more remote causes. Like many of his colleagues, 
however, he felt that war was not inevitable in 191^, so
"^Schmitt, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3, ^69.
34rbld., p. ^72. 
33jbid., p. ^73.
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It was the Immediate causes, those which ignited the in- 
flamable material that had been accumulating for decades, 
which were of prime concern. Here, Professor Schmitt con­
tended, the burden of responsibility fell on Germany and 
Austria. But the fact that Schmitt accepted the revisionist 
interpretation of underlying causes in his early writings 
is an indication that he thoroughly studied the latest 
archival revelations and applied his conclusions with due 
caution, not as Professor Barnes charged, with his eyes 
closed.
As additional primary source material became avail­
able, that is after the French and British archives were 
opened, Schmitt, unlike Fay and Barnes, adopted an even 
more conservative view of the war’s origins. This tendency, 
which culminated in his two volume work. The Coming of the 
War, can be seen in a review of the first volume of the 
Gooch-Temperley collection of British documents. According 
to Schmitt, the British records revealed that Austria was 
the aggressor in igi4 and that Germany was the "evil genius 
of the p i e c e . T h e  most vivid impression to be gleaned 
from the documents was that the primary purpose of the 
British government was to avert war, but, if that was not
possible, to make sure that England joined the "right”
17side and did so before it was "too late." Schmitt’s
^^Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "British Revelations 
on the Outbreak of the War," Current History, XXV,
No. 6 (March, I927), 8̂ 1.
37lbid., p. 851.
choice of words might have been better here. The use of 
the word, "right," conveys to the student the passing of 
a moral judgment and lends authority to the "Anglophile" 
appelation hung on Schmitt by some of his revisionist 
colleagues. Is it, it might be asked, the place of the 
truly objective historian to pass moral judgments?
Schmitt’s two volumes on the origins of the war were 
eagerly awaited by all historians interested in the pro­
blem of war responsibility. By defenders of the Versailles 
verdict, the work was received as a God-send, for here at 
last (1930) was a comprehensive, scholarly treatment of 
the question which held the Central Powers responsible for 
the conflagration. By other American scholars, revision­
ists, the work was a disappointment, because it demonstrated 
that an interpretation empirically drawn from the latest 
evidence other than revisionist might be assigned to the 
events leading to the war.
The fundamental reason, Schmitt wrote, that a two- 
nation quarrel developed into a world war was the rival 
alliance systems. Each year, the nations in the Triple 
Entente and Triple Alliance drew closer together until 
by July, 191 ,̂ none saw an escape from a war which 
directly concerned only two powers. In the decade before 
191^, there had been four possible sources of an European 
war: the century-old antagonism between Germany and 
France, the recent rivalry between Great Britain 
and Germany, Austro-Italien rivalry and the explosive
ll;6
38Near East, All national animosities^ howeverj, had sub­
sided by 191 ,̂ except in the Near East and Balkans, and 
there, the situation was relatively simple, Russia and 
Germany were rivals at Constantinople, and Russia and the 
Dual Monarchy were opponents in the struggle over the 
Balkans. Russia promoted a Balkan League of Rumania, 
Serbia and Greece to thwart Austria's Balkan ambitions, 
while Austria worked for a counter-league also including 
Rumania and Greece but with Bulgaria as its pivot which 
would isolate Serbia and render impossible Greater Serbian 
aspirations, Germany supported Austria's Balkan policy, 
because, in that way, her national interests would best 
be served. As Turkey came more and more under German 
economic and military influence and since Bulgaria seemed 
on the verge of passing into the arms of the Triple 
Alliance, Serbia stood as the only barricade to Austro- 
German hegemony in the Balkans, **A victory {pver Serbia] 
by either side would mean the turning of the. European
39balance in its favor,"
For her part in the assasination which precipitated 
the war, none of which Schmitt denied, Serbia was excused 
because of the "peculiar character of Austro-Serbian 
r e l a t i o n s . T h e  principal responsibility for the
Bernadette E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War 
(New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 19301, 1, 57-59*
^^Ibid., p. 17 .̂.
^^Ibld., p. 2^7.
1^7
murder of Francis Ferdinand fell not on Serbia but on 
the shoulders of Austrian officials, because they had been 
negligent in taking adequate precautionary measures, having 
been forewarned as to what the consequences of the Sarajevo 
visit might be.
Emporer William’s words, "Now or never," spoken after 
hearing of the murder of his good friend, the Austrian 
heir apparent, constituted, according to Professor Schmitt, 
a well-thought out expression of German official feeling 
toward Serbia. The Kaiser’s affirmations "have to be 
considered as a serious expression of the opinion that the 
time had come to apply f o r c e . The words, uttered at 
a time of grave shock, represented the inauguration of a 
policy which was followed through at Potsdam seven days 
later. The Austrian plan presented to William II on July 
5 calling for "isolation and diminution of Serbia" could 
only be pursued by force and was "admirably calculated
to bring about European complications." The Kaiser en.
dorsed the plan, and as "first in order of time, first in 
degree of authority among his countrymen, the German 
Emporer,..sanctioned the course Austria-Hungary desired 
to f o l l o w . I t  was not at all a "blank check" that 
Germany gave Austria July 5 since the envoy from the 
Dual Monarchy explicitly stated all that Austria-Hungary 
hoped to accomplish by the ultimatum. Here, Schmitt
^^Hchmitt, I, 291.
^^Ibld., pp. 293-9&*
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parted company with most scholarly post-war historians who 
claimed the Austrian plans were presented only in the vaguest 
terms at Potsdam.
German actions in the summer of 19l4 were dictated by 
three considerations: (1) For once, the Dual Monarchy 
presented an united front, and Germany felt the opportunity 
to take advantage of that unanimity of purpose after the 
murder of Francis Ferdinand should not be neglected; (2)
A good case against Serbia existed; and (3) If this case 
were promptly exploited, the other powers, out of sympathy 
for Austria, would not i nterfere.William II and Theobold 
von Bethmann-Hollweg were the first "responsible statesmen" 
to make the decision which might conceivably have the most 
dire consequences. "They may be acquitted of deliberate 
intent to precipitate a European war, but they did elect 
to put the system of alliances to its severest test...It 
was they who took the gambler's plunge.
Germany was kept constantly informed of Austrian 
actions throughout the month of July, an allegation other 
historians have questioned. Furthermore, Germany received 
a copy of the ultimatum a full day before the note was 
presented to Serbian officials in Belgrade. If Germany 
had sincerely wished to avoid war, why, asked Schmitt, 
did she not stop her ally before she dispatched the ill- 
fated ultimatum? Other historians have answered that
^^schmitt. I, 318.
^^Tbld., p. 329.
l49
question a hundred times over. With communications as they 
were in it was literally impossible to do anything
about the note which was already in the hands of the 
Austrian ambassador in Belgrade when the duplicate was 
received in Berlin,
Austria-Hungaryj Schmitt contended, was immediately 
responsible for the consequences of the ’’impossible ul­
timatum,” but she would not have gone to the lengths she 
did if it had not been for German pledges of unconditional 
support, Germany accepted the Austrian program which had 
been ’’carefully” explained, if not with deliberate intent 
to precipitate a European war, with a complete willingness 
to accept such a war. Then she and her ally began an 
interim program designed to lull Europe into complacency 
where acceptance of the fait accompli would be certain.
The Serbian answer to the ultimatum was rejected at Vienna 
for one reason--the Central Powers were determined that 
this time the opportunity to achieve their economic and 
political ambitions in the Balkans would not be passed up. 
Although Austria wished to postpone her declaration 
of war on Serbia, Germany insisted on prompt action.
’’The declaration of war was issued in order to please 
the German g o v e r n m e n t , Simultaneously, German dip­
lomats directed their efforts toward a general European 
acceptance of the Austrian action and, by overtures to
^^Schmitt, I,
^^Schmitt, II, l^-l6.
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England and France, endeavored to separate Russia from her 
allies. When it was recognized in Berlin that Russia 
would not permit Serbia's humiliation, German officials 
expressed misgivings over the course events had taken, but 
it was too late for regrets. Having urged prompt action 
on the Dual Monarchy, the German Chancellor and Foreign 
Minister could not easily have reversed their course by 
urging her to moderate. "They did the logical thing; they 
decided to fight the business t h r o u g h . Although Schmitt 
admitted German military preparations had not progressed 
as far as those of Russia and France, he suspected that 
"intellectual preparations" had gone rather far by July 
27. By that date, Bethmann-Hollweg began to doubt the 
prospects of British neutrality but advised Austria only 
to express an opinion on Lord Grey's mediation proposal.
He did not advise a change of course; he was merely "throw­
ing dust in the eyes of Lord Grey."^^
On July 28, Austria-Hungary reached her goal. There 
had been no hypocrisy about Count Berchtold's conduct 
as there had been with Germany's. Berchtold, however, 
would not have taken the fatal step if he had not been 
pushed by Austria's infinitely stronger ally. While many 
students of war responsibility cited the Kaiser's assertion 
that the Serbian answer to the Austrian note had removed 
the causes for war as illustrative of the pacific intent
^^Schmitt, II, 63.
^^Ibldo, p. 71.
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of official Germany, Schmitt saw the Emporer*s words as 
one of those ’’sudden changes of mind of which the Kaiser 
was capable” and a further indication of his mental in- 
stability. It will be recalled that Schmitt did not view 
the emotional outburst by William II at the time of Francis 
Ferdinand’s assasination in the same light. With the 
German Emporer then in a virtual state of shock, Schmitt 
felt the Kaiser’s words represented a well-reasoned de­
claration of intent.
Clearly, Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser desired 
the Dual Monarchy to take the plunge so long as England 
could be kept neutral, Schmitt surmised. When this looked 
doubtful, they could not renege on the Potsdam promises, 
so the German chancellor advised Austria to proceed in such 
a way that Russia might be saddled with the war respon­
sibility. When the Central Powers elected to navigate a 
course which had for its objective the solution of the 
Serbian question in their exclusive interest, they invited 
Russian intervention, ”It is therefore as much upon them 
and their refusal to make any genuine concessions as upon 
the Russian government that responsibility for Russian
5omobilization rests.” Furthermore, Schmitt maintained, 
Russia could not be deemed responsible because of her 
mobilization since such a military measure was not under­
stood in that nation to mean war.
^^Schmitt, II, 122.
50Ibid., pp. 2^5-56.
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The European War came in 191^ because no diplomacy., 
however skillful, could have kept the Dual Monarchy from 
attacking Serbia or have thwarted the determination of 
Russia to defend the Slavic state. Although the struggle 
directly concerned only Austria and Russia, the rival 
alliance systems made certain that it would be extended 
to all of Europe. Most revisionist scholars would contend 
that the struggle was not at all between Russia and the 
Dual Monarchy but between Austria and Serbia, and that 
Russia had forfeited her hypocritical position as "pro­
tector of the Balkan Slavs" in the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal 
talks of 19080
The fundamental and irreconcilable difference be­
tween Schmitt and the revisionists was a divergence in 
the perspective from which war responsibility was viewed. 
If, as Schmitt felt, the war was not inevitable in 191^, 
then it was the immediate causes with which the scholar 
wishing to establish responsibility must concern himself. 
The revisionists, on the other hand, viewed the moves 
made on the diplomatic chessboard in IÇl^ as relatively 
inconsequential and looked to the remote or indirect 
causes, the events of the decades prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities, for the real reasons for the war.
How the most rabid of the proponents of revisionism 
received the Schmitt findings is illustrated by Harry 
E. Barnes’ review of the work. Schmitt’s volumes, Barnes 
wrote, represented the "last, frantic effort" of the
1^3
leader of the salvagers of the Entente verdict to confirm
51the wartime version of responsibility. An incredible 
"Anglomania” amounting to a "fixed idea" was the over­
riding characteristic of the two volumes. In analysing 
the causes for the war, Schmitt had overlooked the most 
important single event of all— the Buchlau Conference 
of 1908 where Isvolsky gave the Russian blessing to the 
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In what 
was without a doubt an overstatement of the case, Barnes 
charged that not a single major contention of Schmitt 
"possesses the slightest validation,Prophetically, 
Barnes cautioned that Europe could not "safely" go on 
maintaining the "absurd lie." In 1930, the friehds of 
peace in Europe were appealing to Hindenburg to save them 
from Hitler. What would be happening in 1933 if the spirit
of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Poincaré' still ruled 
53Europe?
Another of the more distinguished scholars among 
those who maintained a defense of the Versailles verdict 
on the basis of the latest documentary evidence was 
Charles Seymour whose Diplomatic Backgrounds of the War 
was examined above. Seymour, it should be noted, did not
Harry E. Barnes, "Salvaging German War Guilt," 
Review of The Coming of the War, by Bernadette E,
Schmitt, The New Republic, LXIV, No. 852 (October 22,
1930), 270.
^^Ibld., p. 273. 
^^Ibld., p. 273.
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rewrite his earlier account of the diplomacy leading to 
war In the light of the post-war disclosures » After the 
war, the Yale historian's principal Interest shifted to 
American diplomacy during the period of neutrality» In 
his periodical articles on the war guilt problem, however, 
one finds that Seymour, an adviser to Woodrow Wilson at 
Versailles, retained essentially his I916 view of the 
German nation, although he accepted the revisionist view 
on some points. Reviewing the newly published British 
documents In 1927, he acknowledged that the disclosures 
tended to confirm the conclusions of the moderate revision­
ists» Also confirmed by the Gooch-Temperley collection 
was the view that Germany did not "bulldoze" Austria Into 
war, and that Austria, not Germany, was primarily re­
sponsible» Furthermore, It was "true that Russian moblll- 
zatlon forced the Intervention of Germany. But It Is 
certain that long before military factors entered the 
situation...Austria-Hungary, In cold blood, decided upon 
violent action against Serbia,"^4 and In spite of Imminent 
Russian Intervention, she held to her decision. It Is 
perhaps worth mentioning that the same Interpretation, 
whether rightly or wrongly, could have been gleaned from 
any one of a dozen documentary collections, but Charles 
Seymour was unwilling to acknowledge the validity of such 
a view until It had been corroborated by the belated
^4oharles Seymour, "Austria-Hungary In 19lif,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. 38 (April
lb, 1927), 730.
publication of the British documents.
That the Anglophile Seymour retained his wartime 
view of the German nation was confirmed by an article in 
Current History. Germany, he contended, looked upon the 
straightforwardness and candor of British Foreign Minister 
Grey, whose outstanding characteristic was absolute honesty, 
as a masque concealing intrigue. Not only were the German 
characterizations of Grey erroneous, but their suspicions 
of British understandings with France and Russia were ill- 
founded. The Entente Cordiale with France in IÇOlf- and the 
Anglo-Russian accord of 190? were, in fact, moves to 
prevent war, but in Germany, they gave rise to the "myth 
of encirclement."^^
Grey's greatest triumph, according to Seymour, 
was the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors by which the 
British Foreign Minister averted a war in circumstances 
more provoking than in I91I4. In the latter year, however, 
the civil rulers of Germany were not permitted to meet 
the situation in the same manner, and the militarists 
were not willing to forego the opportunity presented by 
the Austro-Serbian quarrel.
After considering all of the diplomatic evidence 
to the contrary, Seymour in 193^ still maintained that 
Entente statesmen had felt their's was the cause of
Charles Seymour, "Secrets of British Diplomacy," 
Current History, XXIII, No. 3 (December, I925), 329°
5̂ Ibld., p. 329.
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Justice and democracy In He asserted that most
historians would agree with President Wilson that the war 
was a conflict of principles. No amount of new light on 
war origins could alter the difference in political philo­
sophy that in 1^1^ had separated the Central Powers on one 
side and the Allies on the other. After the failure of the 
'[|.8er's and the triumph of Bismark, Germany had accepted 
the Hegelian doctrine by which the state was made an entity 
apart and above the collective mass of indivudual citizens. 
The state was personified in one man, the Kaiser, and drew 
on the loyalty of the military caste. Such a philosophy 
was antipathetic to Great Britain, France and the United 
States o
That no particular government willed a European war 
in 1914 is a platitude with which Seymour would not argue.
Once in the war, however, the European statesmen looked 
about to see what advantage for the future might be gained 
from the disadvantage of the present. Thus, wrote Seymour,
59the war aims were formulated. Such a statement cannot
be passed over without comment. That Seymour could pos­
sibly believe Allied war aims were formulated after I914 
betrays either an extreme naivete or a decided ignorance 
of some aspects of the problem posed by war responsibility.
^^Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the 
World War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934)»
pp. 262-63.
98Ibid., pp. 19-20.
59Ibid., p. 254°
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To accept such an explanation for the origins of French and
Russian war aims, namely Alsace-Lorraine and the Straits,
would be to render the years of productive scholarship in
the European archives invalid.
The task of defending Russia in the face of mounting,
incriminating evidence was undertaken by several writers.
Robert C. Binkley of Stanford University suggested that
historians refrain from attempting to find "war guilt,"
a term which indicated criminal intent, and concentrate
upon determining which nation was most responsible for
creating the conditions in which the European War broke
out. In the light of his suggestion, Binkley produced
evidence which he felt exonerated Russia of "responsibility,"
From the Hoover War Library, he introduced a document in
which Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov urged caution on
Belgrade before receipt of the ultimatum. Since the
/French mission headed by Poincare was in Russia when the 
pacific memorandum was drafted and since it was "probably" 
collectively conceived by Russian and French diplomats, 
Binkley argued that it illustrated the peaceful intent 
of both nations. The memorandum "strongly testifies that 
the original intent of the Russian government France
by implicationJ was honorable and pacific.
Charles Altschul also offered a solution to the 
semantics problem which arose in discussing war guilt,
^^Robert C. Binkley, "New Light on Russia's War 
Guilt," Current History, XXIII, No, (January, 1926),
233.
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When considering the responsibility for the mar* he sug­
gested, it should be made clear whether or not one is 
thinking of responsibility for fundamental conditions of 
war or for precipitating the war. For the fundamental 
conditions of the war of IÇl^, all European nations were 
responsible, and the debate was merely over relative 
responsibility. The Treaty of Versailles charged Germany
with causing the outbreak of the war, but not for causing
6lthe circumstances of the war.
Efforts by revisionists to attach the blame for
the war on Russia were seen by Altschul as no more than
a continuation of German wartime propaganda. The Franco-
Russian alliance was always "defensive," and it "remained
with Germany to commit the overt act which alone forced
the Entente into war."^^ If one resisted the temptation
to stray from the ultimate goal-~an understanding of the
tumultuous days in June and July, lQl^--one would find it
difficult to escape the impression that Russia and France
A ̂"were not in the least inclined to provoke hostilities."
Mobilization was not tantamount to war. Such a thesis was
solely a German military and administrative conception 
which had been abandoned in Russia by 1̂ 12. The conclusion 
that mobilization meant war was absolutely untenable in
^^Charles Altschul, "The War Guilt Controversy," 
Current History, XXIV, No. 3 (June, I926), 391-92.
62Ibid., p. 393»
^^Ibid., p. 393.
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the light of the latest evidence, Altschul charged.
Reviewing the newly-published British documents,
Michael Plorinsky of Columbia University wrote that the 
unfounded charge of Russian war guilt was further "exploded” 
by the English revelations. In regard to Russian res­
ponsibility, the Gooch-Temperley collection emphasized 
the straightforward and conciliatory attitude of Russian 
Foreign Minister Sazonov in his struggle to avert war at 
any price compatible with Serbian territorial integrity.
If the baseless accusations brought against Sazonov and 
the Russian government by a "few American sympathizers" 
needed refutation, Plorinsky suggested it would be found 
in the British documents.
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the "sal­
vagers" was their acceptance of the dictum that the war 
was not Inevitable in IÇlij- or at any time. With the 
remote causes thus disposed of, they could honestly devote 
their attention to the immediate causes of the war— causes 
which most revisionists saw as secondary in assessing 
responsibility. These war guilt scholars, unlike those of 
the Hazen stamp, considered the latest documentary evidence, 
but used it to substantiate and defend the justice of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Unlike their wartime colleagues, 
however, many of the "salvagers" accepted the divided 
responsibility thesis applied to the indirect conditions
^Michael Plorinsky, "Russia's Responsibility,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. 39 (April 23,
1927), 750.
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of the war, but felt that Germany„ on the basis of immediate 
causes, was guilty of precipitating the war in 1914° Citing 
the same evidence as the revisionists, the Seymour-Sohmitt 
"school" often arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions. 
Their method was essentially the same, but their respective 
findings were poles apart as shall be illustrated below.
Ill
The revisionists logically fall into two loosely 
defined groups, those who favored a divided responsibility 
feeling all of the belligerent powers were guilty of con­
tributing toward the outbreak of the war, and those who 
took the more uncompromising position that neither of the 
Central Powers were guilty in I914, and that responsibility 
should be collectively shouldered by Russia, France and 
Serbia,
By general historical consensus, the most outstanding
of the former group, the moderate revisionists, was Sidney
69Bradshaw Fay, Originally published in I928, Fay's The 
Origins of the World War expounded the thesis of war re­
sponsibility which has been accepted by most scholarly 
American historians. The two volumes have several times 
undergone revision, the latest in 1948 when Pay wrote 
that there was no need to change the general outlines of 
his work although recent scholarship had necessitated
^^In 1928, Pay was a professor of European history 
at Smith College, Later, he became a member of the 
Harvard faculty.
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some revision of detail. In other words, the Pay thesis 
of 1928 was sound In 19^8, and one can safely assume It 
will remain equally valid In I968,
Fay deprecated both those who contended that Germany 
was solely guilty In 191^ and those who attached responsi­
bility only to Russia or France. All parties to the 
dispute were responsible, for the basic guilt lay In the 
events of the century proceeding the outbreak of hostili­
ties. No serious historian. Fay wrote In 1928, any longer 
accepted the dictum of the Allied victors In 1919 that 
Germany and her allies were solely responsible. All agreed 
that the blame was divided; the only question was over how 
the responsibility was to be divided.
The underlying causes could be traced to national 
sentiment engendered by the French Revolution. Fay ar­
ranged the complex and Interrelated factors underlying 
World War I under five general headings: the alliance 
systems, militarism, nationalism, economic Imperialism 
and the newspaper press. Of these, the greatest single 
cause was the European alliance systems which came Into 
existence after I87I, The systems, while they lasted, 
did much to preserve peace, but they also made certain 
that any war Involving one major power would Inevitably
67Implicate all Europe.
Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War 
(2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 19^8),
I, 12-16.
^^Ibld., pp. 32-3^^
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Having examined "fundamental causes" generally* Fay 
began his chronological narrative with the Pranco-Prussian 
War. Els discussion of the events between I87O and 1̂ 1̂
Is Intensive but only so far as Is necessary for an under­
standing of the problem. In addition to assimilating all 
of the pertinent documentary evidence, he considered the 
most Important of the secondary sources relating to respon­
sibility. In cases where evidence from two or more sources 
was contradictory. Pay examined each thoroughly, carefully 
weighing the merits or demerits of each, before revealing 
his reasons for accepting one document and rejecting another 
There are no a priori judgments evident in Pay's work.
The Pranco-Prusslan War reversed a situation which
had existed In Europe for two hundred years. Now Prance*
not Germany, was weak and In danger of attack. But more
than a defeat for Prance, the war provided the occasion
for Bismark*3 gravest blunder--the annexation of Alsace
and Lorraine. "The provinces remained an "open sore
68threatening the peace of Europe for forty years."
After the war, the "Iron Chancellor" devised a 
scheme whereby France might be indefinitely Isolated 
to prevent future ravages on the Infant German state.
In 1882, France's Isolation was ostensibly complete, 
and German progress was guaranteed by the Triple Alliance. 
Bismark, however, had not considered the possibility of 
the Pranco-Russlan rapproachment of 189^, "the natural
68^"Pay, I, 5̂ -52.
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result of suspicions... and irritations against Germany
69existing in both countries," Like the Triple Alliance, 
the Dual Alliance was defensive. The Pranco-Russian 
alliance, in its early years, strengthened rather than 
threatened peace, because it established a healthy counter­
poise to the Triple Alliance. The decade, 1894-1904, 
however, witnessed two changes that tended to destroy the 
European equilibrium— England's exchange of diplomatic 
isolation for an Entente Cordiale with France and Italy’s
70vacillation and dubious loyalty to her allies. Before 
her adherence to the Dual Alliance powers, England had 
offered an alliance to Germany, but the Kaiser and von 
BÜI0W were not receptive, Germany was not worried about 
an Anglo-French entente since such a move, it was felt, 
would undoubtedly lead to a breach in the Dual Alliance.
In 190^, the Entente became a reality with British and 
French diplomats delimiting their respective spheres of 
interest with little regard to "rightful" German claims in 
Morocco, The division of the North African territory 
precipitated the Tangiers crisis and the subsequent Al- 
geciras Conference of I906, the importance of which was 
that it illustrated the close ties between Great Britain 
and France, Chancellor von Bulow’s Moroccan policy, os­
tensibly a German diplomatic victory, was, in fact, worse 
than a defeat because it led to the feeling in France that
^^Fay, I, 10̂ ,
7°Ibld,, pp. 123-2̂ ,
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war would be preferable to another humiliation at the
71hands of Germany,
The informal, secret naval and military agreements 
following on the heels of the signing of the Pranco-English 
Entente became very binding. Although Grey insisted that 
English hands were free, he permitted France to feel that 
England was bound to support her. It was extremely dangerous 
Fay pointed out, to allow military authorities to develop 
strategic plans which necessarily involved diplomatic obliga­
tions of which Parliament remained ignorant until IÇl^.
72"Herein lies Grey's responsibility for the war." Mili­
tary conversations, however, had progressed a good deal 
further than even Parliament suspected in 1914» As early 
as 1911, Pranco-British talks had advanced to the point 
where it was said in Russia that the French army would 
concentrate, in the event of war, as quickly as the German 
army, and that from the twelfth day, it would be in a posi­
tion to take the offensive against Germany with the aid of
73the English army on its left flank, the Belgian frontier. 
Apparently that frontier was more sacrosanct to the British 
parliamentarians than to the foreign office. While the 
von Schlieffen plan and the German "rape" of Belgium re­
ceived wide notoriety in the world press, little notice 
was given the minature Anglo-French "Schlieffen" plan.
7̂ Fay, I, 190-91.
72lbid.. pp. 192-93.
73lbid., p. 213.
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Isvolsky's accession to the portfolio of minister 
of foreign affairs In Russia heralded the drive toward
the Anglo-Russlan settlement of 1907? and the Triple Entente 
became a fact. Germany was diplomatically Isolated, and 
in the next seven years, the lines between the Triple 
Entente and Triple Alliance solidified. The crystallizing 
of the rival systems was accompanied by four sets of 
"tendencies:" (1) Each alliance evolved from a strictly 
"defensive" coalition and espoused "offensive" character­
istics; (2) Attempts were made by both Germany and France 
to strengthen the bonds of their respective alliances;
(3) Friction within each system necessitated concessions 
or "blank checks;" and (I|.) The armaments race was pursued 
with renewed vigor. As Churchill so aptly put it, "Where 
the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente had stood side by 
side. In 1914 they stood face to face."^^
Although Germany was on the road toward more amicable
relations with Russia after the Potsdam conversations of 
1910-1911, her relations with the other Entente nations 
steadily worsened. The French occupation of Fez rendered 
the Act of Algeciras a dead letter and set the stage for 
the appearance of the German gunboat. Panther., at Agadir. 
Fearing a possible bilateral agreement would come from 
the "direct conversations" between France and Germany 
whereby the latter might gain an Atlantic port in Africa,
Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, threatened
_  -
Fay, I, 22S-26.
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Germany in his ’’Mansion House” speech. Germany came out 
of her ’’Moroccan Adventure” more isolated than ever.
The fall of the pacific Gaillaux ministry and the 
formation in 1Ç12 of the Poincare ’’Great Ministry” including 
Delcasse bode ill for Franco-German relations. With the 
help of Isvolsky, now Russian ambassador in Paris, the 
bonds of the Triple Entente grew steadily stronger. Prior 
to 1912, Fay maintained, Russo-French cooperation toward 
war was not so close as the uncompromising revisionists 
would have us believe. After the elevation of Poincare 
to the premiership and subsequently to the presidency, 
however, France actively supported Russian aggressive 
intentions in the Balkans and assured her of support in
76case of war with Germany. The demise of the pacific 
Georges Louis, French ambassador to Russia, and his re-
placement in 1913 by the bellicose Delcasse, who encouraged 
Russia in her uncompromising Balkan policies, was one of 
the principal reasons the war came in IÇl^»^^ As the 
Triple Entente grew stronger, the vacillation of the Triple 
Alliance's ’’weak sister,” Italy, materially weakened the 
Central Powers.
Although the armaments race was intensified as a re­
sult of the Balkan crises of I912 and 1913, the two wars 
provided one beneficial result--an attempt at creating a
75Ray, I, 312.
7&Ibld., pp. 330-31.
77lbld., p. 3^2,
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concert of Europe to transcend the rival alliance systems-- 
for which Lord Grey and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, more 
than any other European statesmen, worked unceasingly.
The failure of their efforts. Fay wrote, stemmed directly 
from the inepitude of European statesmen to see beyond the 
confines of their own system. While such an anarchic at­
mosphere prevailed, Franz Ferdinand’s assisination posed 
a new threat in the Balkans.
There was. Pay contended, absolutely no truth in the 
charge that Austria was pushed into the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in I9O8 by Germany to expedite the comple­
tion of the Bagdad Railroad. "If anyone pushed, it was
78
Russia" in the person of Isvolsky, The major effect of
the Bosnian crisis, besides further alienating Italy from
the Central Powers, was that it encouraged Russia and
Serbia to regard the annexation not as a fait accompli
79but as a Serbian Alsace-Lorraine, Germany did back 
Austria in I908, but only because she was her only depend­
able ally. Between I908 and 191 ,̂ the German influence 
on Austria was one of moderation. To represent Germany as 
having complete control over her ally as so many did. Fay 
argued, was incorrect. It was not until well into the war 
that Germany, recognizing the Dual Monarchy’s general 
administrative incompetence, assumed control over her 
ally’s destiny,
^ Fay, I, 385^88.
79lbld., p. 399.
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The settlement of the difficulties caused by the 
General von Liman mission to Turkey in early 191^ indicated 
to Pay that the war was not inevitable. Of all world 
problems, however, the Balkan question was the most nearly
80incapable of peaceful solution. After Isvolsky had 
failed to open the Straits diplomatically in I9II, he 
worked persistently for the only alternative to open 
"Russia's back door"--a general European war. By IÇl^, 
he had convinced Foreign Minister Sazonov that only by a 
European conflagration could Russia’s historic mission be 
realized. In the spring of that year, the bonds of the 
Triple Entente were further strengthened by Anglo-Russian 
naval agreements. Entente solidarity was a fact, and
R"lIsvolsky could say in August, igi^, "C ’est ma guerre 1"
The "immediate occasion" for the World War was the 
murder of the Austrian heir apparent. Had it not occured. 
Pay wrote, there would have been neither an Austro-Serbian 
war nor a World War, and European diplomacy, as incompetent 
as it was, might well have averted a war for years. On this 
ground. Pay justified his intensive study of the plot "which
82was to have such awful and world racking consequences."
From his investigation of the plans for the assasina­
tion, Pay concluded that the combination of activities by
the "Black Hand," a secret organization dedicated to the 
—
Pay, I, ^^6.
^^Ibid., p. ^26.
GZibid.. II, 23.
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union of all Serbs by whatever means necessary; the Narodona 
Obrana, a "cultural” organization, disseminating antl- 
Austrlan propaganda; and the Serbian government, a number 
of whose officials knew of the plot and did nothing to 
prevent It, were responsible for the Archduke’s death. The 
so-called warning from Serbia to Austria was very vague 
and did not In any way "relieve the Serbian government of 
the guilt of withholding Information concerning a plot to 
commit murder...a crime known In private life as ’com-
83pounding a felony.’"
Pay subjected Ambassador Morgenthau’s allegations, 
cited at Versailles as proof of German war guilt, to care­
ful scrutiny proving beyond a doubt that the Potsdam 
Council, as the American diplomat portrayed It, was 
largely a myth. That the Kaiser held separate meetings 
July 5 and 6 was acknowledged. To William II, the Austrian 
ambassador related Count Berchtold’s Intention to make the 
Sarajevo Incident the occasion for a final reckoning with 
Serbia. The principal topic of discussion was not, however, 
the difficulties with Serbia but the prospective Inclusion 
of Bulgaria In the Triple Alliance. How the "blank check" 
was given In Berlin, and how It was used In Vienna were 
two different things. By letting Austria Judge for her­
self with Implicit assurances of German support, Germany 
placed Europe In the hands of the unprincipled Austrian 
Foreign Minister. "The Kaiser and his advisers on July 5
^^Fay, II, 166.
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and 6 were not criminals plotting the World War ; they were 
simpletons putting a noose about their necks I I n  so 
doing, of course, they Incurred a grave but not the primary 
responsibility for what later happened.
Before the ultimatum was finally drafted, Austria 
kept Germany Informed, but after July lij., the Dual Mon­
archy paid little heed to German advice « Germany was 
not shown the precise terms of the Austrian utllmatum, 
merely a general outline. The assertion heard In some 
quarters that she had no prior knowledge of the note's 
contents was a lie. So too was Grey's assertion of the 
same thing. On July l6, he too had been Informed as to 
the substance of the Austrian note. Unfortunately, Pay 
commented, diplomatic lying was not the monopoly of any 
one country In July, IÇl^.^^ When German officials were 
shown the exact text of the ultimatum, the general con­
sensus was that It was "too sharp," but that was July 22, 
and It was too late to do anything since the note was 
presented In Belgrade the next day. Peeling the war could 
be more easily localized if Austria was energetically 
supported, Germany accepted the fait accompli.
The Serbian reply to the note, which Entente his­
torians maintained was more conciliatory than could be 
expected under the circumstances, was. In fact, more 
conciliatory In form than In substance. Actually, Serbia
^^Pay, II, l66.
Ĝ Ibld., 260-64̂
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accepted only two of the demands unconditionally. After 
the diplomatic break between Austria and Serbia, proposals 
came from all quarters to preserve the peace. The first 
was Grey’s suggestion for direct conversations between the 
Dual Monarchy and Serbia which was vetoed by France as 
"very dangerous." Grey’s proposal for mediation between 
Austria and Russia was accepted by Germany but refused by 
Russia. Grey’s suggestion for four-power talks was refused 
by both Germany and Russia, not Germany alone as Entente 
writers so often attested. Finally, the German appeal for 
direct conversations was thwarted by the Austrian declara­
tion of war which was designed to "cut the ground from any
86attempt at intervention,"
Russia could no more desert Serbia than Germany could
Austria, and Sazonov devised a plan of partial mobilization
to prevent the Dual Monarchy from striking Serbia, Until
July 2^, Sazonov worked for peace, but on that day, he and
the Tsar conceded general mobilization to the Russian mili- 
87tarists. The Russian mobilization, generally held in 
pre-1914 Europe to be tantamount to a declaration of war, 
subverted Bethmann-Hollweg’s eleventh hour attempts to 
pacify Vienna. France had pledged her support July 28, 
and with this in mind, the Tsar consented on July 29 to 
official general mobilization. The order was rescinded 
by Nicholas, who was convinced of the genuine efforts of
^^Fay, II, 4^0-16.
^^Ibld., pp. 327-28.
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the Kaiser to placate Austria, but Russian militarists
continued the mobilization which was officially re-ordered
the following day. Contrary to the assertions of pro-
Entente writers, there was, according to Pay, no Potsdam
Council on July 29 where final German plans for war were
formulated. Instead, the German Chancellor, on that day,
applied the brakes to von Moltke's plans for a swift blow.
It was Russian mobilization, not military discussions,
which determined German action and plunged Europe Into 
88war.
In 1914, none of the European powers wanted a war.
It broke out because In each nation leaders did things that 
should not have been done, and did not do things they ought 
to have done. "All of the European countlres.,.were respon- 
slble." The dictum of Versailles very simply was untrue. 
It was a confession exacted by the victors from the van­
quished. Pay disavowed efforts by any historian to affix 
the exact responsibility for the war. Even If It could be 
assigned, he maintained that It would be different for the 
Immediate causes from the remote causes.
Serbia’s failure to prevent an assasinatlon of which 
she was aware was a grave responsibility for the Immediate 
origins of the war. Berchtold gambled on a localized war 
for "self-preservation" and lost. The one man who might 
have been able to conciliate the diverse nationalities In
GGpay, II, Sl^.
G^lbld., p. 5^8.
173
the ’’Ramshackle Empire" short of war was the victim of the 
occasion for the war. Germany did not plot a European 
war, and she made genuine efforts to prevent the holocaust. 
Austria, however, would probably not have gambled on a 
localized war had she not received assurances from her 
stronger ally, however innocently they might have been 
tendered, "To this extent, Germany must accept respon­
sibility for the war."^^ Germany was, in fact, the last 
of the European powers to accept the fact that the war was 
’’inevitable." It was not inevitable until the premature 
Russian mobilization,
France, by her encouragement of Russia, was as guilty 
as Germany for her assurances to the Dual Monarchy. Finally, 
everything else having failed, an explicit declaration of 
the English position would probably have averted a European 
war. The refusal to commit England until after hostilities 
had begun was the responsibility shouldered by Grey. 
Furthermore, Germany’s eleventh hour effort to urge moder­
ation on Austria received little notice in England. There
were, by July 29, indications that Downing Street already
91had made up its mind that war with Germany was probable.
In the forty years after I87O, Fay concluded, Europe 
was divided into two opposing camps whose hostility toward 
one another was increased by armaments, economic rivalry,
9°Fay, II, 549-523.
91S. B. Fay, "Germany’s Part," Saturday Review of 
Literature, III, No. 38 (April I6, I927), 729.
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nationalism and the newspaper press. Still, if there had 
been no assasination on June 28, igi4, Europe probably 
would have had peace for a number of years. That factor 
consolidated the elements of hostility and started a suc­
cession of events which ultimately led to war. For that
92factor, Serbian nationalism was primarily responsible.
In a later periodical article. Professor Pay eluci­
dated upon what he felt was one of the principal fundamental 
causes of the war, the poisoned atmosphere created by the 
European press. For this cause. Fay considered the London 
Times under Lord Northcliffe, later of Wellington House, 
one of the more guilty. Northcliffe and his staff were 
obscessed with the idea that Germany posed a threat to 
Great Britain and conveyed that impression to government 
officials by their constant extractions from the Pan-
German press which in no way reflected German public 
93opinion.
Nor was the German press Innocent in this regard.
Some of the smaller papers, particularly in South Germany, 
launched outrageous attacks on England beginning with the 
Boer War and continued them through World War I. The 
difference between the two presses, according to Pay, was 
that the German press criticized its own government as 
scurrilously as it did England, but, because few English
^^Fay, The Origins of..., II, 558.
936, B. Fay, "Pre-War Diplomacy and the European 
Press," Current History, XXXII, No. 2 (November, 1930),213,
17^
diplomats read German, they were aware only of the samples 
of German journalism reprinted in the Times British 
diplomats who were most accurate in their evaluations of 
German public opinion such as Frank Lascelles and Edward 
Goschen, both ambassadors to Berlin were dismissed because 
of the press comment contradicting their reports. Fairfax 
Cartwright, British ambassador to Munich and later to 
Vienna, on the other hand, extracted the most Anglophobe 
comments that could be found in the German press and for­
warded them to London, British officials had more faith 
in Cartwright’s reports because their contents compared 
favorably with what appeared in the English press than in 
the more truthful dispatches from Goschen and Lascelleso 
Suspicion of Germany was the overriding characteristic of 
British thought between I907 and IÇl^o The press attacks 
which gave birth to the suspicions. Pay maintained, went 
far in explaining the prompt British entry into the war 
in 1914.
Although Professor Pay is generally considered 
America’s outstanding revisionist historian, he was not 
the only scholar who attacked the Versailles theory of 
war guilt. He was not even the first. As early as 1922, 
the journalist, Albert J. Nock, charged the Treaty of 
Versailles with gross inequity. Propounding what at that 
date was an extremely unpopular and ’’radical” view, Nock
'^^Pay, Current History, XXXII, No, 2, 215,
9^Ibld,, pp, 216-17,
l?6
might properly be called the first of the moderate revis­
ionists» He did not assume for a moment that Germany had 
been innocent in 1^1^, an assertion Barnes and other scho­
lars defended. She was, however, "far, very far from being 
the only guilty p a r t y . "^6 since Germany was not solely 
responsible, the verdict of Versailles was not only inde­
fensible, but It was economically, morally and legally a 
farce.
Nock cited the figures on military and naval expen­
ditures to refute the Allied claim that the Entente was 
unprepared for the war. In IÇl^, the combined armaments 
expenditures of England, France and Russia totaled |ll(.2 
million compared to $92 million for the Central Powers. 
Furthermore, he argued, the suppressed telegram from the 
British ambassador in Vienna telling of the substance of 
the Austrian ultimatum belied Lord Grey’s assertion that 
the Entente nations were taken by surprise by the action 
of the Dual Monarchy.
Nock compared two statements by Lloyd George which 
"put the lie" to the Entente myth of war guilt. The first 
concerned what the later English prime minister called 
"the most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the 
liberty of nations; carefully, skillfully, insidiously, 
clandestinely planned,„.with ruthless, cynical determin-
9&Albert J. Nock, The Myth of a Guilty Nation 
(New York: B. W. Huebsch^ Inc., 1922), p. o.
977'ibid., p. 25.
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atlon,” The Prime Minister's second statement was delivered 
December 23, 1920 after the hatred bred by war had subsided 
and rendered propaganda unnecessary:
The more one reads memoirs and books written 
in various countries on what happened before the 
first of August, 191^...the more one realizes 
that no one head of affairs meant war at that 
stage...A discussion, I have no doubt, would 
have averted it.9°
Nock took to task the official British wartime 
apology for Joining Russia and France. England’s rela­
tionship to Belgium revealed no obligation to protect 
Belgian territorial integrity, merely to respect it her­
self. "Belgium was not thought of by Asquith’s cabinet 
before August 2, 191^. She was brought in then as a 
means of making the war go down with the British p e o p l e . "99 
Revelations by the Soviet government in I9I8, Nock argued, 
should at least reopen the question of responsibility.
As early as I912, Poincare promised that Russia would 
have the support of France in the event of a Balkan 
war in which Austria was supported by Germany. Isvolsky, 
in the same year, received similar assurances from Lord 
Grey and King George.
Nock succinctly stated his interpretation of the 
orogins of the war as follows:
A train of gunpowder...had been laid from 
Belgrade through Paris and London to St. Peters­
burg;... the engine of that train was Pan-Slavism.
A spark in the Balkans would cause the train to
'^^Nock, pp. 38-40.
99Ibid., p. 46.
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flash into flames throughout its entire l e n g t h . 100
Albert J. hock will never be accorded the place of 
a Fay, a Schmitt or a Barnes as an analyst of the causes 
of World War I, but as one who provided an early insight 
to the American public that the blacks and whites of 
Versailles were after all greys, he deserves mention in 
any study of the historiography of the war's origins.
After the publication of Fay's classic in I928, 
American historians began increasingly to apply a "mod­
erate revisionist" interpretation to the origins of the wa: 
No longer was it only the "Twelve Days" which were nec­
essary to understand the world's greatest cataclysm to 
date; historians showed an increased interest in the in­
direct or fundamental causes dating generally from the 
French Revolution, but more particularly from I87I0 
Walter C. Langsam of Columbia University is illustrative 
of this trend. In his The World Since 191^3 Langsam wrote 
that the morbid action of the psychopathic Bosnian was 
merely the occasion for the war. First among the fun­
damental or real causes which provided the tinder for 
Princip's spark were the twin curses nationalism and
irredentism, the legacies of the French Revolution and
101the Age of Metternich.
The diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, according
lO^Nock, p. 103.
^^^Walter C, Langsam, The World Since 191^ (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1933 p. 3«
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to Langsanij, shaped the course of European politics between 
1815 and 191^» ThereJ the doctrines of nationalism and 
democracy had been repudiated. By IÇl^, many of the 
territorial maladjustments of the shortsighted statesmen 
had been rectified, but several nationalistic sore spots 
remained plus a few new ones. Including AlSace and Lorraine, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Trieste and Trentlno, the "polygot* 
character of the Dual Monarchy and the rivalries over 
"Europe’s sick man."
Suppressed nationalism, Langsam noted, was no more 
or less dangerous to peace than exaggerated nationalism.
To be a patriot In nineteenth century Europe meant to 
scoff at foreign cultures and view one’s own nationality 
as a "chosen people," While Treltschke and Bernhardl lent 
a special flavor to German patriotism, "the Germans at 
worst suffered from only a slightly more severe attack of 
nationalism than did England and France.
The vogue of militarism was another underlying cause 
of World War I, Langsam defined a militaristic state as 
one In which the people permitted military power to overawe 
civil power. By 1^1^, all European states could be so class­
ified. Military alliances were sought first by Bismark and 
later by all leaders until Europe was gradually divided 
Into two hostile camps. "Both sides were strong...Each 
was ready to resort to sword-rattllng to Intimidate the 
other. Should either group call the other’s bluff, war would
102_ ^Langsam, p. 5«
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103be inevitable.” The immediate affect of the crystalli­
zation of the alliance systems was a series of internat­
ional crises beginning with the Moroccan incident of igo^ 
and culminating in the assasination of Francis Ferdinand. 
With each crisis, armaments soared until by 19li|, there 
were more than four million men under arms. By then, it 
was obvious that another crisis could not be weathered 
peaceably.
The third fundamental cause, as Langsam viewed the 
origins of the war, was economic rivalry and imperialism. 
The world's history during the nineteenth century was 
characterized by a search for markets and sources of raw 
materials which were necessitated by the Industrial Rev­
olution. It was Germany’s misfortune to appear on the 
imperialistic scene late after the world had been divided, 
but she made great strides in spite of her handicap, and 
by the iBBO’s there was widespread apprehension that Great 
Britain might be outdistanced by the upstart. "England 
suffered a veritable 'made in Germany' complex.
The fourth underlying cause for the war was the lack 
of any machinery to control international relations. The 
worst of the "international anarchy" was secret diplomacy. 
Where cabinets before had been kept informed of the inter­
national situation, they were now kept in the dark. Thus 
it was that Sir Edward Grey on August 3, IÇl^ could deny
^^^Langsam, p. 9»
lO^Ibld., pp. 12-13.
I8l
that Commons had any restriction of action, while in actual 
fact, there were commitments of the utmost importance to 
France. The German ambassador to Paris, von 8chon, accurately 
described the European situation when he said, "Peace 
remains at the mercy of an accident.
After the assasination at Sarajevo, a result of the 
historic Austro-Serbian enmity, Austrian officials sus­
pected Serbia of gross neglect if not connivance. Austria, 
Langsam maintained, believed that unless severe retribution 
was demanded, Russo-Serbian subversive machinations against 
the tottering Dual Monarchy would continue. The Austrian 
plan was to frame an "unacceptable" note to which Russia, 
as in 1908, would yield, and then strike quickly so that
106the war might be localized. On July 5s Germany endorsed
the plan but cautioned against making unreasonable demands 
on Serbia. By the time Germany was shown the precise terms 
of the ultimatum, it was too late to modify it, and she 
could not easily retract her pledge of July 5» The Austrian 
declaration of war, according to Langsam, was made in the 
sincere belief that it was the only way to save the Dual 
Monarchy from extinction.
While Germany did her utmost to restrain Austria,
Russia prepared in secrecy and haste. The general Russian 
mobilization of July 30 forced Germany into a declaration 
of war which drew in all of the European powers. "Who was
lOS?Langsam, p, Iq.
lOGlbld., pp. 16-17.
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to blame Is hard to say, but in every belligerent capital,
107the people went wild with joy."
Erik Achorn^^^adopted a similar thesis to the one 
propounded by Pay and Langsam but with certain modifica­
tions. To Achorn, the fundamental or real causes of the 
war appeared to be four in number: economic factors, the 
affect of universal military service, secret diplomacy and 
the rival alliance systems. In addition to these four 
"basic" causes, there were seven other forces which served 
to intensify international hostilities: (1) the spread of 
nationalism and the so-called dictates of national honor;
(2) the nationalistic trend in history; (3) the jingoistic 
press; (Ij.) irredentism in all nations; (^) international 
anarchy, the outstanding characteristic of which was the 
assimilation and application of the ideas of Darwin and the 
ethics of Machiavelli by politicians in all nations; (6) 
exaltation of war; and (7) mob p s y c h o l o g y ,
The majority of Europeans in IÇl^ wished for peace.
In Great Britain, the people were apathetic to inter­
national affairs. Although official France wished the 
restoration of Alsace, the peasantry was largely uncon­
cerned. In Russia, the great masses were unaware of 
international relations. A numerically insignificant,
107Langsam, pp. 20-21.
^^®Achorn was a professor of European history at 
Harvard,
lO^Erik Achorn, European Civilization and Politics 
Since l8l5 (New Torlc: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Iy3l|.), pp. 38̂ -86.
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although strong, minority was involved in the activities 
of the Serbian secret societies dedicated to the dissolu­
tion of the Dual Monarchy. One could easily visualize 
the feelings of Vienna, however. ’’Imagine the feelings
in Washington if Mexico decided to annex the American 
110Southwest.”
German officials feared the envy of Great Britain,
the vengeance of France and the overwhelming preponderance
of the Slavic hordes. The idea was current in Germany
that the three rivals had leagued together under Edward
VII to throw an ’’iron ring” around Germany and keep her
from her ’’rightful place in the sun." Achorn condemned
those who accepted the loose-mouthed utterances of the Pan-
Germans as credible evidence of responsible policy.
Nietzsche, Treltschke and Bernhardl helped create an
atmosphere and a public sentiment detrimental to the peace
of the world, but Achorn noted, there were similar ex-
111ponents in every nation in the world.
Since it was not the masses of the belligerent nations 
that precipitated the war, Achorn next analysed the posi­
tion of each of the individuals close to the center of 
things in 19li|« Grey knew England but not the continent, 
and because of this, he was unable to see beyond the 
principles of British policy laid down by his predecessors, 
Poincare, a "Lorrainer of '71," may not have willed the war,
^^^Achorn, pp, 378-88,
^^^Ibid., pp, 388-90,
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but he believed it was inevitable which was just as bad.
The Kaiser was a ’’pathological” case for whose actions 
neurosis was the only suitable explanation. He surrounded 
himself with incapable advisers among #iom was Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg, a ’’well-intentioned bureaucrat over­
shadowed by militarists,” Francis Joseph, like the Tsar 
in Russia, was incapable of ably discharging his duties 
which was his contribution to causing the war, Sazonov and 
Berchtold, the ’’ardent chauvinists” who occupied the center
of the stage, directed affairs in their respective count-
112ries,
The assasination of Francis Ferdinand was merely the 
occasion for the war. If he had not been murdered, there 
would have been no Austro-Serbian war and consequently no 
World War in the summer of IÇlij- or perhaps ever. Clearly, 
Achorn argued, Serbia was guilty in countenancing the anti- 
Austrian activity that led to the assasination. Serbia 
was an ’’accessory after the fact,” Those who believed 
the Serbian cause was just, Achorn maintained, must accept 
assasination as a rightful means toward attaining national 
ends,
Because Austria did not adequately prepare her case 
for the ultimatum in the accompanying dossier, inter­
national public opinion did not realize Serbia was the 
guilty party and looked on Austria as an aggressor,
^^^Achorn, pp. 390-93.
I13ibld,. p. 397.
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Throughout the "Twelve Days," Achorn contended, Germany
was dragged along the path to the abyss by her ally
who presented her with one fait accompli after another.
Germany, however^ laid herself open to such treatment by
her July 5 promises and her insistence that the quarrel
nilconcerned only the Dual Monarchy and Serbia.
Assessing relative responsibility, Achorn pointed 
out that since the primary cause for the outbreak of 
the war was the Austro-Serbian quarrel and since high 
Serb officials shared in responsibility for the first 
blow, Serbia shared heavily in the blame for the larger 
conflict. Because of her actions, the Dual Monarchy 
shouldered some of the blame. She was, in contradistinc­
tion to Russia, however, fighting for her life. Because 
the Dual Monarchy was Germany's only dependable ally, 
the latter, perhaps foolishly, backed her. When the 
war became imminent, however, Germany made sincere 
efforts to avert the calamity. Russia was responsible 
because she encouraged anti-Austrian propaganda from 
Belgrade and prompted Serbia to reject the ultimatum. 
France was guilty in that she, as much as Germany, 
tendered a "blank check" to her ally. Without assur­
ances of French support, Russia would not have mobilized. 
Grey's "unofficial" promises to France bound England to 
her across-Channel neighbor and Russia although Belgium 
was used as the selling point. If England's position
Achorn, pp. 399-qOO.
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ii'ohad been made clear, there might not have been a war.
That the moderate revisionist thesis of the import­
ance of fundamental causes vis-a-vis immediate causes is 
as tenable in the 1950's as it was in the 1920's is borne 
out by a number of contemporary historians. C. E. Black 
and Eo C. Helmreich looked to what they labeled the "spirit 
of the age" for the real reasons behind the outbreak of 
hostilities in 191^. After l8l5, this spirit manifested 
itself in an adulation of progress and a trend toward 
materialism in which the state took over many of the 
functions formerly exercised by the Church» Nationalism, 
which filled spiritual needs heretofore taken care of 
by religion, was also characteristic of the age pro­
ceeding the war. Nationalism nurtured a new liberalism 
brought on by the victory of the bourgeoisie over the 
aristocracy in which personal liberties were sacrificed 
to the national interest. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries sovereignty versus interdependence 
loomed as a problem to be resolved, and the scramble for 
colonial possessions was but a manifestation of the 
conflict. But imperialism failed of its major objective-- 
economic and political security. Unable to find security 
iraperialistically, the European nation-states turned 
to alliances, a trend which culminated in the Triple
^^^Achorn, pp. ij.05-08.
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il6Alliance and Triple Entente.
It was futile, the authors contended, to try to 
fix the blame for the war on any one nation. The war 
was the product of the age. Its real origins lay far 
back in the past and to view it in any other way was short­
sighted. Because of the rivalry of the Great Powers, an 
Austrian-Serbian clash developed into a great inter­
national war over how the continent was to be organized
117and how the balance of power should be weighted.
Ferdinand Schevill of Chicago University, whom H. E. 
Barnes somewhat erroneously aligned with himself as an un­
compromising revisionist, provides a logical transition 
from the moderate exponent of the new interpretation to 
the more uncompromising revisionist. In his A History of 
Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day first pub­
lished in 1925 but revised in 195̂ 1» Schevill carefully 
distinguished between remote and immediate causes. For 
the serious historian, he wrote, the fundamental causes 
were far more important than immediate causes, despite 
the importance attached to the latter by the general 
public.
116C. E. Black and E. G. Helmreich, Twentieth Century 
Europe (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1954)* PP* 23-25.
Black is a professor of European history at Princeton 
University, and Professor Helmreich is on the faculty of 
Bowdoln College,
117Ibid., pp. 55^5:6.
ll8Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe from the 
Reformation to the Present Day (2d ed. revised; New 
York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 19^4)* P« 705«
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To anyone versed In the processes of history, the 
Chicago professor wrote, it was obvious that an epochal 
event like the World War could not have sprung from 
other than the spirit and forms assumed by a changing 
civilization. He enumerated the fundamental causes as 
follows: (1) Europe had evolved into a body of competitive 
states, a process which had begun with the Reformation;
(2) Nationalism was exaggerated in all European states;
(3) The Industrial Revolution gave rise to the third 
cause, imperialism, which often took the form of a "civi­
lizing mission" to extend material benefits to less 
fortunate nations; (ij.) The export of capital and the 
accompanying search for new sources of raw materials
and markets also could be traced to the Industrial Revo­
lution; (5) Since each of the European powers felt war 
was a legitimate tool of policy, each desired a strong 
army and navy which led to competition in armaments;
(6) The alliance systems replaced the Concert of Europe;
and (7) The European mind was diseased and dominated by
119fears and hatreds.
Discussing the immediate causes of the war, Schevill 
discarded any view that held one man or group of men 
responsible. "All five powers immediately involved, 
Austria, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany must 
assume some measure of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . E a r l y  in
^^9schevill, pp. 705̂ 07. 
izoibid.. p. 708.
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July, 191 .̂, Germany worked toward localizing the war,
hut on July 28, realizing the Russian attitude made such
a policy unrealistic, Germany took a new stand. On the
one hand, she warned Russia not to mobilize generally,
and on the other, she brought strong pressure to bear on
Vienna to accept mediation. Unfortunately, it was too
late. Following Russia’s Initiative, the other powers
121mobilized, and war was a certainty.
Despite his general condemnation of Russian activities
during the critical "Twelve Days," Schevill warned that it
is a short view to try to explain the causes of World War
I on the basis of moves made during July and August, IÇl^.
At best, those moves may be said to have caused the war
at that particular moment. That the war was prepared
generations before I91I1 was the only view worthy of the
serious historian. The war was a plunge Into disaster
by civilization owing to the growth of certain unfortunate
trends which the leaders In Igl^ had neither the will nor
122the wisdom to control.
So wrote the moderate revisionists, moderate when 
compared to the Barnes brand of revisionism. The out­
standing characteristic of these scholars was their 
recognition of the importance In looking beyond the 
events of the summer of I91I1- for the real reasons for 
the war. Most of them would agree that the diplomatic
^^^Schevlll, pp. 712-13»
122%bid,, pp. 7î _î _
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moves made In did no more than start a conflict which
had been brewing since at least I87I, or perhaps as some 
would have It, since the French Revolution or the Reforma­
tion. Each of the scholars considered above can be labeled 
"moderates" on the basis of what has been generally accepted 
as the correct thesis of World War I responsibility, al­
though several of them, notably Nock and Schevill, were 
viewed as "radicals" In the years In which their works 
were published.
Needless to say, the lines between the moderate and 
more unyielding revisionists are not as sharp as this 
study might Indicate, Some of Pay’s Interpretations, 
which today are considered quite conservative, were, In 
1928, viewed as the worst kind of radicalism. Although 
Barns likened the Schevill Interpretation to his own In 
1926, from a 1958 perspective, the Intellectual relation­
ship between Fay and Schevill seems much closer than that 
between Schevill and the rabid revisionists. While the Barnes 
"school" may have had many declples In the 1920's, few 
scholars can be found today who accept the Barnes thesis 
which Is characterized primarily by absolutes, the blacks 
and whites so evident In the writings of the earlier stu­
dents of responsibility.
Barnes admittedly accepted the Entente version of 
war guilt until he was awakened from his "dogmatic slum­
bers" by the I92O-I92I periodical articles by Fay. "Pro­
fessor Fay’s demolition of the ’Potsdam myth’ was equlva-
191
lent to the loss of Santa Claus In my y o u t h . B a r n e s ’ 
purpose In writing was to show that there was no basis for 
the Treaty of Versailles since Article 231 was a farce.
The work also represented a protest against the Dawes 
Plan which had merely reduced the penalty on an "innocent 
m a n , B a r n e s  predicted the course later taken under 
the Lausanne settlement of 1932 when reparations were 
terminated, but not, however, for the reason he had sug­
gested.
Like his more moderate colleagues, Barnes recognized 
that no adequate understanding of the war’s origins could 
be limited to a study of the diplomatic exchanges between 
June 28 and August 3, 1914» Furthermore, he argued, a 
study of the diplomacy of the generation proceeding the 
war would not suffice to solve the problem of responsi­
bility. The biological, psychological, sociological, 
economic and political causes of war in general must first 
be understood. Only after one recognized the inherent 
qualities in mankind which were conducive to war could 
one hope to view the diplomacy of 18?1 through 1914 in a 
proper perspective.
Having disposed of these, the "basic" causes of all 
wars, the sociologist-historian enumerated the remote 
causes of the World War under four broad and interrelated
123Harry E. Barnes, The Genesis of the World War 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), p. xii.
^^4Ibid., p. 705,
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headings: economic and commercial rivalry, nationalism
and patriotism, military and naval armaments and the
129rival alliance systems.
Economically, Great Britain bore the greatest guilt.
The Industrial Revolution hit Germany, and in manufact­
uring, commerce and shipping, she challenged the erstwhile 
British monopoly and evoked animosities heretofore re­
served for France. Moreover, Germany was gradually replacing 
Russia as Great Britain’s greatest competitor in the Wear 
East. The term, ’’guilt," however, was not correctly 
applied to either England or Germany in this instance 
since the former merely wished to retain the status quo
126against the ambitions of the latter. Nationalistically,
none of the European states had a clean bill of health. 
Perhaps, Barnes suggested, France was most guilty, but her 
guilt was merely one of degree, Militaristically, Germany 
was no better nor worse than the other European powers.
The German Army Bill of 1913# generally credited by Entente 
historians with starting the armaments race anew, was, in 
fact, implemented sixteen days after the French Army Law 
was laid before the Chamber of Deputies.^^7 After 1902 
when the Italo-French conversations had the affect of 
extricating Italy from the Triple Alliance, the systems 
were not equal. During the decade immediately proceeding
^^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p.
1 pAIbid.. pp. i)-9-5o.
^^7lbid.a p. 66.
193
the war, the Triple Alliance had become an "empty shell" 
even for purposes of defense, while the Entente grew 
steadily stronger. It was no wonder, Barnes commented, 
that Germany balked at suggestions of armament control,
128"The encirclement theory had been vindicated."
Of all possible sources of friction in Europe bet­
ween 1871 and 191^, the French desire for revanche was 
the most important just ahead of the Russian desire to 
control the Straits, Poincare and other French militarists 
exploited the Russian desire for the Straits, equating it 
with the French demand for the restoration of Alsace and 
Lorraine, Another source of unrest was the Moroccan 
question in which Germany did no more than demand an inter­
national conference before the partition of the North 
African territory. The chief significance of the Moroccan 
question was that it strengthened the bonds of the Triple 
Entente.
Barnes, however, pointed to the Bosnian crisis of 
1906 as the most significant of all single events in the 
diplomacy which led to the war. Repudiating her historic 
position as protector of the Balkan Slavs, Russia, through 
her foreign minister, Isvolsky, proposed to Austria-Hungary 
that she annex the Serbian provinces in return for Austria's 
support in securing the Straits from the "Sick Man."
Austria forthwith annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but to 
Isvolsky's chagrin, Britain prevented Russia from attaining
^^®Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 70-73.
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her end of the bargain. Isvolsky then secured the appoint­
ment as Russian ambassador to Paris where he Immediately 
began to "plot" with the French Revanchards led by Poln- 
car^. The French Prime Minister and the Russian Ambassador 
designed a joint program through which the Straits might 
be secured for Russia, and Alsace and Lorraine would be 
restored to France. The negotiations between Isvolsky 
and Poincare, according to Barnes, constituted the most 
Important "phase" In the genesis of the World War.^^^
The basic thread connecting the underlying and Im­
mediate causes, according to Barnes, was the Russian 
desire to control the Straits, When Isvolsky joined 
hands with the "Poincare clique," the peace of Europe 
was threatened. To Insure permanence In his bellicose 
foreign policy, Poincare resigned the premiership In 
favor of the presidency. Complete cooperation between 
Russia and France was made certain when Delcasse re­
placed Georges Louis as French ambassador In St. Peters­
burg. England was brought Into line by the Grey-Chambon 
correspondence In I912, and the Anglo-Russlan naval con­
vention In 1914 set the stage for the World War. All 
that remained was the casus belli which was quickened 
when. In 19l4> the Tsar received the Serbian premier and 
encouraged Serbian nationalistic ambitions, promising 
Russian aid In the event of war. The casus belli was 
short In coming.
^^'^Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 83-87.
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The Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, accord­
ing to Barnes, was drafted in form if not in detail in 
the French foreign office. The reply which ostensibly 
accepted the Austrian demands, was in reality an outright 
rejection. Still, Austria was not justified in her rash
130action.
Germany, Barnes admitted, did tender her ally a 
"blank check" on July but it was not a blanket en­
dorsement of all future Austrian actions. It referred 
only to the Serbian question. When Russian mobilization 
threatened a general European war, Germany pressed Austria 
to reconsider her action, but Berchtold was irreconcilable 
until July 31 when it was too late because of the "fatal" 
Russian mobilization. The Austrian war on Serbia did not 
necessitate a European war as was so often charged. On 
the contrary, it was the "unjustifiable" Russian inter­
vention that produced the wider conflict.
Germany, Barnes maintained, had absolutely nothing 
to gain from a European war in 1914j she had everything 
to gain from peace. The Anglo-German rivalry had for the 
moment subsided after agreements concluded in 191 -̂j the 
German imperialistic venture in the Balkans, the Bagdad 
Railroad, was running smoothly. The best indication of 
German public opinion, the I912 elections, proved that 
the German masses were pacifically inclined. In that
^^^Barnes, The Genesis of,,., pp. 221-23.
^^^Ibid,, p. 22ij.,
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year, eight of eleven million votes went to candidates
from the Center, Radical and Social Democratic parties,
each of which was inalterably opposed to militarism.
Although the Kaiser looked upon Serbia as a "band of
132robbers that must be seized for its crimes," the 
German ruling classes generally opposed war. William 
II favored only a punitive war against Serbia. In grant­
ing his "blank check," he emulated Poincare’s 1912 and 
1914 guarantees to Russia, the difference being that 
Poincare gave his later assurances knowing full well a
133European war would result,
Germany worked steadily for peace throughout the 
crisis of I914» Although mobilization was acknowledged 
by Germany, France and Russia as tantamount to a declara­
tion of war, Germany did not declare war until forty-eight 
hours after what amounted to the Russian declaration.
The Kaiser then tried to localize the conflict in the East 
by obtaining French and English neutrality. Two days 
before Germany’s invasion of Belgium, however, France and 
Great Britain had promised Russia support. More than any 
other European diplomat, William II endeavored to preserve 
the peace in the critical days of July and August, 19l4»^^^ 
The responsibility for the hasty Russian mobilization 
rested on the shoulders of the Tsar, Isvolsky and Sazonov
^^%arnes. The Genesis of..., p. 2^0.
133lbid., p. 222.
13^Ibid., pp. 300-03.
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who, in 1916, admitted that the war was brought on by 
France and Russia to humiliate Germany.
The accession of Poincare to the premiership in 
1912 had committed France to a program of revenge. By 
October, 1914, England was congenial to the general pro­
gram which called, in addition to the restoration of 
Alsace and Lorraine, for the seizure of the Saar Basin 
and the creation of an independent Rhineland under French 
protection. Because French obligations to Russia under 
the Dual Alliance were not even debated in the Chamber 
of Deputies before plunging into war, Barnes charged 
that responsibility for the French actions rested solely 
upon the shoulders of Poincare and a few of his lieutenants 
The autocracy over foreign affairs was more stringent in
-1 g ̂
France than in Russia, Austria or Germany in 19l4«
Although Russian mobilization actually precipitated the 
war, France was equally guilty. She was not bound under 
the terms of the Dual Alliance; Russian prior mobilization 
released her from her obligations, a fact Poincare kept 
carefully hidden from the French masses in 1914.^^^
The key to British action, Barnes maintained, was 
the determination to go to war if France did. Grey him­
self was for peace in the "abstract,” but he promised 
France and Russia aid and led Germany to believe England
IB^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p. 373» 
13&Ibid.. p. 438.
^^?Ibid., p. 441•
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would remain neutral. Great Britain, by the end of July, 
however, refused to pledge her neutrality even in the 
face of German promises to keep clear of Belgium and 
France, Since the offer had been made, England was not 
bound by her Entente commitments. Belgium was no issue 
except for world opinion. The case of Grey in IÇl^,
Barnes asserted, was illustrative of the "disasters which 
befall a country which entrusts its destiny to a well- 
meaning but vacillating and indecisive man and an ignorant, 
stupid and naive diplomat."
That the Barnes thesis of war guilt was not accept­
able even to some other revisionists was illustrated in 
a review of his book by Charles A. Beard, a moderate ex­
ponent of the new interpretation. Accepting Barnes* view 
of the remote causes of the war. Beard parted company with 
the uncompromising revisionist when the transcendent im­
portance of personalities in his work became apparent.
From the incisive Barnes account, Beard wrote, the "Sunday 
school theory," that which maintained three innocent boys, 
Russia, France and England, were suddenly accosted by 
two villains, Germany and Austria, who had long been 
plotting cruel deeds in the dark, was "exploded,
No "sane" person could feel the guilt clause of the peace
^^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 579"80.
^^^Charles A. Beard, "Heroes and Villians of the 
War,"Review of The Genesis of the World War, by Harry 
Elmer Barnes, Current History, XXIV, No, 5 (August,
1926), 733.
iterlally advanced the cause of peace In
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treaty was just. Beyond that, all was debatable, "If 
there is peril in the attempt to enforce the Versailles 
theory of responsibility...there is equal danger in attempt­
ing to whitewash the German ruling classes.
From the materials on hand in 1926, Beard wrote that 
it was clear that the German government, egged on by the 
Kaiser, a "Divine Right" monarch angry over the death of 
a member of the Hapsburg ruling house, granted Austria a 
"blank check," That Entente politicians refused oppor­
tunities by which peace might have been maintained was 
true, but the evidence did not substantiate Barnes’ con­
tention that the attitude of the German governing class 
mal
Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow were no better nor worse 
than Poincare, Grey or Sazonov. Barnes' effort to con­
vince Americans that European quarrels should be viewed 
with open eyes was commendable, but "to shift heroes and 
villains only confuses the issue.
In a review entitled "Menckenized History," Barnes 
was taken to task for succumbing to the temptation to 
"debunk" simply because that was the literary vogue.
Vociferous and sweeping denunciations of 
existing beliefs, customs, standards and insti­
tutions is the current mode, and 'revisionism' 
is merely one of its phases...Never before has 
the fretful energy of the slam-bang and slap-
^^^Beard, Current History, XXIV, No. 5s 733» 
l^^lbid., p. 73l|. 
ll(.2ibid,, p. 735.
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dash radicals been so amply rewarded.
The only value of the book, according to the re­
viewer, was that It might stir some historians out of 
complacency so that the problem of war responsibility 
might be considered by someone other than a "revision­
ist.” The book, which was not the Intended "bombshell" 
but a "dud," was not history. It was a violent harangue 
to a jury which was asked to shift the blame from the 
defendants to the accusers, Barnes, the reviewer charged,
was overladen with his material and could not Intelll- 
]li%gently use It.
In 1927, Barnes maintained that the revisionist 
view had become thoroughly vindicated, particularly with 
respect to the guilt of France, Russia and Serbia. While 
the case against those powers was materially strengthened, 
Barnes contended that the case against the Dual Monarchy 
had become less strong. Austria faced three alterna­
tives In 191^: acquiescence In gradual extinction, sec­
uring Serbian submission to the ultimatum or war against 
Serbia, The most damaging fact to the Entente thesis 
of Austrian war guilt to come to light since the pub­
lication of The Genesis of the World War, Barnes maintained, 
was proof of the Austrian promise to Russia to refrain 
from dismembering Serbia permanently, a fact Sazonov
j, Ghent, "Menckenized History," Review of 
The Genesis of the World War, by H. E. Barnes, The Outlook, 
GXLIII, No. 1 (June 23, I926), 286.
l^^Ibld., p. 287.
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carefully concealed from St, Petersburg and Paris,
Barnes abandoned the position he had assumed in a IÇSij. 
periodical article wherein he placed Austria first in 
relative responsibility. In 1927* Austria was fourth 
after Serbia, Russia and France in that order.
After it became evident that Germany could no longer 
be considered solely guilty of precipitating the war, 
Barnes wrote, the defenders of the wartime verdict aban­
doned their defense of Article 231 and based their indict­
ment on the charge that Germany was principally respon­
sible for creating the conditions in which the war arose 
in 1914* Germany was in no way exonerated from her share 
of the blame in creating the fundamental causes, but far 
from first in relative responsibility, Barnes argued, she 
stood with England as least g u i l t y . R u s s i a  was the 
one great power immediately responsible for the war. Her 
decision for mobilization was made July 24, a full three 
days before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia,
In spite of her precipitate mobilization, Russia’s posi­
tion might have been defensible had her’a been an "honor­
able cause," but it was not unless the forcible seizure 
of the Straits was considered honorable,
^^^Harry E, Barnes, "A Revised Verdict on the Guilt 
of Nations for the World War," Current History, XXVI,
No. S (August, 1927), 684-85.
^^^See Harry E. Barnes, "Assessing the Blame for 
the World War," Current History, XX, No. 2 (May, 1924),
171-95.
^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5, 685.
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Barnes* 1Ç27 opinion of Grey was somewhat Improved over 
that expressed in his book a year earlier. Neither was 
the British Foreign Minister the knight in shining armor 
portrayed by Schmitt nor the Machiavelli claimed by the 
most Anglophobe historians. Grey and his advisors were 
constant sources of encouragement to the French and 
Russians, although "probably inadvertently."^^® If it 
was in the British national interest to enter the con­
flict on the Entente side, the British documents proved 
that Grey and company played their cards with great skill. 
If, on the other hand, they wished to avoid war, the Eng­
lish diplomats behaved with "the utmost--even criminal'—  
stupidity." Had Grey chosen to declare England's position 
publically, there would probably not have been a war.^^^ 
Serbia, France and Russia, Barnes asserted, were the only 
states that desired a general European war; Austria wished 
only a punitive war; Italy, England and Germany opposed 
any kind of conflict, and after July 26, IÇl^, "Germany 
withdrew her support from Austria.
Europe, Barnes maintained in 1927, was still gov­
erned by wartime prejudices and hatreds. It was, he 
noted, somewhat incongruous to attempt the erection of 
Locarno on the foundations of Versailles. The chief
^^®Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 693-94»
^^^Harry E. Barnes, "England Arraigns Herself,"
The Nation, GXXV, No. 324 (August 17, 1927), I63.
^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5» 697*
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obstacles to peace, as he prophetically viewed them in
1927, were the South Tyrol, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor,
Silesia, Bessarbia, a dismembered Hungary, the forbidden
Austro-German customs union and an outlawed Russia, all
l*7l"products of a peace treaty founded on flagrant lies." ^
Barnes was not the sole exponent of the uncompromising 
revisionist position, although he was the most productive. 
Perhaps as vocal in his defense of Germany was Francis 
Neilson, an English editor transplanted on American shores. 
As early as 1923, Neilson urged that scholars in all 
nations search deep into the workings of the pre-war 
European system to discover what it was that made it 
possible for "ministers and diplomats to wreck a con­
tinent and destroy its y o u t h . A t  the start of the 
war, Neilson noted, the American people had been rela­
tively open-minded concerning the causes of the war.
The change had been a direct result of the many-sided 
efforts of the war propagandists to instill in the Am­
erican mind one "fact"--sole German war guilt.
Russia, Neilson contended, was immediately respon­
sible for the war. No matter how much Austria was to 
blame for her obstinacy in refusing to accept the Serbian 
reply to her ultimatum, Russian intervention rendered 
any attempt at peaceful solution impossible. In the
^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5, 697-98.
^^^Prancis Neilson, Duty to Civilization (New York:
B. W, Huebsch, I923), pp. 11-12.
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end, after Austria accepted the proposal for mediation,
it was Russia, not Germany, that drew England, France
1S3and Belgium into the conflict.
Neilson preached the necessity of reopening the 
question of war guilt. Bismark and Gladstone, he asserted, 
had agreed that the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine hy 
Germany in I87I was detrimental to the peace of Europe.
The military party in Prussia was responsible for the 
terms of I87I, and the Entente militarists were respon­
sible for the terms of 19ll|. "If the peace of I87I was 
a danger to Europe, what sort of danger," Neilson asked,
"is the Peace of Paris?" The only way another European 
conflagration could be avoided was for the Entente nations
to admit their "error" and draft a new peace treaty— one
lEliwithout a guilt clause, ^
Reviewing the Gooch-Temperley collection of British 
documents then being published, William L. Langer of 
Clark University added his voice to those of the uncom­
promising revisionists charging France with responsibil­
ity. The British documents, he asserted, strengthened 
earlier suspicions of Poincare and pointed to his actions 
as the least savory of any of the principal igi^ European 
statesmen.
The French President's rejection of Grey's proposal 
for "direct conversations" between St. Petersburg and
^•^^Neilson, pp. 83-87' 
^^^Ibid, , pp. Illj.-15.
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Vienna as '’dangerous” was, according to Langer, at the 
root of the problem» Poincare advocated outside Inter­
vention, fashioning himself from the very outset the 
champion of Entente solidarity. He repeatedly expressed 
the need to keep Sazonov firm. The attitude adopted by 
Poincare and, at his behest, Sazonov was that Russia could 
not back down. France's policy. Langer asserted, was 
cleverly and tactfully designed to make a good Impression 
at home and, above all. In England. France took her stand 
at the outset and held to It consistently throughout.
Her policy left the Central Powers only two alternatlves-- 
humiliation or war.
As Illustrated above, all of the post-1920 American 
scholars concerned with war responsibility were not re­
visionists. In the early 1920's, In fact, the diplo­
matic evidence to support such a position was relatively 
meagre. Pay's 1920-1921 articles In the American His­
torical Review and the archival revelations flooding 
Europe convinced Increasing numbers of American histor­
ians that the blacks and #iltes painted by the Entente 
apologists were at best greys, but still few Americans 
were willing to attack the foundation of the Versailles 
Treaty— the war guilt clause. In the early 1920's, a few 
writers, notably journalists like Nock and Neilson, sounded 
the note upon which many professional historians soon
l^^willlam L. Langer, "French Policy In I91I4.,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. Ï4.O (April
30, 1927), 7Ü1-Ü2.
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wrote. As the documentary evidence concerning the origins 
of the war and memoirs of the wartime statesmen became 
more profuse, the number propounding a revisionist thesis 
grew proportionately until by the mid-1930's, the "mod­
erates," the most notable of whom was Fay, claimed a major­
ity of American historians as followers.
There were some who ignored the latest documentary 
evidence, labelling it German or Bolshevik propaganda, 
and continued to write on the basis of the evidence offered 
in the wartime belligerent apologies. As late as 1930, 
it was evident with the appearance of Schmitt's two volume 
work on the war's background that an interpretation other 
than revisionist might be gleaned from the post-war dis­
closures. Schmitt was joined by Seymour, Plorinsky and 
others who cited the latest findings in support of the 
antithesis of the revisionist position.
That the moderate revisionist view of the war's 
origins had gained the upper hand by the 1930's was evi­
denced by its espousal by most general historians con­
cerned with the period. Of these, Schevill, whose work 
was originally published in the 1920's and revised in 
each succeeding decade, Walter Langsam and Erik Achorn 
of the 1930's and Black and Helmreich of the 19^0's 
have been examined and found to adhere generally to 
the moderate revisionist theory of World War I respon­
sibility.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the controversy over war res­
ponsibility passed through four loosely-defined phases.
The first phase witnessed the circulation of the "colored 
books" and secondary sources authored by Europeans designed 
to sway American opinion in favor of one side or the other. 
The ideas embodied in the initial belligerent apologies 
had been current among Europeans for several decades and 
were similar to the suspicions that gave birth to the 
"war scares" of 1875 and 1877. To the French mind, German 
militarism, personified in von Moltke and William II, was 
bent on conquering the world as it had Alsace and Lorraine. 
In England, Germany was feared as a colonial and economic 
rival and recognized relatively early as a power which, 
if left alone, might challenge the virtual British monopoly 
in the Near East and on the high seas. To Russian statesmen 
after I908, Germany was seen as the driving force behind 
Austrian moves in the Balkans where a conflict with Pan- 
Slavism was imminent. In each of the early Entente apolo­
gies, Germany played the villain's role.
The German defense, on the other hand, was not dir­
ected at any one of the Allied powers but at all three 
collectively. The fear of revanche appeared vindicated 
by the Boulanger crisis in France. When Russia shifted 
her interests to the Balkans and the Near East after her
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humiliating defeat by Japan, concern was expressed in some 
German quarters lest all Europe fall under the domination 
of the Slavic hordes. After consummation of the Entente 
Cordiale, Germany feared Great Britain, but with the death 
of the Germanophobe, Edward VII, and the agreement delim­
iting spheres in the Near East, Anglo-German tensions 
were ostensibly eased, and officials felt Great Britain 
might remain neutral in any future war. Nevertheless 
in the hastily-prepared early statements, German apolo­
gists, for want of a better scapegoat, exploited the 
"encirclement theory" to exonerate Germany of the blame 
for causing the war. The motivations for the Entente 
actions were the French desire for revenge, Russian aggres­
sive aims in the Near East and English envy of German 
commercial prowess.
In the second phase of the controversy, the basic 
arguments were so contorted and exaggerated that each 
side was charged with all conceivable barbarities. His­
torians the world over had lost the power to reason out 
the war’s origins. From l^l4 through 1920, American war 
guilt scholars for a number of reasons seconded almost 
unanimously the official Entente theory of responsibility. 
Because of a similar cultural background and a decided 
paucity of reliable information by which both sides of the 
story might be told, British propaganda found a receptive 
audience in the United States, and even before the American 
entry in I917, the efforts of American historians were
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hardly in keeping with the presidential proclamation of 
neutrality. With American implication in "Europe’s War," 
a concerted drive was launched to mold dissident groups 
into a conforming public amenable to a successful pro­
secution of the war. To the historian under the intel­
lectual mobilization fell the task of revising traditional 
historical views so that the Allies might appear in the 
most favorable light possible. To this end, the American 
historical profession, almost to a man, lent its services.
Scholars, caught in the mass hysteria of war, were 
guilty of acknowledging all sorts of absurdities which, 
in retrospect, appear incredible. Germany, as in the 
early Allied apologies, played the part of the villain.
She had clandestinely plotted the war to achieve her 
diabolical ends without regard for her neighbors in the 
European family. Austria was a "cat’s paw" of Pan-Ger­
manism whose ultimate goal was the conquest of the world. 
The plan by which that goal was to be realized was devised 
by the Kaiser and his henchmen at Potsdam on July 5»19l4* 
This was the basic American text, although some of the more 
talented of the Entente mythologists added a few novel 
twists. When the fabrications of the wartime students of 
responsibility were given legal sanction at Versailles, 
"asininity triumphed."^
It was the unprecedented rapidity with which the
^Clarence W. Alvord, "Historical Science and the 
War Guilt," The American Mercury, XI, No. lj.3 (July, I927),
324.
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archives of first Russia, Austria and Germany and later 
France and Great Britain were opened that caused the 
shift in historical opinion. The opening of the European 
repositories and seven years of exhaustive scholarship 
therein constituted a third phase, an exploratory period, 
in the war guilt debate. It prepared the way for the 
fourth phase where scholars could presumably approach the 
problem free from external pressures. Seldom in the annals 
of historiography had there been so rapid and complete a 
reversal in historical consensus as that which followed 
the opening of the European archives. A world-wide phenom­
enon, it was particularly apparent in the United States 
where, during the war, there had been such conformity of 
opinion concerning war responsibility.
After 1920, the lines were drawn between the several 
"schools" of American students of the war's origins. The 
first included those who closed their eyes to the recent 
revelations, conveniently branding them Bolshevik or Ger­
man propaganda. A second group included those who cited 
the latest evidence but used it to substantiate the I919 
version of responsibility. The third category encompassed 
the revisionist#— those who felt the Central Powers had been 
wronged by the guilty verdict handed down by the victors 
at Versailles. To these historians, the most pressing 
problem facing civilization was the revision of the 
"Carthaginian Treaty" to which Germany's signature had 
been extorted at the point of a bayonet. The American
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exponents of the new interpretation logically fell into 
two sub-divisions: the "moderates" who felt all of the 
belligerents were responsible for the war, and the un­
compromising revisionists who maintained that the Central 
Powers were innocent in l^l^.
In contrast to the earlier period of the war guilt 
controversy, the origins of the war began to be considered 
in the light of historical trends rather than through the 
personality quirks of individual statesmen. Furthermore, 
an understanding of the "Twelve Days," was no longer ade­
quate if one wished to fathom the real reasons for the 
war. Hundreds--indeed thousands--of forces had operated 
on those twelve days which scholars had examined minutely 
to solve a problem the answer to which lay hidden in the 
past. As one writer so aptly put it, "In those days, it 
was not the living, but the all-powerful generations of 
the dead who acted."
Although there was a commendable trend toward con­
sideration of fundamental causes before assessing res­
ponsibility for the war, the criticisms directed at the 
early war guilt scholars are often equally applicable to 
later students of the subject. It has been noted above 
that early American scholars of the war's beginnings were 
motivated largely by national, racial or institutional 
biases rather than by a sincere desire to tell the truth. 
After 1917, patriotic responsibilities overshadowed in- 
2Alvord, The American Mercury, XI, No. ij.3, 326.
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tellectual responsibilities and often debased the end 
products of American historians. Distorted Judgments were 
the rule among early students of war origins. Most of them 
were guilty of ascertaining responsibility before discern­
ing the facts. In the case of the earlier students of the 
subject, reliable documentary evidence was scarce enough 
that an interpretation holding Germany solely guilty for 
causing the war might be condoned.
For many of the later American historians, however. 
Justification for the position they assumed is more diffi­
cult to find. The post-war students in many instances 
were as unbalanced as had been their predecessors. No 
longer did mere words suffice as evidence as was illust­
rated by the varying interpretations assigned to identical 
documents. Many of the scholars publishing after I920 
were guilty of omitting whatever evidence might tend to 
refute their general thesis. To Barnes, Germany was 
innocent, and the most important event underlying the 
war was the Buchlau conversations. On the other hand, 
Schmitt, who purported to examine all of the evidence 
bearing on the outbreak of the war and who felt that 
Germany was guilty on the basis of that evidence, com­
pletely ignored the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal talks in his work. 
With such contradictions apparent in the works of scholarly 
writers, it was small wonder that the "pseudo-scientific"
dispute was deemed as "useful to society as English fox 
hunting."3 Although both Barnes and Schmitt paid lip
^Alvord, The American Mercury, XI, No, k.3, 32k*
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service to the distinction originally made by Thucydides 
in his history of the Peloponnesian Wars, neither of them 
"practiced what he preached." Of a total of 737 pages in 
his volume on war guilt, Barnes devoted exactly eighty- 
seven to what might be termed remote causes. Schmitt, for 
all practical purposes, wrote off the fundamental causes 
in practice. Of the three outstanding American post-war 
scholars, only Pay accorded to underlying causes in pra­
ctice the importance all three acknowledged in theory.
Nearly all of those who wrote on war responsibility 
after 1920, like their wartime colleagues, adopted a point 
of view before beginning their investigation. Vfith Schmitt, 
it was the conviction that the Versailles version of re­
sponsibility was just, and he ignored those facts that 
might tend to refute that allegation. To Barnes, Article 
231 was an anathema, and the assertion of German innocence 
was the overriding characteristic of his contributions to 
the great debate. Barnes, however, did not attack the 
philosophy behind the treaty as did Fay. It was German 
guilt, not "sole guilt" that bothered Barnes. Having 
cleared Germany to his own satisfaction, he merely attached 
the guilty appelation to another party. As Charles A.
Beard commented, he merely shifted villains. Fay, on the 
other hand, argued in terms of "relative responsibility," 
not "guilt," a term which connoted a prior inclination.
He disavowed attempts by any scholar to attach the "guilt" 
to any one nation or man. Moreover, he maintained that
2lk
if it could be scientifically apportioned, the degree of 
guilt would be different for the fundamental causes from 
the immediate causes. To Fay, there was no war "guilt."
The conflict was a manifestation of human society in action. 
There was no more guilt involved in causing the war than 
in any other aspect of a changing civilization.
Both the wartime and post-war students of the war's 
origins were equally guilty of using vague terms without 
bothering to define them. For example, there were few #io 
suggested what was meant by militarism, navalism, Pan- 
Germanism, Pan-Slavism, hegemony or encirclement. Re­
sponsibility or guilt meant very little if the scholar 
did not reveal the context in which he used the term.
If the jargon used by the students of war responsibility 
had been adequately defined, the suspicion that many of 
the "scholarly" accounts would break down is probably well- 
founded.
Besides the subjectivity that permeated the dis­
cussion of the events leading to the war, historians gen­
erally insisted upon passing moral judgments on the men 
whom they studied. If wartime scholars attributed incred­
ible characteristics to the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg, 
later historians were as guilty in their discussions of 
Sazonov, Isvolsky, Poincare and Grey. Had both the early 
and later writers given human fallibility more consid­
eration in their treatments of the war's beginnings, the 
end product would have been more palatable. Blundering
21^
was a better explanation for the war in 191^ than scheming. 
By few historians was there a real effort to discover the 
ideas that prevailed in that fateful summer. Instead, 
scholars tried to generalize on the actions of individual 
statesmen through an idea attributed collectively to his 
predecessors. In other words, the events of I914 were 
viewed by wartime and post-war scholars alike as one aspect 
of an infinitely larger picture. If the earlier writers 
on war responsibility read the expansionist theories of 
Treitschke and Bernhardi and applied them to explain the 
actions of German officials in 191^, later scholars, par­
ticularly the uncompromising revisionists, viewed the 
events leading up to the war as a part of a long range 
"plot." It was easy and apparently fruitful to take the 
French idea of revanche or the traditional Russian desire 
for control of the Straits and apply them as the motiva­
ting factors behind the actions of the two Entente powers.
If one reads a pro-German historian, he is likely 
to be impressed with the importance of "Gallic excita­
bility" in assessing the responsibility for the war. On 
the other hand, by a pro-Entente scholar one can expect 
"Prussian militarism," "Junkerdom" or Pan-Germanism to be 
accorded a position of predominant importance. The gen­
eralizations applied to national character by most students 
of the war’s origins, although they might be substantiated 
in isolated instances, very simply do not stand up to 
critical analysis. Traditional historical methodology
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was cast out of the window by many learned scholars because 
the actions of Individuals in pre-l^l^ Europe were more 
easily explained by vague and meaningless "national char­
acteristics." Until 1928, there was a decided need for 
the reinstitution of traditional historical methodology 
to discover the real causes of the war. That need was 
satisfied in the United States by Fay, who, to all outward 
appearances, approached the problem of responsibility with 
an open mind and a sincere desire to discover the truth.
His efforts performed in the United States the same service 
as those of Gooch in England, Renouvin in France and 
Albertini in Italy,
Whether the Barnes, Fay or Schmitt interpretation of 
the war's origins is the proper one is still debated in 
some quarters, although Pay’s "divided responsibility" 
thesis has been accepted generally by professional his­
torians. Perhaps the most fruitful and lasting result of 
the post-war controversy was the final and complete repudi­
ation of the war-time theories of responsibility which 
rested largely upon emotional conjecture, not historical 
fact.
The contradictory conclusions arrived at by the later 
students of the subject can be attributed to a number of 
reasons. Because the proliferation of new evidence con­
tinued almost until the outbreak of World War II, many 
of the American scholars of responsibility, the majority 
of whom published during the 1920's, were unable to take
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advantage of the later releases. Furthermore, some scholars, 
even as late as the 1930's, found it extremely difficult 
to divest themselves of partisanship and drew conclusions 
which were not warranted by the facts.
At any rate, it is generally agreed by the world’s 
historians that the guilt for World War I can no longer 
be laid exclusively at the door of Germany or any other 
nation for that matter. Revisionism, failed of its ultimate 
goal--a de jure recognition by the architects of Versailles 
of their ’'error’’--but it succeeded in convincing the world’s 
scholars that no one nation could be saddled with responsi­
bility for the ’’Great War.”
The triumph of National Socialism in Germany and 
World War II gave rise to a cry for reconsideration of 
the revisionist position. In some historical circles-- 
few to be sure since most scholars had learned a lesson 
from World War I— a mild reaction against the revisionist 
theory of responsibility manifested itself. Again the 
Versailles version of guilt appeared to answer current 
problems, and scholars in various nations announced the 
discovery of new, incriminating evidence vindicating the 
1919 verdict. That evidence has not been forthcoming.
The thorough-going publication of the French documents, 
the completion of the British collection in I938 and other 
recent revelations have done nothing to alter the view that 
the moderate revisionist view is the proper interpretation 
of the war’s origins. The most recent critical analyses
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of the-years leading to the conflict bear out Fay’s asser­
tion that the only view worthy of the scholar is that which 
holds all of the major European powers accountable for 
World War
^See Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War.
3 vols. Translated and edited by Isabella M.
Massey. London; Oxford University Press, 1952-57»
Albertini, an Italian scholar, tended toward the 
Schmitt view that Germany was perhaps more responsi­
ble for the European War than the other powers, but 
that each of the belligerents because of misunder­
standings, misplaced suspicions, inadvertent blunders 
or reluctance to act when action was necessary bore 
some measure of responsibility. Unfortunately, Alber­
tini ’s untimely death prevented his writing the last 
chapter to his three volumes which was to have been 
devoted to assessment of relative responsibility.
His thesis, however, agrees with that of Pay that 
no power deliberately willed the war, but that all, 
in a greater or lesser degree, contributed to it.
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